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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the Staff Planning and Decision Support
System (SPADS). The analysis presented uses the Modular Command and Control
Evaluation Structure (MCES), a structured approach to evaluate C2 systems using
standard and evolving operational research tools. The analysis answered the
following three problems by assessing the effectiveness of SPADS. Did SPADS
provide the V Corps commander and his staff with the ability to exercise command
and control of combat assets to meet overall mission objectives? Did SPADS
demonstrate that the dispersed command post concept enhanced command
survivability? Did SPADS evolve as a command and control force effectiveness
system for the V Corps DCP based upon operational lessons learned? Appropriate
measures of performance, effectiveness, and force effectiveness were identified to
answer these problems. These measures and their assessment are presented as a
strawman for consideration by the analytical community. As SPADS evolved from
August 1981 to March 1985, it provided distinct advantages to the V Corps
commander and his staff in terms of effective C^ mission orientation, enhanced
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The purpose of this thesis is to present an analysis of the Staff Planning and Decision
Support System (SPADS). This system was a Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
exploratory development initiative in response to U.S. Army requirements for Command,
Control and Communication (C3 ) survivability of theater nuclear forces. The V Corps
dispersed command post (DCP) concept was the basis for enhancing survivability. In its
acquisition, SPADS represents an evolutionary development with each phase based upon
the results of lessons learned during field exercises in central West Germany.
The analysis presented uses the Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure
(MCES) to assess the effectiveness of SPADS. MCES is a structured approach to evaluate
C3 systems using standard and evolving operational research tools. Previous applications
of MCES at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have focused on theater-level and higher
C2 issues. A common characteristic of these analyses was the future focus on evaluating
systems and testbeds. This is the first MCES-based evaluation of a tactical C3 system that
evolved from its conceptual stage to operational performance.
A. MCES EVOLUTION
The initial development of MCES grew out of a challenge to determine the force
effectiveness of C2 systems. A methodology was needed to describe C2 systems
architecture which would allow analysts to measure C2 systems response and attribute the
effectiveness of that response to the elements and/or structural relationships which form the
C2 system [Ref. l:p. 13], In 1984 Dr. Ricki Sweet and Lt. Col. Thomas Fagan III chaired
a conference which focused on identifying issues and topics an analyst would address
when evaluating a C2 system in terms of its contribution to force effectiveness. Five
working groups were formed to address the following subjects: Definitions, Conceptual
Models, the Identification of Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), Evaluation Techniques
and Approaches, and an overall appraisal of the current status and future course of MOE
analysts [Ref. l:pp 24-27].
Subsequent workshops and conferences further defined expressed interests in and the
need for further attention to C2 systems. A "strawman" was developed by Drs. Morton
Metersky, Michael Sovereign and Ricki Sweet to provide a framework for effectiveness
analysts and deliberation at the 1985 Military Operations Research Sv cL;y (MORS)
sponsored workshop. This led to the publishing of an integrated document describing
MCES in June 1986.
MCES was designed to be applicable to any C2 system, to be modified or altered to fit
any C2 system of interest. MCES methodology continues to evolve in order to resolve key
C2 issues. New C2 tools and models have been identified, developed and integrated into
MCES.
Numerous efforts at NPS have been directed towards the application of MCES to
various command and control issues. During the last two years, six master's of science
degree theses have been completed using MCES at NPS. These theses spanned the range
from applying MCES as a framework for acquistion management to analyzing the
Identification Friend, Foe or Neutral (IFFN) Joint Testbed to evaluating C2 components of
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) architecture.
B . MCES METHODOLOGY
MCES was developed during the 1980s as a structured approach to evaluate C2
systems and architectures. MCES defines "architecture" as a description of an integrated
set of systems whose physical entities, structure, and functions are coherently related. This
representation of the architecture provides the ability to measure the C2 system response
and its effectiveness in directing forces to accomplish their mission. MCES uses standard
and evolving operations research tools, and attempts to integrate previous, diverse efforts
of decision makers and analysts to provide a concise C2 evaluation structure [Ref. l:p. 13].
MCES is composed of seven sequential modules which guide an analyst through a
comprehensive C2 evaluation. Figure 1.1 presents the graphic structure of MCES
methodology.
The first module is used by both the analyst and the operational user to specify the
particular C2 problem. The next three modules employ the terminology and theory of
MCES to describe the C2 system architecture. This permits the analyst to model the C2
system and its operation. The methodology integrates the physical elements of the system
with its process functions into a structural framework. In the fifth module, measures are
identified, based upon the C2 system bounding, which will be used to evaluate the C2
architecture. The sixth module requires appropriate data for measurement. The seventh
module aggregates and evaluates the results for presentation to the decision maker [Ref.
2:pp. 10-23]. (A more detailed explanation of how MCES is applied is provided in
Appendix D.)
C. SPADS BACKGROUND
The U.S. Army V Corps, headquartered in Frankfurt, West Germany, attempted to
employ a dispersed command post (DCP) configuration in the early 1980s. Despite early
success with concepts and their employment, the corps was constrained by Army hardware





















Figure 1.1. Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure
Planning (TAP) microcomputer workstations, V Corps requested assistance from DNA for
the implementation of their DCP concept. In September 1981, DNA introduced the Staff
Planning and Decision Support (SPADS) system at V Corps as the focus of its
"Exploratory Development Program (EDP) in Support of TNF C3 Survivability (Support
of V Corps/8ID Dispersed Command Post)." DNA employed V Corps as the proof of
concept experiment (POCE) testbed for SPADS from September 1981 through December
1984. V Corps energetically used this evolutionary command and control system in every
field training and command post exercise throughout the 1980s.
The dispersed command post concept was the basis for enhancing survivability. V
Corps Headquarters operated from dispersed cells, representing the traditional Corps
Tactical Operations Center (CTOC), rather than from one large center that could present a
lucrative target. The communications links between and among the dispersed cells were
provided by the Army's Tactical Area Switching System (TASS).
SPADS was a distributed information processing system that supported C3 functions
at multiple geographic locations. The system was designed for use in vans, tents,
buildings, or armored command vehicles by functional staff personnel and commanders.
The SPADS architecture consisted of a co-located group of staff duty stations linked by a
local area network to form a module. Several modules were then interconnected by
communication gateways through Army tactical communications to form a distributed,
wide area network. The capabilities of the staff duty stations consisted of text editing,
electronic mail, graphics and overlays, a relational database management system, map and
photo correlation, spreadsheet models, and functional area algorithms.
D. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
This thesis addresses the question: How effective was the SPADS system in the V
Corps sector of the Central Army Group (CENTAG) region in: (1) providing decision
makers with the means to access and employ their combat assets to meet overall mission
objectives; (2) demonstrating that the DCP concept enhanced command survivability; and
(3) evolving as a command post support system, based upon operational lessons learned?
To elaborate, this thesis will specifically attempt to assess SPADS' effectiveness in the
following three problem areas:
1
.
Did SPADS provide the V Corps commander and his staff with the ability to exercise
command and control of combat assets to meet overall mission objectives?




Did SPADS evolve as a command and control force effectiveness system for the V
Corps DCP based upon operational lessons learned?
The resolution of the first problem requires a measure of effectiveness (MOFE)
derived as a function of: (1) capability to achieve the C3 system's objectives interpreted as a
function of flexibility, availability, interoperability, and responsiveness; (2) structural
components interpreted in terms of timeliness; and (3) the physical entities interpreted in
terms of capacity.
The second problem addresses command survivability as a function of dispersion,
redundancy, and continuity of operations. And the third problem measures—across levels
of operational capacity—the evolution of C2 force effectiveness together with survivability.
This final measure of command and control growth is thus derived as a function of the
MOFE from Problem 1 and the MOE from Problem 2, with respect to time.
Appropriate data for these three problems were gathered from after action reports,
external evaluations, and operational experience. These data were generated during
numerous field training and command post exercises from 1981 through 1985. A
worksheet was developed to select specific data for the measures of performance,
effectiveness, and force effectiveness.
As indicated in the preceeding paragraphs, several of the measures are functions of
other, lower level measures. For the purpose of this thesis, the values are defined as the
unweighted sum of the constituent measures of performance. Only replication and external
validation can present more certainty on the assessment of factors and their aggregation.
These measures and their assessment are presented as a strawman for consideration by the
analytical community.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis summarizes how MCES methodology was specifically applied to evaluate
the SPADS system. The doctrinal definition of a forward deployed, heavy corps is
discussed in terms of MCES in Chapter II. Chapters III, IV and V present an MCES
analysis of the three phases of the SPADS program. Finally, Chapter VI provides
conclusions and recommendations concerning the SPADS program, evolutionary
development, and the MCES methodology.
II. THE CORPS BASELINE
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
1 . Background
In the early 1980s, existing and projected Army communications systems
inhibited rather than enabled command mobility. The standard small set of known, fixed
command posts and communications nodes was vulnerable to disruption and destruction by
Soviet radio electronic combat units. One solution to this vulnerability was to dramatically
increase the number of C3 targets and mobility and to achieve position location uncertainty.
There were other technical alternatives, but military application of these technologies
resulted in prohibitive unit costs and frequent program curtailment or termination. Some
means had to be found to substantially lower survivability costs.
Potential solutions started to surface in military efforts to exploit the growing
power of the microprocessor. The DNA, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), and V Corps all initiated programs to achieve enhanced C2 survivability which
were heavily dependent on new approaches to communications and command post decision
aids. By 1981 V Corps began vigorously testing innovative command and staff procedures
to support command post (CP) survivability, mobility, and effectiveness. The corps main
CP used a closed-circuit TV system to support command and staff briefings in the
consolidated Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC). Original plans to disperse the
CTOC had been defeated due to an inability to transmit a secure video signal carrying text
and graphic information.
Meanwhile, TRADOC identified certain initiatives which the Army could pursue
to enhance corps and division battle coordination efforts, including [Ref. 3:p 3-23]:
1. Dedicating intelligence (Intel) and fire support element (FSE) personnel to work
continuously on analyzing data throughout the depth of the battlefield
2. Placing a field artillery officer in the CTOC support (formerly the intelligence)




Dedicating a CTOC support element analyst to develop quick reaction priority targets
4. Co-locating and training the G2/G3, FSE, tactical command post (TAC CP), and
other staff elements designated by the commander to ensure synchronization of the
deep, close-in, and rear battles
5. Introducing the use of microcomputers in the FSE and CTOC support element to
develop, analyze, and prioritize targets in a rapid and continuous manner
6. Using closed-circuit TV and non-voice data links among critical staff elements
During this same period, DNA fielded the experimental, microcomputer-based
Target Acquisitions Planning (TAP) system in V Corps. The purpose of TAP was to
develop, analyze, and prioritize artillery targets in a rapid and continuous manner. 1 The V
Corps commander recognized a possible linkage between TAP and the efforts to disperse
command posts. In May 1981, V Corps contacted DNA directiy to request an expansion of
the TAP program to support corps operations. First, V Corps requested that DNA provide
personnel to conduct an in-depth analysis of corps requirements during the June 1981
command post exercise. Second, the commander requested that an expansion of the TAP
program, geared to the corps dispersed command post concept, be tested in September
during REFORGER 81. [Ref. 4:pp. 1-2]
!The TAP system employed microcomputer automation to provide an integrated
capability for U.S. and NATO targeting staffs to identify Warsaw Pact echeloned forces in
near real time. Intelligence and fire support staffs today employ TAP in conjunction with
other automated systems to streamline the targeting process. It provides staff officers with
an interim capability until such systems as All Source Analysis System (ASAS) and
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) are fielded in the early 1990s.
[Ref. 7:p. 27]
2 . Di spersed Command Post Concept
The dispersed command post concept offers the possibility of reducing and/or
disguising both the electronic and physical signatures of the consolidated CP. Nearly all of
the communications and other electronic equipment, vehicles, and facilities found in the
corps CP are also found in lower echelon CPs. If these assets could be reassembled as
smaller modules and then dispersed on the battlefield, the enemy would find it very difficult
to distinguish the main corps CP from many other, lower echelon CPs. In addition, once
the CP is broken into smaller units, it is much easier to accommodate the components in
civilian structures or small wooded areas. Supporting communications links could then be
maintained at smaller regional nodes in a further effort to reduce the electronic signature.
The traditional corps CP configuration in the early 1980s presented a target of
some 150-meter radius. Either a small nuclear weapon or a well-targeted conventional
attack could have destroyed nearly all of the C2 capabilities. Given the "kill radius" of even
small nuclear weapons against CPs and other C3 facilities, DNA recommended a DCP
system that called for the dispersion of the corps main CP—particularly the CTOC—into
several modules that would be separated by a minimum distance of ten kilometers. DNA
envisioned that this system would be extended throughout the corps CPs and eventually
down to the division CPs. The corps CP would then be dispersed throughout an area
approximately 40 kilometers by 50 kilometers.
Despite expected difficulties in coordination, DNA concluded in 1981 that the
DCP offered the greatest probability for the survivability of corps C2 on the modern
battlefield. The conclusion reached by DNA was further reinforced by emerging U.S.
Army doctrine revealed in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, The AirLand Battle and Corps 86
.
dated 25 March 1981, which strongly encouraged the dispersion of critical C2 facilities.
10
To test this concept, DNA felt it necessary to establish a proof of concept testbed
at an operational corps. In May 1981, the V Corps Commanding General sent an electronic
message to DNA requesting assistance with a concept to employ microcomputers to
support C2 operations in a dispersed command post. DNA took this opportunity to
establish a testbed at V Corps with the objective of proving the DCP concept while
developing an automated C2 system to enable its effective test and evaluation.
3. Evolutionary Acquisition
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) is not a cure-all for the real or perceived ills of the
U.S. acquisition process; but it does hold promise to help field command and
control (C2) systems sooner, at lower cost and with higher user satisfaction than
other approaches. [Ref. 5:p. 23]
The purpose of evolutionary acquisition is to be able to field critically needed
operational capabilities (OCs) within six to 12 months, rather than the years that would be
required under standard acquisition policies. Deployment of the initial operational
capability (IOC) is accomplished during the first year. The operational users conduct
studies and/or exercises in their own tactical environments with on-site technical assistance
from the contractor. Command and control procedures—along with system capabilities
—
evolve and are tested and refined during each field test and exercise.
Two critical components of this approach are incremental testing and user
involvement. Hirsch noted that:
A premise involved in using EA [Evolutionary Acquisition] to acquire C2 systems
is that C2 systems are tested incrementally to determine whether the core system (or
core system plus incremental upgrades to that system) meets the operational
requirement....Therefore, users gain more extensive experience and make
recommendations for establishment of operational requirements for subsequent
system increments. This process of requirement evolution and introduction of
upgrades distinguishes the evolutionary approach from the more classic weapon
acquisition process. [Ref. 5:p. 26]
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Each operational capability cycle is repeated to respond to changing
requirements, to counter the new threat systems or techniques, and to take advantage of
new and rapidly maturing technologies. Enhancements to the system are made within each
cycle by adding or replacing components and by integrating new software that is tailored to
specific military requirements.
Subsequent operational capabilities consolidate incremental enhancements or
involve complete system upgrades to take advantage of major advances in microcomputer
technology. The result is a fully integrated system, tailored to meet the operational user's
specific needs. The final operating capability remains undefined, due to .he evolutionary
nature of this developmental approach and the continued implementation of hardware
and/or software modifications arising from user requirements.
Operational capability cycles can be of different lengths or quantity. Milestones
are normally sequential but can overlap. The initial responsibility of the operational user is
to develop valid requirements. This requires an understanding of procedures which can be
automated to meet the user's operational needs. Once the hardware configurations and
software utilities are designed, the operational user has to identify and develop data
structures and select those procedures to be automated. At the same time, the operational
user plans manpower and training requirements for the evolving system. How the
commander ranks these responsibilities strongly determines the initial success—or lack
thereof—of early exercises and tests.
4. SPADS Evolutionary Development
The SPADS evolutionary development approach arose from the evolutionary
acquisition concept. This process was mandated by Department of Defense Instruction
(DODI) 5000.2 (System Acquisition) which provided a method to rapidly refine an
automated command and control system that employed state-of-the-art technology guided
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by user requirements. DODI 5000.2 devised a new approach to counter the following
impediments to rapid fielding of technological advances:
1. A ten-year lag between research and development (R&D) and effective system
implementation, resulting in built-in obsolescence
2. The ineffectiveness of systems that cannot respond to changing U.S. Army doctrine
3
.
The lack of affordability of automated systems that are tailored to user requirements
SPADS evolutionary development produced its greatest benefits for V Corps
when the operational users initiated a critical dialogue with DNA and the systems
integrator. Hirsch noted that:
In using EA [Evolutionary Acquisition] to acquire C2 systems, a major premise is
that the real user—working in a close, continual relationship with the developer and
supporter—should have a major voice in formulating operational requirements and
defining detailed system characteristics. [Ref. 5:pp. 24-26]
As a consequence of this approach, the resulting SPADS system was smaller,
lighter, more rapidly deployable, and required less manpower to operate and maintain.
5 . Problem Focus
The three problems identified in Chapter I will be examined under four
conditions throughout the remainder of this thesis. The four conditions consist of the V
Corps baseline and the three SPADS operational capabilities (detailed in Chapters III
through V). Each condition will be evaluated using MCES, then the problems will be
addressed at the conclusion of each evaluation.
B
. BOUNDING THE V CORPS SYSTEM
In the terms of MCES, the V Corps C2 system consists of: (1) physical entities—the
equipment, personnel and command posts; (2) structure—the hierarchical relationships,
staff procedures, concepts of operation and information flow patterns; and (3) the C2
process—what the command and control system was doing [Ref. 2:pp. 11-12]. (Appendix
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E provides a detailed definition of the Army's forward deployed corps in terms of mission,
organization, operational concepts, threats to the corps, commander and staff, command
posts, and communications support.)
Emphasizing the battle management functions necessary to control a forward deployed
corps in central West Germany, the V Corps C2 system could be defined structurally in
terms of its hierarchical relationships, its geographical areas of responsibility within the
Central Army Group (CENTAG), and the information flow patterns between command
posts. Hierarchically, the corps received its commands from CENTAG; it had lateral
relationship, v/th the III (German) Korps to the north and the VII (U.S.) Corps to the
south; it commanded the 3rd Armored Division (3AD), the 8th Infantry Division (8ID), the
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11ACR), the 12th Combat Aviation Group (12CAG),
and numerous brigade-sized units.
From a geographic perspective, V Corps was responsible for approximately 37,500
square kilometers of real estate in the West German federal state of Hesse.
Information flowed vertically and horizontally throughout the corps. The V Corps
main and rear CPs received orders and information, and reported to the CENTAG CP; the
corps support command received information from and reported to U.S. Army Europe
(USAREUR) headquarters; the V Corps CPs transmitted orders and information, and
received reports from the divisions, the armored cavalry regiment, and the major combat
support and combat service support units in the corps area of operations.
The V Corps headquarters was normally divided into three wartime command posts:
the TAC CP, the main CP, and the rear CP. The TAC CP consisted of four armored
command post vehicles, one platoon from the corps signal brigade, and necessary
supporting vehicles. The TAC CP was 100 percent mobile and was capable of displacing
every 12 to 24 hours. The main CP had very limited mobility and required considerable
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time to displace. In addition, the main CP had prominent physical and electronic signatures
that were very difficult to reduce. Like the main CP, the rear CP had limited mobility,
many vehicles, and distinctive signatures.
Prior to the implementation of the dispersed command post concept, the corps
command posts were the main CP, the rear CP, and the TAC CP. The main CP consisted
of Communications, Intelligence, Tactical Operations, and Air Support Operations elements
compressed into a 300- by 300-meter area. The critical Tactical Operations Center (TOC)
consisted of the Command, Gl (Personnel and Administration), G3 (Operations and
Plans), G2 (Intelligence), Engineer, Weather, Fire Support, and Targeting elements in a
75- by 75-meter area. During the same period, the division command posts were the main,
rear, division TAC, and division rear CPs.
Once V Corps decided to pursue the DCP, there was a concerted effort to realign
physical entities and structural components. The main CP was restructured into four
modules that supported four battle tasks. The new modules were CTOC, Plans, FSE, and
Intel. The CTOC was similarly restructured; its new elements became Command, G3
Operations (Opns), G2 Opns, Gl Opns, G4 Opns, Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC),
Engineer, and Corps Airspace Management Element (CAME) in addition to liaison officers
from subordinated units, adjacent corps, and higher headquarters.
C . ANALYSIS OF THE V CORPS C2 PROCESS
To analyze the V Corps C2 process using MCES, it is necessary to specify the corps
mission objectives, the commander's tasks, the staff functions, and the functions of each
module in the three command posts.
1 . Corns Mission Objectives
The V Corps mission objectives can be defined in terms of four battle tasks:
management of the current battle, planning the future battle, planning and executing the
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deep attack, and sustainment of the force [Ref. 6:p. 2]. The corps mission determines
tasks to be performed and initiates the military decision making process, which proceeds in
four phases: (1) collecting information; (2) planning—to include an estimate of the situation,
a decision, and preparation of the operations plan; (3) issuing orders; and (4) supervising
the execution of issued orders [Ref. 3:pp. 3-36 - 3-46].
2 . Corps Commander's Tasks
In planning his battles, the corps commander analyzes his mission, defines
tasks, establishes intelligence requirements and priorities, organizes the corps for combat,
assigns missions and tasks to subordinate commanders, and sets priorities for combat,
combat support, and combat service support units. In planning all operations, the corps
commander must take into account available time and space required to defeat engaged
enemy forces before divisions would have to fight follow-on forces. This becomes the
"window" against which system performance must be assessed. As the plans are executed,
the commander must be aggressive, demanding, and personally involved. The way the
corps commander generates and applies combat power often decides the outcome of battles
and campaigns. (Appendix E specifies the tasks performed by the commander in the
forward deployed corps.)
3. Corns Staff Tasks
The commander requires assistance to assimilate information provided through
the corps command and control system. He needs support to filter available information,
demand more when the picture of the situation is not complete, analyze pertinent facts, and
communicate decisions to the many people that must thoroughly understand his intent. The
staff directs and coordinates execution of the commander's intent by providing the
necessary control of the battle. Appendix C specifies those tasks completed by each staff
section in the corps CP. [Ref. 7:p. 2-7]
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4 . Command Post Functions
The three wartime CPs of the V Corps Headquarters were identified in Section
B. The orientation of the TAC CP is the most limited of the three command posts. With its
focus on the close-in battle, the TAC CP monitors the deep and rear battles only for their
impact on Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) operations. The main CP focuses on the
deep battle. Although a major focus of the rear CP is to sustain operations in all three
battles, it must also focus on fighting the rear battle. A major element of the rear CP is the
rear area operations center (RAOC). The RAOC manages rear area protection, commands
and controls rear area combat operations, provides current battle information to the rear CP,
and acts as the alternate main CP. Appendix E presents the functions of each of the three V
Corps command posts.
Each module of the corps main CP is organized to support one of the battle tasks
of the V Corps mission objective [Ref. 5:pp. B-l-1 - B-4-1]:
1. The CTOC monitors the current situation in the corps sector and adjacent corps
sectors. It allocates resources to major subordinated units in order to influence the
current battle. The CTOC executes operations plans and operations orders. It
ensures the availability of current battle information to all elements of the corps C2
structure with emphasis on decision making information required by the commander.
2. The FSE coordinates the attack of deep targets. The FSE also executes the attack of




The Plans module translates the commander's guidance into appropriate priorities for
the intelligence effort, target development, the deep attack, and resource allocations.
The Plans module also incorporates priorities and guidance into operations plans.
4. The Intelligence module provides timely and reliable information on threat
dispositions, capabilities, activities, and intentions. It tasks the intelligence
collection assets to support operations plans. This module disseminates periodic
intelligence reports to other modules, subordinate units, and higher headquarters.
Finally, it nominates appropriate targets to the FSE.
17
D. V CORPS C2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The V Corps C2 system architecture is described by an integrated set of systems
whose elements and functions are coherently related. The corps physical entities and
structural components (described in Section B) are mapped to the C2 process definition
(Section C). Figure 2.1 graphically represents this integration for the consolidated main
command post. To construct the V Corps system architecture, it was necessary to map
from the corps battle tasks—the highest level of this architecture-down to the module
elements (or sub-elements) that perform the specific staff functions. (These functions are
subdivided into specific tasks for each staff section or element in Appendix C.) First, the
corps battle tasks were mapped to the corps CP functions. Next, the CP functions were
decomposed into specific functions for each module. Then these specific functions were
mapped to the module elements—or sub-elements—which perform them. Finally, the
functions were mapped to the appropriate task of the particular element. Table 1 illustrates
this mapping from one of the four corps battle tasks, "Manage the current battle," through
one of the many CTOC functions, down to the specific tasks for each CTOC element, e.g.,
G3 Operations is tasked to "Monitor the current situation."
After these architectural relationships were identified, the MCES provided guidance
for both qualitative and quantitative measures based upon the specific form of data
generation selected.
E. SPECIFICATION OF MEASURES
1. Introduction
The purpose of this section is to identify, develop, and select measures that gauge the
V Corps C2 system's response to directing forces. These measures will provide the values
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as the underlying architecture of the C2 system changes from the V Corps baseline through
the three operational capabilities. The measures are selected to relate directly to the
architectural and operational issues posed in this analysis. It should be noted that additional
measures might be useful for addressing another set of issues.
Three problems were identified in Chapter I. The first asks whether SPADS
supported the V Corps commander as he exercised command and control of his combat
assets to meet the mission objectives in the four corps battle tasks. The second asks
whether the V Corps dispersed command post concept actually enhanced command
survivability. The final problem questions whether the SPADS evolutionary development
approach affected C2 force effectiveness throughout the three OCs.
2. Problem 1
Four measures of performance (MOPs) and two measures of effectiveness
(MOEs) were initially selected for the first problem. The MOPs were: (1) flexibility, (2)
availability, (3) interoperability, and (4) responsiveness. These MOPs specified
performance inside the C2 system using the criteria "yes-it-works/no-it-doesn't-work"
[Ref. 2:p. 97]. The MOEs were: (1) timeliness and (2) capacity; these address structural
components and physical entities respectively. A third MOE was developed as a function
of flexibility, availability, interoperability, and responsiveness (FAIR) to address the C2
process. Finally, a measure of force effectiveness (MOFE), addressing C2 mission
orientation (xMO-n), was defined as a function of the C2 process, structural components,
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3 . Problem 2
In the second problem, the three MOPs selected were: (1) dispersion, (2)
redundancy, and (3) continuity of operations [Ref. 6:pp. 1, B-l - B-2]. The issue of
command survivability (xCS-n) was addressed by defining an MOE that was a function of
the three MOPs. The selected measures are defined in Table 3.
4. Problem 3
The third problem was more challenging. SPADS could not evolve as a C2
force effectiveness system based upon operational lessons learned unless it: (1) provided
the commander, and his staff, with the ability to exercise command and control of his
combat assets to meet overall mission objectives; and (2) demonstrated that the dispersed
command post concept enhanced command survivability. Therefore, an MOFE related to
C2 force effectiveness (C2/FE) was defined in terms of C2 mission orientation in command
survivability. C2 force effectiveness is defined in Table 4.
F. DATA GENERATION
Appropriate data for the measures specified in Section E were generated from after
action reports, external evaluations, and operational experience. Data were generated
during numerous field training and command post exercises throughout the three OCs.
These exercises closely followed the general defense plans used by V Corps to train for
combat operations. In each exercise, the C2 system was exercised by highly trained staff
officers and NCOs who used the system as they would in a wartime environment.
The worksheet used to collect the data is shown in Table 5. This format was used for
evaluating the three operational capabilities; the worksheet results are shown in Sections F
and G of Chapters III, IV, and V. The corps baseline was evaluated using operational
experience and doctrinal publications. After action reports were the principal source of data
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MEASURE SELECTED FOR THE THIRD PROBLEM
Type Name/Formula Description
MOFE C2 Force Effectiveness, = f (XMOTi, XCSTi)
C2/FE, at Ti
Command and control force effectiveness of the V Corps
Dispersed Command Post can be interpreted, at the
conclusion of an operational capability, as the summation
of the values for command and control mission orientation,
XMOTi, and command survivability, XCSTi.
Each measure listed in Tables 1 through 3 was evaluated as a binary condition. The
measure received a single, unweighted digit if it met the condition "the description of the
measure in the table is true." Using the worksheet shown in Table 5, each module present
during that exercise was evaluated for every measure. The results on the worksheet were
columns consisting of ones and zeroes. Every summed measure (e.g., FAIR, XMOTi, and
XCSTi) received a cumulative, unweighted score on the worksheet. The final measure,
C2/FE, was computed using the description in Table 4, and the result was placed on the
worksheet. The results of these evaluations are displayed in tables in Section F of Chapters
m, IV, and V. In addition, the means of each measure for the entire operational capability
cycle are displayed in figures immediately following the tables.
Two indicators of bias in the underlying data must be discussed. The first is missing
data; in certain after action reports specific activities are absent and cannot be inferred. The
second is observer unreliability; there are clear differences in both style and content
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G. AGGREGATION AND INTERPRETATION OF MEASURES
l. Genial
Problem 1 addresses command and control as a measure of force effectiveness
derived as a linear function of the values for:
1
.
Mission orientation—the C2 process—which itself is interpreted as the summation of
the values derived for flexibility, availability, interoperability, and responsiveness
(FAIR)
2. Structural components interpreted as a measure of timeliness
3 Physical entities as a function of capacity
Problem 2 addresses survivability as a measure of effectiveness derived for
dispersion and redundancy.
In Problem 3, the measure of command and control force effectiveness is derived
from the linear aggregation of the value derived for the MOFE from Problem 1 and the
value of the MOE from Problem 2. The command and control force effectiveness of the V
Corps CP was measured, at the conclusion of an operational capability, by adding the
values derived for the evaluation of: (1) the interaction of mission orientation, structure,
and physical entities in Problem 1; and (2) survivability in Problem 2.
As indicated in Section E, several of the measures are functions of other, lower-
level measures. The actual algorithm for any given application must be validated and
verified against real world or other applicable observations. For the purpose of this thesis,
the values of such proposed measures as FAIR, xMO-n, xCS-n, and C2/FE are defined as
the weighted sum of the constituent MOPs. However, other weights are arbitrary and the
relationships could be linear or non-linear, relational or multiplicative. Only replication,
conferencing and/or synthesis of expert opinion, and external validation can present more
certainty on the assessment of factors and their aggregations. The major advantage of this
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thesis is that it broaches the subject and presents a strawman for consideration by the
analytical community.2
2 . V Corps Baseline
In evaluating the V Corps baseline it would be counterproductive to attempt to
apply the quantitative standards used for the three operational capabilities. The baseline
condition requires a subjective evaluation based upon the appropriate doctrinal publications
and operational experience.
a. Problem 1
Before impleme dng the DCP concept, the commander and his staff were
able to exercise command and control to meet mission objectives. Certainly the staff was as
flexible, available, and responsive as their procedures and communications support
allowed. On the other hand, traditional command posts had no links to other C2 systems,
and the staff received all of their information by hard copy message, facsimile or verbal
report. Although staff members may have prided themselves on their efficiency, they had
no way to speed up the flow of critical information from its source(s) to the commander.
In a similar manner, the staff had only a limited capacity to handle data, reports, or
functions during a given period; they were often overcome by events during operations.
In analyzing the manual C2 process, it becomes obvious that technology would
be hard pressed to meet the staffs contribution to the C2 functionality. However, the
greatest potential of automated C2 systems lies in improving the physical entities' and
structural components' contributions to overall C2 mission orientation.
2 Conversation between Dr. Ricki Sweet, Sweet Associates, Ltd, and the author in
San Jose, California, 11 March 1988.
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b. Problem 2
The V Corps commander wanted to employ the DCP concept in 1981 to
dramatically increase command survivability. (Appendix E describes the numerous threats
to the corps command posts.) It was obvious at that time that merely dispersing the
modules of the main CP would not be enough. A plan was required that would support
continuity of operations with redundancy of functional staff personnel and key information.
Before it implemented the DCP concept, V Corps had no way to consistently achieve
command survivability.
c. Problem 3
The third problem cannot be fairly addressed with regards to V Corps' use
of a consolidated main CP. Before dispersion, V Corps recognized the threats to command
survivability and effectiveness but was constrained by Army doctrine and materiel in its
efforts to improve the situation.
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III. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 1
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The Defense Nuclear Agency started the first operational capability in September 1981
with a microcomputer workstation demonstration during REFORGER 81. The exploratory
development program had proceeded from concept formulation to the initial design and
demonstration phase. Designs and capabilities were tested and refined during the four
exercises of Operational Capability 1 (OC1): REFORGER 81, Able Archer 81, Crested
Eagle 82, and Caravan Guard III.
This section addresses four issues central to problem formulation:
1
.
What were the stated requirements of OC 1 ?
2. What tasks from the statement of work (SOW) supported OC1?
3 What design principles, mandated by DNA, guided the development?
4
.
What were the goals of each exercise?
Figure 3.1 shows the five requirements of OC1 along a month by month timeline
consisting of 17 months. The dates of the four exercises during OC1 are marked by "•,"
and are listed below the central rectangle. The objectives of OC1, based upon the re-
quirements and the technological characteristics, are shown to the right.
1 . Requirements for OC1
OC1 objectives consisted of: (1) the effective implementation and operation of
nine dispersed V Corps command post modules, (2) distributed processing through an
automated communications gateway, (3) automated briefing files, (4) an electronic mail
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a. V Corps DCP Concept
The DCP experimentation program was conducted under Contract
DNA001-81-C-0277 1 , awarded in August 1981. The purpose of the contract was to allow
the earliest possible testing of the V Corps DCP concept. To accomplish rapid fielding,
DNA employed non-developmental items (NDI) which took advantage of off-the-shelf
technology.
DNA established a testbed at V Corps; its objective was to develop an
automated command and control system instrumental to testing and evaluating the dispersed
command post concept. The primary test objective—evalua.ing the effectiveness of the
DCP concept—would be accomplished while responding to the V Corps request of May
1981 [Ref. 4:pp. 1-2]. What remained was to design an automated C2 system which could
be fielded rapidly to support the test and evaluation of the DCP concept.
DNA postulated a DCP model which called for the fragmentation of the
corps main command post, particularly the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), into several
modules and for dispersal of these modules with ten kilometers or more between them.
DNA envisioned that the concept would be extended throughout the corps operational area
to its supporting CPs such as the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) and the tactical
command post (TAC CP), as well as to combat divisions and armored cavalry regiment.
After action or lessons learned reports would be prepared for each exercise conducted
during this operational capability period (August 1981 through December 1983). [Ref.
8:pp. 9-13]
1 Interview between R. Laird, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Defense Nuclear Agency,
Alexandria, Virginia, and the author, 17-18 December 1987.
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Since requirements were expected to be refined as the system was fielded
and experimentation proceeded, an evolutionary development approach and modular design
philosophy was adopted [Ref. 8:pp. 75-9]. This would allow early fielding of basic
capabilities and subsequent DCP experiments, while providing the flexibility to add greater
and more finely tuned capabilities throughout the test period. It would also allow the
experiment to proceed without waiting for the availability of microcomputer and peripheral
equipment based on emerging technologies, and it would maintain the ability to insert
advanced capabilities when those technologies matured and new equipment was available in
the commercial marketplace.
b. Distributed Processing
The V Corps automated prototype was required to support a distributed
processing configuration consisting of a network of microcomputer workstations. (This
definition contrasted with traditional automated systems composed of one central processor
and dependent terminals that are incapable of independent processing.) A local area
network (LAN) would connect workstations within each V Corps command post module.
A communications gateway would provide network connectivity via Army voice
communications channels. The supporting architecture would include a replicated data base
at each module, thus providing each cell with the same information. The communications
links between and among the modules were to be provided by the Tactical Area Switching
System (TASS). The capabilities at each work station would eventually include word
processing, electronic mail, graphics and overlays, a relational database management




An automated briefing capability was specified to enable any staff officer to
create briefing slides and text at a workstation. In order to minimize communication
requirements when transmitting these briefing slides to other modules, graphics
information that was not expected to change would be created and stored as a background
slide. Information that was expected to change would be created, stored, transmitted, and
presented as an overlay. All slides would be stored on a module's mass storage station.
New and updated slides from other modules were to be received through the
communications gateway and stored at the mass storage station. A printing capability for
text and graphics would be provided. [Ref. 8:p. 26]
d. Electronic Mail
An electronic mail system (EMS) was required to transmit messages
between the workstations in the dispersed modules of the DCP. The EMS would be able to
handle standard text messages as well as non-text material such as graphics. Mail would
be prepared by the operator and would be sent to any other user through that module's
gateway. [Ref. 8:p. 27]
e. 8ID DCP Concept
The 8th Infantry Division would be employed as a smaller and more tactical
version of the V Corps testbed. The requirement was to provide dispersal plus
effectiveness for the small, highly mobile elements of the division command posts.
2. Tasks from the Statement of Work
a. Task 1: V Corps Support
This task provided for support to V Corps during Exercises REFORGER
81, Able Archer 81, and Crested Eagle 82. The first responsibility was to ensure that the
current procedures, SOPs, reports, and information flow were examined before proceeding
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with the project. The second responsibility was to gather specific requirements from the
principal staff sections so that applications and data bases could be developed.
b. Task 2: DCP Concepts
The purpose of this task was to identify and test feasible information
exchange concepts for the DCP project. For communications networking within the
module, different commercial LANs would be tested and one selected to support SPADS.
For communications networking between modules, gateway concepts would be examined
and tested to determine the baseline for developing a communications gateway that could
support the DCP concept. All networking tests would be conducted in CONUS.
c. Task 3: Caravan Guard Support
This task specified various tasks to support the V Corps DCP concept in
Germany. The staff operators, NCOs, and action officers would be trained on how to use
SPADS to support V Corps DCP operations. An SOP would be developed for dispersed
operations that used microcomputer equipment. Communications gateway software
development would proceed to support four dispersed CP locations.
d. Task 4: PTT Management Interfaces/Procedures
This task required that the West German national telecommunications
system (the Deutsches Bundespost, or DBP) be examined to determine how it could
support SPADS. The first test would determine whether gateways would be able to
communicate over the standard DBP phone lines. This would be followed by tests to
determine if special "conditioned" data links would be required to effectively use the DBP.
e . Task 5: V Corps/8ID C2 Doctrine Evaluation
This task would develop a capability to evaluate, through evolutionary
testing, the effectiveness of the requirements for emerging Army doctrine on dispersed field
C2. The principal effort would be to develop a testbed to evaluate an information
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distribution and processing system between the corps, division, and corps/division
command elements. The final test plan would provide a basis for documenting and
evaluating the results of the theoretical efforts related to internal corps and division C2
operations.
Task 5 carried the V Corps DCP demonstration through the fall of 1982. In
January 1982 the Army Communicative Technology Office (ACTO) provided $536,000 (of
the $1.2 million required for SPADS up to that date) to purchase equipment for a "full-up"
demonstration. 2 The pacing items would be software development and assimilation of the
equipment by V Corps.
f . Task 8: 8ID AirLand Battle DCP Program
The purpose of this task was to develop a division-level SPADS program that
would eventually be integrated into the V Corps DCP program. The sub-tasks were to: (1)
deliver a division level SPADS system, (2) conduct user training for the 8ID, (3) support
the user test of the system in garrison, and (4) support user tests of the SPADS system in
the field environment. This task specifically required support for 8ID to develop and
validate the operating procedures as well as to develop and test its own field procedures.
The TRADOC Combined Arms Center contributed $480,000 in March 1982 to support the
8ID SPADS development.3
3 . DNA Design Principles
The DNA evaluated necessary automated command and control requirements
from the perspective of battlefield information needs and the capabilities available from




proach to evaluating the DCP concept. This section addresses those design principles that
were incorporated in OC1. [Ref. 8:p. 16]
a. Maintain a Common Battlefield Perception
Every module in the DCP had to share a common perception of the
battlefield situation if operations were to be effectively planned, executed, and controlled.
This meant that every module must have the same information. A key design concept of
the DCP automated C2 system was replication of the essential parts of the current situation
information available at every module. Each module was responsible for maintaining a
portion of the Current Situation data base and transmitting updates to all other modules.
The common perception concept would [Ref. 8:pp. 17-18]:
1
.
Allow the commander immediate access to critical data on the total situation at any
module and at any time
2. Provide a common perception of all aspects of unit status to all corps modules
3 Provide redundancy necessary for continuity of operations
4. Be less dependent on the communications system than remote query to a central data
base
5. Relieve the staff from the necessity of requesting critical information from other
modules
b. Minimize Data Transmission
Limited Army tactical communications capabilities within the corps required
a conservative data update philosophy to reduce the heavy burden that data, particularly
data for graphics displays, could impose. The principle adopted for the DCP would be to
transmit only overlay data through electrical means; backgrounds such as maps or chart
matrices would be pre-positioned at all modules or delivered by courier. Only the data that
changed (i.e., the overlays) would be sent through the communications network. [Ref.
8:p. 19]
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c. Maintain Continuity of Operations
The critical requirement for continuity of operations influenced the DCP
equipment configuration and recommended employment concept. The basic principle was
to design for graceful degradation. If part of the system failed, the remaining components
should continue to operate. Specific design features were [Ref. 8:p 21]:
1
.
Distributed, intelligent workstations would be selected rather than the traditional, less
capable terminals serviced by a multi-user central computer
2. A graphics plotter would be employed at selected modules to periodically provide
backup acetate overlays of the force status and enemy situation; this duplication
would ensure that critical map overlays would be available even if the system totally
failed
3. A medium-speed printer would provide hard copy text and ensure that essential
records were kept in the event of a major system failure
4. A direct communications interface between selected workstations at distant modules
would provide backup communications in the event of a gateway failure or during
peak traffic backlogs
5. The data bases and current situation briefings would be duplicated at each module;
each module would contain the data necessary to reconstitute the functions of a
destroyed module
d. Computational Support
Each module would have its own set of requirements for analysis, e.g.,
generating spreadsheets on personnel and equipment needs, or for creating local data bases.
The system would be designed to provide the capability of executing commercial software
programs and creating local programs to meet the needs of each module. This principle
would ensure maximum utilization of existing programs and enable individual staff
elements to develop software tailored to their specific needs. [Ref. 8:p. 21]
e. Provide a Rugged, Low-cost System
The DCP program was required to use commercial equipment modified for
field use. The time to develop and field the system was thus expected to be one-fifth of the
normal development time because of the use of off-the-shelf commercial products. This
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would also maintain a lower cost than conventionally developed hardware and software
programs.
It would be necessary to take some steps, without attempting full
militarization, to ensure that the hardware package would perform effectively in the field.
The microcomputers would be modified to provide simple connections between the
computer and other devices in the system. This would alleviate the need for an operator to
open the microcomputer case to make connections in the field environment. Special
transport cases would be designed to protect the equipment from exposure and during
transportation. The rigid cases would provide the structural framework for the operating
workstations. [Ref. 8:p. 21]
4. Exercise Objectives During OC1
The objective for Exercise REFORGER 81 was to demonstrate the
capabilities of a microcomputer workstation in the corps main command post. The
objective of the next exercise, Able Archer 81, was to demonstrate that files could be
transferred over Army tactical communications between microcomputer workstations in
different modules. The two objectives for Exercise Crested Eagle 82 were to: (1) conduct a
test that demonstrated that bulk-encrypted data could be transferred between two modules
using TASS, and (2) to add the 8ID to the DCP experiment. The five objectives of the last
exercise, Caravan Guard III—the most significant of OC1—were to: (1) simulate the
dispersal of nine modules, (2) use the automated communications gateway station (CGS)
over TASS, (3) connect the 8ID main CP to the corps SPADS system, (4) disperse the
TAC CP up to 45 kilometers from the main CP, and (5) implement the Current Situation
and Electronic Mail System (EMS) software. Table 6 presents the exercises and objectives
ofOCl. [Ref. 8:pp. 26-28]
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TABLE 6
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 1
Primary Objective(s) Date
Contract Award Aug. 1981
Exercise REFORGER 81 Sept. 1981
Demonstrate microcomputer workstation
Exercise Able Archer 81 Jan. 1982
Demonstrate file transfer
Exercise Crested Eagle 82 March 1982
Transfer bulk-encrypted data between two modules
Exercise Caravan Guard m June 1982
Disperse nine CP modules
Automate communications gateway over TASS
Add 8th Infantry Division to experiment
Disperse CP modules up to 45 km apart
Test Current Situation and Electronic Mail System
B . BOUNDING THE C2 SYSTEM
This section addresses the bounds of the SPADS system in terms of physical entities
and structure at three distinct levels. First, the workstation bounds the hardware and
software with which an operator interacts. Next, the module level describes the SPADS
entities and structure within the confines of one modular command post. Finally, the
network level defines the SPADS system within the geographical and hierarchical bounds
that interconnect the modules.
1 . Workstation Level Bounding
a. Hardware
The only hardware that the staff officer or SPADS operator interacted with
personally was the staff duty station (SDS). The SDS was contained in two ruggedized
cases that stacked one atop another to provide an operational workstation. The upper case
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contained two monitors. The lower case contained an Apple 4 11+ microcomputer, two
floppy diskette drives, and a power control panel. The Apple 11+ microcomputer was the
central focus of the SDS. Inside the microcomputer case were numerous interface cards to
control the disk drives, provide accurate time, interface with the printer, provide a serial
port for a modem, and provide extra random access memory (RAM). The operator typed
all commands at the keyboard. Two 5- 1/4-inch floppy diskette drives were attached to the
backplane of the microcomputer. These drives could be used to store and input data or to
execute commercial software programs. On the left side of the upper SDS case a black and
green (B&G) monitor provided for text display. To the right, an analog color monitor
displayed briefing slides. Table 7 presents an overview of the SDS hardware. [Ref. 8:pp.
38-41]
b. Software
All SPADS software functions were performed at the SDS by the operator.
The two required functions implemented during OC1 were Current Situation and Electronic
Mail System (EMS). Current Situation provided an immediate overview of the battle
situation, including the status of units. It was dependent upon the Briefing package, which
provided the ability to create and present briefings. EMS allowed the operator to send or
receive standard text messages, data, graphics, and computer code. One flexible SPADS
software package was Local Program Execution, which allowed the operator to execute
programs locally, e.g., special programs to assess personnel needs, logistics support, and
other staff tasks. [Ref. 8:pp. 44, 48]
4 Apple is a registered trademark of Apple Computer, Inc., Cupertino, California.
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Synertek MOS 6502, 8-bit data
48K (64K with Slot Card)
5x7 Dot matrix for 280 x 192 array
Analog Color Display
Black and Green Display
52-key typewriter keyboard (attached)
120V/50-60 Hz power
5-1/4-inch, 140 Kbytes
The Current Situation package preceded any common data base function in
SPADS. Current Situation allowed text and slide displays of any data that the staff wished
to include. Current Situation data consisted of input from local users plus information
obtained from staff sections in other modules. All information generated or received was
stored on the module's mass storage station. All locally generated slides and text used in
Current Situation were transmitted through the CGS to the other command post modules.
Any operator was able to obtain a hard copy printout of the text and graphics information
from the shared output station. [Ref. 8:p. 48]
The operator was able to create briefing slides and text at the SDS. In order
to minimize communications requirements when transmitting slides to other modules,
graphics information that was not expected to change from one slide to another was created
as a background slide. Information that was expected to change was presented as an
overlay. When updates were needed to a given set of slides, only the overlays had to be
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transmitted. The text provided with the slides described the essential features of the
displayed graphics information. [Ref. 8:p. 56]
EMS was the principal mechanism for transmitting messages between the
modules of the DCP. EMS handled all standard text messages as well as non-text material
such as graphics. Outgoing mail was prepared at the SDS by the operator. Incoming and
outgoing mail was handled by the gateway. All mail was stored in "mailboxes" on the hard
disk of the mass storage station. The mail could be called up for reading by addressees,
sent to the shared output station for printing, or both. [Ref. 8:p. 51]
2 . Module Level Bounding
A SPADS module consisted of one or more staff duty stations, a mass storage
station, a shared output station, and a communications gateway station, all interconnected
by a local area network. Table 8 presents a summary of the module-level hardware and
communications capabilities.
The mass storage station (MSS) was the primary shared memory for the SPADS
module. It normally contained all of the data, text, graphics, and computer programs for
each module. The MSS consisted of a hard disk drive, a hard disk server, and a
videocassette recorder (VCR). The server controlled access to the hard disk and its
operations. These included local work files used by each SDS as well as common data
base files. The VCR was used to create a backup copy of the hard disk. Only one MSS
was installed at each module.
The shared output station (SOS) provided medium-speed, medium-volume
printing and plotting capability to support the module's SDS operators. An SOS consisted
of an SDS, a printer,and an optional plotter. Some modules had a plotter capable of
producing large map overlays, hard copy slides, and conventional hard copy paper plots.
All the SDSs in a module had access to the SOS for their printing and plotting needs. The
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SOS was essential for module operations during OC1 because the SDSs did not have local





• Apple 11+ (four required/gateway)
- Synertek MOS 6502
- 48K (Expanded to 128K)
- 5 X 7 Dot matrix for
280 x 192 array
-120V/50-60 Hz power
Corvusa 20 Megabyte Hard Disk:
• Winchester technology
• 64 device capable common bus






• TASS switching—TTC 38/41
•PTT-KG-84: 300—1200 baud
Software Capabilities:
• Variable packet size
• RS 232/RS 422 protocols
• Error detection code
• Corvus Constellation protocol
The communications gateway station (CGS) was the link between each SPADS
module and all the other cells in the DCP. It was mandatory for module operation. The
CGS consisted of three Apple 11+ microcomputers, up to four modems, and two B&G
monitors. Its purpose was to process incoming information, control the transmission of
a Corvus is a registered trademark of Corvus Computers, San Jose, California.
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outgoing information and maintain the EMS network control. Figure 3.2 presents a
schematic of the Apple 11+ Communications Gateway Station. [Ref. 8:p. 44]
3 . Network Level Bounding
The DCP consisted of a network of SPADS modules with one gateway per corps
command post module. In the initial distributed command and control network, the CGSs
were connected via the Army Tactical Area Switching System over tactical multichannel
radios or cable systems. [Ref. 8:pp. 28-30]
C. C2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
1 . Workstation Level Integration
Once V Corps had working staff duty stations in its modules, the staff began to
implement manual functions either through provided SPADS software or through local
program execution. Chapter II presented an overview of the functions of the corps
commander and staff in any CP configuration. (Appendix E provides an in-depth look at
the tasks that must be performed by the corps staff.) Even before SPADS was being
formalized in procedures and SOPs, resourceful staff personnel were using SPADS to per-
form more effectively.
The next four figures present the integration of each software package with the
C2 system and the C2 process. First, Figure 3.3 displays the integration of system,
process, and function with Current Situation [Ref. 8:pp. 48-49], then Figure 3.4 shows
the integration of entities, structure, and functions with Briefing [Ref. 8:pp. 56-57]. Next,
Figure 3.5 illustrates the integration of Electronic Mail System with the processes,
structures and entities [Ref. 8:pp. 51-52]. Finally, Figure 3.6 depicts the integration of
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2 . Module Level Integration
Throughout OC1 the addition of SPADS hardware and software was slowly
influencing the structure, organization, procedures, and information flow patterns of the V
Corps command posts. In comparison to Chapter II's pre-DCP architecture, Figure 3.7
presents module-level integration within a generic module during OC1.
3 . Network Level Architecture
The most significant integration at the network level in OC1 occurred during the
period that covered Crested Eagle 82 and Caravan Guard III. In March, during Exercise
Crested Eagle 82, two corps modules were physically dispersed and transmitted files
between them. Furthermore, during Exercise Caravan Guard III in June 1982, nine
modules of the V Corps DCP concept were used and SPADS links were established
between four dispersed modules. In addition, the 8ID main CP was connected to the V
Corps main CP through SPADS at a distance of almost 40 kilometers.
Once the corps was able to support the DCP concept through SPADS
communications gateway stations, it was in a position to begin integration of the V Corps
C2 process from the individual staff duty stations throughout the entire network.
D. DATA GENERATION
The data generated for this OC are shown in Table 95 . The data generation worksheet
and formulas discussed in Chapter II were used to produce values for this OC. The means
for each evaluation category are displayed in Figure 3.8. A brief review of the data
generation procedures
—
presented in Chapter II—follows in the next paragraph.
5 The following sources provided raw data on these exercises: Reference
(REFORGER 81, Able Archer 81, Crested Eagle 82, Caravan Guard III), Reference 10


































































































C 4-> H -3 2 <x C/3 u,
-a U CM














/Cjo2ajB3 ipcg joj sueaj^
54
After action and lessons learned reports were collected from V Corps, DNA, and the
developer for each exercise during this operational capability cycle. Using the worksheet,
definitions, and procedures specified in Chapter II, values were determined for each
measure from every exercise. The measures were individually considered as binary
conditions for each DCP module that participated in the exercise. The summed measures
(e.g., FAIR, XMOTi, and XCSTi) received their cumulative, unweighted scores based
upon their constituent measures of performance or effectiveness. The final measure,
C2/FE, was computed as a linear function of XMOTi and XCSTi and recorded on the
worksheet. The results for each exercise are displayed in Table 9, and the means for each
category are presented in Figure 3.8.
The reader should exercise caution in interpreting the values generated for OC1. The
scarcity of data and the biases noted in Chapter II lead to a necessarily conservative view of
the accomplishments of the V Corps DCP program during this 17-month period.
E. AGGREGATION AND INTERPRETATION OF MEASURES
1 . C2 Mission Orientation
The value of C2 mission orientation, XMOTi, rises dramatically during OC1.
This may be a gain in effectiveness; however, it may also represent the natural reaction to
coping with the dispersed command post environment. The following subsections interpret
the three components of C2 Mission Orientation.
a . C2 Process
There was a dramatic loss in functionality during OC1, and SPADS could
have been exploited to regain the level of functionality that existed before dispersal [Ref. 12:
pp 21-22]. While the functions of the V Corps commander and staff remained constant,
the environment they had to work in changed drastically. The rise in FAIR represents the
increasing functionality of the SPADS system within the DCP environment.
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b. Physical Entities
The physical entities of the V Corps C2 system changed the most during
this period. As the facilities were dispersed, new hardware and software was introduced to
increase command survivability and bring C2 mission orientation up to its pre-dispersal
level. The value of capacity remained constant for each module that was added to the DCP,
but the total aggregated value increased as the modules were networked by the gateway and
through TASS to one another.
c. Structural Components
The value of the structural measure remained at zero thiou&hout OC1.
SPADS was not able to accomplish the transmission of critical information required by the
commander during this period. During each exercise more traffic was generated than in
previous ones, but at no time could the V Corps commander depend on SPADS for critical
decision making information.
2. Command Survivability
SPADS was able to make significant gains towards achieving command
survivability during OC1. Dispersion between modules gradually increased from zero up
to 48 kilometers—well beyond the minimum ten kilometers required. On the other hand,
no progress at all was made toward redundancy; this specifically related to command
influence and staff interest. Previous Army C2 systems and research studies indicated that
if the commander did not provide personal leadership and demand use of the system, then
the staff members would only use it in a haphazard manner. [Ref. 13:pp. 2-8-2-11, 2-39
- 2-42] Finally, the values of reliability remain constant throughout OC1, while the value
for transportability rises to a steady level by Exercise Caravan Guard III.
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3 . C2 Force Effectiveness
SPADS clearly evolved during OC1 based upon the operational lessons learned.
However, it is not clear that it evolved as a C2 force effectiveness system during this
17-month period. The evolution involved hardware, software, protocols, and
communications interfaces. SPADS had not affected the organization, procedures, or
concept of operations for the V Corps command posts. The dramatic rise in the value of
C2/FE is direcdy related to the increase of XMOTi during the period; more specifically, it is
related to the values of FAIR which measure the interactions of the C2 process. The
measure of the structural component remains zero throughout OC1; therefore, it must be
stated that C2/FE does not "evolve" during this period.
Figure 3.9 provides the cumulative (unweighted) value of each evaluation
category for each exercise of OC1. Figure 3.10 displays the increasing value of each
measure—XMOTi, XCSTi, C2/FE—throughout each exercise of the first operational
capability.
F. SUMMARY
A basic workstation concept was demonstrated in Exercise REFORGER 81 during the
month following contract award. By Exercise Crested Eagle 82, the SPADS concept was
being verified with two modules passing data over encrypted TASS circuits. The
experiment was accelerated with the deployment of nine modules in Exercise Caravan
Guard III in June 1982. The V Corps rear, RAOC, and TAC CP modules were dispersed
some 19 to 45 kilometers from the main CP and a connection was made to the 8ID main CP
SPADS system at a distance of 48 kilometers. The main CP itself was broken up into five
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The rapid deployment of equipment, the limited training time allocated to the staff and
operators, and the lack of command influence and staff interest resulted in a mediocre
demonstration of the SPADS system's ability to effectively support a dispersed command
post. Nor was SPADS able to obviously enhance the commander's ability to achieve
mission objectives during this period. However, the DCP concept had shown that it could
be technically viable if SPADS equipment, software, procedures, and interface could be
improved during the next OC. The key to success for SPADS would have been the direct
influence of the commander, and the role the staff took in integrating SPADS into the entire
V Corps C2 system [Ref. 13:pp. 2-39 - 2-42].
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IV. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 2
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The second operational capability (OC2) began field testing in September during
REFORGER 82. OC2 was planned and designed to use OC1 as a baseline condition and
progress from there. Once again, designs and capabilities were tested and refined during
the operational capability's four exercises: REFORGER 82, Able Archer 82, Wintex 83,
and Caravan Guard IV.
This section addresses four issues central to problem formulation:
1
.
What were the stated requirements of OC2?
2. What tasks from the statement of work (SOW) supported OC2?
3 What other design principles, mandated by DNA, guided the development?
4 . What were the goals of each exercise?
Figure 4.1 shows the seven requirements of OC2 along a month by month timeline.
The dates of the four exercises during OC2 are marked by "•," and are listed below the
central rectangle. The objectives of OC2, based upon requirements and technological
characteristics, are shown to the right.
1 . Requirements for OC2
The seven OC2 objectives to be completed during the 19-month period were: (1)
development of videodisc-generated maps and overlays, (2) distributed and replicated data
bases, (3) minimized data transmission with automated reporting capabilities, (4)
development of a 16-bit microprocessor communications gateway station, (5) dispersal and












































































































































the 8ID DCP concept, and (7) fielding of an improved Apple communications gateway
station.
a. Videodisc-generated Maps and Overlays
OC2 specified videodisc-generated map and overlay capabilities that used
standard map images and overlays of military symbols or icons. The maps were to be
stored on videodisc. To minimize data transmission, only overlay images were to be sent
electronically. [Ref. 8:pp. 32-33]
b. Distributed and Replicated Data Bases
The DBMS was to provide the basic capability for an operator to extract
information from the data base and to enter new or update information. The SPADS
DBMS was to provide the staff with a flexible, responsive and powerful data base. Two
data bases were scheduled to be delivered at the beginning of OC2: the Battlefield
Information Reporting System (BIRS), and the Order of Battle (OB). The BIRS data base
was to be constructed to store friendly force data; the OB data base would provide storage
for enemy force information. These were to be replicated data bases that would be updated
throughout the SPADS network, and all SDSs would be able to obtain the same current
information from their local module's hard disk. [Ref. 8:pp. 32-33]
c. Minimized Data Transmission with Automated Reporting
Capabilities
Automated reporting capabilities were to be designed so that only data (and
not the report format) would be transmitted electronically. This requirement was similar to
the capability achieved in OC1 where only graphics overlays were transmitted. [Ref. 8:p.
32]
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d. 16-bit Microprocessor Communications Gateway Station
Development
This requirement marked a technological enhancement in the gateway
function. The CGSs were taxed to their limits during full-up tests of the DCP. Therefore,
a newer generation microcomputer with 16- and 32-bit architecture was to be selected to
increase the speed of message traffic transmission and reception. [Ref. 8:p. 33]
e. Dispersal and Effective Operation of 13 Modules in the
V Corps DCP Concept
The DCP experimentation program was to continue until the entire V Corps
command post structure could be fully dispersed while effectively performing all corps
battle tasks. This phase of the program was to progress from the accomplishments of
OC1. Full dispersal would be conducted in parallel with the refinement of SPADS system
requirements and the technological enhancements necessary to meet all of the OC's
objectives.
After action or lessons learned reports would be prepared for each exercise
conducted during the time period of this operational capability (June 1982 through
December 1983). [Ref. 8:pp. 28-31]
f . Full Implementation of 8ID DCP Concept
During OC1 the 8ID made progress toward employing a DCP concept.
During OC2 further resources were to be dedicated to developing a more rugged,
transportable and survivable version of the SPADS dispersed command post environment.
[Ref. 8:p. 33]
g . Improved Apple Communications Gateway Station
Selecting a more powerful CGS (Requirement d.) was a long-term solution
to the gateway problem. A short-term fix was required to support the 8ID DCP concept
and to provide a smaller, more capable CGS for all modules. [Ref. 8:p. 33]
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2 . Tasks from the Statement of Work
a. Task 7: Support for REFORGER and Able Archer
This task provided for "on-site" contractor support at V Corps for 120 days.
It would support a limited SPADS demonstration during REFORGER 82 and fund a test of
the full-up DCP concept during Able Archer 82. It was to provide assistance to V Corps to
develop SOPs for each functional area of the staff. Finally, it would provide for
corrections and refinements to the software developed under Task 3 in OC1.
b . Task 8: 8ID AirLand Battle CP Program
Sub-task 8e would continue 8ID support through REFORGER 82.
c. Task 9: Baseline Support
This task provided for support during REFORGER 82, Able Archer 82,
Wintex 83, and Caravan Guard IV. This support was to increase the overall effectiveness
of the system, increase user friendliness and improve clarity.
d. Task 10: On-site Support through Wintex 83
This task required that the developer coordinate with the V Corps staff to
clarify staff requirements for SPADS development.
e. Task 11: 16-bit Microprocessor Communications Gateway
Station
Task 1 1 began the gateway software conversion from the Apple II 8-bit
code to the Corvus Concept 16- and 32-bit code.
f. Task 12: SPADS System Training Documentation
Task 12 required that written and audiovisual instructional materials be
developed. The written materials would include: (1) a User's Guide to the software
capabilities, (2) a Technical User's Guide to assist system managers in operating the
gateways and gaining a deeper understanding of module operations, and (3) a Concept of
Operations Manual aimed at educating staff officers about SPADS.
65
g. Task 13: DCP Videodisc Support
This task was not specified.
h. Task 14: Support to Exercise Caravan Guard IV
The final task for OC2 provided for support for pre-exercise training,
equipment upgrades, and exercise support for Caravan Guard IV. The equipment upgrades
would include the new ACTO mini-SDS for the CBC and Intel modules as well as an
upgrade for the Apple CGS. The Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, VA,
provided $770,000 in March 1982 to purchase microcomputers, videodisc players, hard
disk drives and computer networking equipment to support Caravan Gsaard IV. This was a
joint effort of V Corps, ACTO, DNA, FORSCOM and TRADOC's Combined Arms
Training Development Activity. 1
3 . DNA Design Principles
The second operational capability continued to follow the original five DNA
design principles specified in OC1. It also added two more. These principles would be
continued throughout OC2. [Ref. 8:p. 16]
a. Automate Map Graphics
The objective of this design principle was to minimize the "culture shock"
problem associated with new technology. Videodisc technology was to be used to store
thousands of color photographs of standard military maps. The map images were to be
overlayed with standard military symbols and displayed on a color monitor. This method
would avoid the use of computer-generated maps which seemed less realistic and required
extensive retraining (in the early 1980s). This technique had several secondary benefits:
1 Interview between R. Laird, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Defense Nuclear Agency
Alexandria, Virginia and the author, 17-18 December 1987.
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1.
Everyone would use the same maps
2. Various combinations of friendly and enemy units could be displayed
3 . The problem of working on map corners would be minimized
All these C2 functions were carried out manually at the start of OC2. DNA
believed that it would be impossible to operate efficiently in a DCP environment without
automated map functions. [Ref. 8:pp. 19-20]
b. Develop a User-friendly System
Using familiar formats and simply operated equipment would ensure
effective operation under high levels of stress. This design principle involved the
application of the following concepts:
1
.
Programs would provide prompts to the operator on which steps to take to perform
each function
2. The automated map display would use images of standard army maps (stored on
videodiscs) that presented an identical appearance to other maps in the command post
3 The graphics backgrounds and message formats would be designed to look like the
paper copies of messages already in use
Users would not have to learn any new formats, and standard Army formats
would be used as extensively as possible. [Ref. 8:p. 21]
4. Exercise Objectives during OC1
The overall objective of Exercise REFORGER 82 was to conduct a limited test of
the SPADS system that emphasized testing communications and components. The sub-
objectives were to [Ref. 14:p. 1]:
1 Establish successful data transfer between V Corps and two 8ID elements
2. Experiment with the use of three different types of modems to determine which
could best support SPADS
3
.
Test the uninterruptable power supply (UPS) using field generator power at 8ID and
German commercial power at V Corps main CP
4. Conduct oil-site training of V Corps and 8ID personnel
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5 . Demonstrate the videodisc system of SPADS
The overall objective of the next exercise, Able Archer 82, was to conduct a
limited test of the SPADS system that emphasized two aspects: the testing of power, and




Test the isolation transformers and the UPS in a field environment
2. Continue training V Corps personnel on SPADS
3 Demonstrate videodisc and plotter capabilities
The major objective during Wintex 83 was to test the capability of the SPADS
prototype to provide information exchange and display capabilities in support of the DCP
concept. The sub-objectives included field-testing of the recently deployed videodisc
equipment and the new database management system (DBMS). [Ref. 16:p. 1-1]
V Corps deliberately limited the SPADS test objectives during Exercise Caravan
Guard IV in order to concentrate on the following sub-objectives that were deemed critical
to the success of the V Corps DCP experiment [Ref. 17:p. II- 1]:
1 Establish and maintain a SPADS link with 8ID
2. Successfully transmit time-sensitive tactical information within V Corps and between
V Corps and 8ID using EMS
3
.
Integrate the new ACTO mini-SDSs into CBC operations
4. Experiment with methods of updating the SPADS data base
The 8ID also limited the objectives for this exercise to:
1 Demonstrate SPADS reliability by keeping all modules operational throughout th?
exercise
2. Successfully transmit EMS messages among 8ID modules and with V Corps
3
.
Maintain the current battle data through Current Situation
Table 10 presents an overview of the exercises and objectives for OC2 [Ref.
8:pp. 28 - 30].
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B . BOUNDING THE C2 SYSTEM
This section uses the same approach as Chapter III. First, the workstation bounds of
the hardware and software are described. Then, the module level describes the SPADS
entities and structure within the confines of one modular command post. Finally, the
network level defines the SPADS system within the procedural, geographical, and
hierarchical bounds that interconnect the modules.
TABLE 10
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 2
Primary Objective(s) Date
Exercise REFORGER 82 Sept. 1982
• Interface V Corps-8ID
•Improve communications gateway
Exercise Able Archer 82 Nov. 1982
•Field power system enhancements
•Validate distributed data base
•Deploy 8ID in vans
Exercise WTNTEX 83 March 1983
•Disperse full corps command post
•Field Automated replicated data base
•Field video battlefield display system
Exercise Caravan Guard IV May 1983
•Disperse and displace 8ID
•Create V Corps-8ID command data base
1 . Workstation Level Bounding
a. Hardware
The only new hardware introduced at the workstation level during OC2
either involved enhancements to the SDS or supported a completely new function. The five
peripheral devices added to the staff duty station were a local printer, a videodisc player, a
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graphics overlay device, a joystick, and a graphics tablet. The local printer reduced the
competition at the SOS. The videodisc player and graphics overlay device (both required
by VBDS) were packaged in a rugged case that could be placed underneath the standard
SDS to support the new automated map and overlay functions. The joystick allowed the
SPADS operator to scroll and zoom the picture display, offering greater control the view of
the battiefield within VBDS. The graphics tablet was useful both in preparing slides and in
sketching plans or evaluations of the battlefield situation to be overlayed on the map
display. [Ref. 17:pp. 36-40]
The videodisc system was first demonstrated to V Corps and 8ID during
Exercise REFORGER 82. Both headquarters considered it an important capability and
expressed their desire to have it integrated into their SPADS modules [Ref. 13:p. 9]. The
videodisc system was demonstrated a second time for acceptance testing during Exercise
Able Archer 82. Again, V Corps and 8 ID were impressed by the C2 enhancements
offered by these capabilities [Ref. 15:p. 8 J.
During the SID CPX in December 1982, there were a large number of
hardware failures at the module, workstation and lower levels. A variety of the
components needed to be repaired during this exercise (e.g., floppy disk drives, Apple
microcomputers,circuit cards), and a large number of individual integrated circuit chips had
to be replaced. They were destroyed by power surges, grounding problems, and
unbalanced electrical loads on the SPADS equipment [Ref. 18:pp. 8-14].
An obvious factor that contributed to an incomplete test of the DCP during
OC2 concerned the capabilities of the 8-bit Apple II gateway configurations. There were
many valid and invalid perceptions arising from use of these 8-bit gateways. The inherent
limitations of the microprocessor, as well as the manner in which software had to be
written for that system, required excessive "chaining" and "swapping" to access the many
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SPADS programs and to pass files through the communications gateways. These two
limitations made the system very slow, particularly when under heavy use. [Ref. 16:p. II-
10]
During Exercise Caravan Guard IV the long-awaited ACTO SDS was
delivered. This configuration would soon be known as the mini-SDS. It became very
popular with many SPADS operators and action officers, but it was particularly helpful in
the cramped CPs at the division level. The ACTO SDS consisted only of an Apple 11+
microcomputer, two 5-1/4-inch floppy diskette drives, a thermal printer and a single B&G
monitor in a small ruggedized container. | Ref. 17:p. II-5]
b. Software
Software development during OC2 was divided between adding new
functions for the SPADS user, or correcting or enhancing functions from OC1. The new
functions were the Database Management System (DBMS) and the Video Battlefield
Display System (VBDS). DBMS allowed the staff officer or user to maintain and
manipulate data [Ref. 8:pp. 56, 60]. VBDS displayed an image of a standard military map
with an overlay of both friendly and enemy unit locations, status, and other battlefield data
[Ref. 8:p. 49]. One other function that was introduced was HPITS, which allowed direct
access communications between two staff duty stations in different modules [Ref. 14:p. 6].
The two functions implemented during OC1, Current Situation and
Electronic Mail System (EMS), were both substantially improved during OC2. Current
Situation was able to access the local printer added to the SDSs, and the software was
speeded up over several exercises | Ref. 17:p. 11-5 1. Briefing, which provided the ability to
create and present briefings to the Current Situation software, was also improved during
this cycle [Ref. 17:p. 11-6]. The EMS code, improved during almost every exercise,
allowed the operator to send or receive standard text messages, data, graphics and
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computer code [Ref. 15:pp. 8-9J. Table 1 1 provides an overview of the OC2 software at
the workstation level.
V Corps had repeatedly expressed criticism for the commercial data base
products delivered as stopgaps during OC1. Some of the G1/G4 functions could be
handled by commercial spreadsheet products in Local Program Execution, but their usage
was limited to worksheet-type formats and processing [Ref. 14:p. 9]. The new SPADS
DBMS, using the commercial data base programming language PDBase, was fielded
during Exercise Wintex 83. The DBMS incorporated both BIRS and OB formats for
controlled input by the G3 Operations and G2 Intelligence respective '.y. Tables 12 and 13
display the BIRS and OB input fields respectively. All other users could only read and get
reports from the data; they did not have the capability to make changes to the data base.
Table 14 shows the BIRS and OB report formats available to all users during OC2. The
new VBDS function automatically extracted the current force data for overlay displays
[Ref. 16:p. III-5].
The VBDS software displayed unit and battlefield data as a graphics overlay
over a map image stored on a videodisc. VBDS took the data for graphics from VBDS
files on the module's hard disk. These files contained information on unit location and
status, control measures, and other battlefield characteristics required for a realistic
automated map display. VBDS files were updated locally through the SDS with data
received through the gateway from oilier modules. The graphics overlay was keyed to
UTM2 coordinates, and graphics were adjusted to reflect changes in scale or location. A
graphics tablet was introduced for VBDS during OC2 to input additional overlay data such
as phase lines or boundaries. [Ref. 8:p. 5 1
1
2 Universal Transverse Mercator projection.
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By Exercise Wintex 83, the VBDS code had been rewritten to use a new
videodisc platter that contained expanded map coverage and photos. The new software
added a PHOTO option on the menu; this option identified all locations for which photos
were available on the map being viewed. Although the G3 did not have a need for this
function, several other staff sections immediately requested information on the availability
of photo images and their applications. [Ref. 16:pp. 1II-7, III-8]
2 . Module Level Bounding
The only change at the module level during OC2 was the introduction of a down-
sized communications gateway station (CGS) for use in divisional command posts. This
smaller model had a more limited capacity to support communications links, but was
TABLE 11
BOUNDING OG2 SOFTWARE
AT THE WORKSTATION LEVEL
Relational Data Base
• PDBase (modified) 1
• Enemy and friendly force structure
Video Battlefield Display
• Laser disks hold map images
• Overlay text symbols
• Accesses the two data bases
Electronic Mail
• Commercial package
• Templates or free text




• Two commercial packages
• Rubber band drawing
• Supports graphic tablet/joystick
System Tools
• Word processing
• Execute user software locally
• Network, manager
3 PDBase is a registered trademark of IOTC, Inc.
TABLE 12
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supported by more efficient code which allowed it to operate 25 percent faster than the
original CGS. [Ref. 8:pp. 31-33]
3 . Network Level Bounding
The only advancements at the network level during OC2 involved
implementation of the system at wider or deeper levels. The Wintex 83 Exercise was
extremely successful in demonstrating that the corps headquarters could operate effectively
in the dispersed mode [Ref. 16:p. II-5]. No apparent degradation of C2 functions were
experienced as a result of dispersing the CP modules over a large area during that exercise;
however, the true potential of SPADS capabilities was not tested due to insufficient
integration of support requirements in central C2 functions [Ref. 16:p. II-6].
The following exercise. Caravan Guard IV, simulated the dispersion requirement
and merely used SPADS to pass all data from one module to another. Three corps modules
(CBC, FSE and Plans) were co-located in a civilian gymnasium complex while the Intel
module was located nearby in command post vans. In contrast, SID spread its command
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posts over a wide area, operating out of vans and tracked vehicles across the German
countryside. The division main CP was approximately 40 kilometers from the corps main
CP; DTAC was about 30 kilometers forward of the division main; meanwhile the division
rear CP was located some 20 kilometers to the rear of the 8ID main CP. [Ref. 17:pp. 1-2,
1-4]
TABLE 14
DATA BASE REPORTS AVAILABLE DURING OC2
BIRS REPORTS
Provides the composition of each unit sorted by OPCON
Provides the color codes for current status of equipment
Prints detailed equipment status to SOS only
Prints the Front Line of Troops report and Task
Organization information to the SOS only
Provides the UTM coordinates of friendly locations
Provides the friendly unit missions sorted by OPCON
Provides a description of enemy activity in friendly
sector
Prints a copy of each report to the local printer only
OB REPORTS
Provides a history of a particular unit over time.




4. FLOT and TASKORG
5. Locations
6. Missions
7. Activity of Enemy
8. Print All Reports
1
. Unit Location History
2. Listing of Reports by Time Provides a listing of Intelligence reports sorted by date
3 . Combat Activity Provides the combat activities of all units or a particular
unit. Report is sent to the SOS only
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C. C2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
1 . Workstation Level Integration
Throughout OC2, software and hardware changes produced new opportunities
for the staff sections to interact with SPADS. Although only two new software packages
were introduced, they generated more interest from the operationally oriented staff elements
than any of the previous developments.
The next two figures present the integration of the two new software functions
with the C2 system and the C2 process. Figure 4.2 displays the integration of system,
process and function with the Database Management System [Ref. 8:pp. 58-60]. Figure
4.3 shows the integration of entities, structure and functions with the Video Battlefield
Display System software [Ref. 8:pp. 53-55].
2 . Module Level Integration
The addition of SPADS hardware and software slowly influenced the structure,
organization, procedures and information flow patterns of the V Corps and 8ID command
posts. In OC2 it gradually became clear that without expressed command interest in this
experiment, only certain staff sections or elements would voluntarily take up SPADS as an
effective C2 toolset; most staff sections just ignored SPADS during the exercises. The
G3—the proponent of operations, plans and training—would have been the logical driving
force behind a system that could restore effectiveness to the dispersed CP configuration.





































The V Corps Artillery leadership, from the commander and the Assistant
FSCOORD down to the FSE staff and NCOs, demanded that SPADS meet their needs for
targeting and fire support management. Those leaders invested in SPADS by making
valuable personnel available for training and then assigning them to primary SPADS duties
during all exercises. The FSE module achieved SPADS self-sufficiency before any other
modules. The FSE staff developed its own procedures for integrating SPADS operations
into primary functions before any exercises and tested them throughout OC2. At FSE's
initiative, FSE and Intel modules established their own network and procedures for using
SPADS to improve the processing and passing of critical targeting data for the deep attack
[Ref. 16:pp. 11-15 -11-16]. The TCATA evaluation during Exercise Wintex 83 found that
the FSE's procedures worked extremely well [Ref. 16:pp. 11-22 - 11-25].
b. Plans
The G3 Plans and Exercise officer selected a highly talented and aggressive
NCO at the beginning of OC1, sent him to all of SPADS training, and assigned him as the
module system manager. The G3 Plans came to expect the system to speed up and smooth
all of the internal operations of the module. All Plans action officers soon became adept at
using the system to produce and transmit OPLANS during exercises. In Exercise Wintex
83, the Plans module transmitted ten OPLANS and seven changes; this represented a 400
percent increase over previous exercise results. The Plans module had the highest system
usage per individual during Exercise Wintex 83. [Ref. 16:p. 11-17]
3 . Network Level Architecture
There are two perspectives in examining the network level architecture during
OC2: connectivity and procedures. Communications were finally starting to support
SPADS by the end of OC2. In addition, numerous novel connections were made to the
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gateways during this cycle. On the other hand, integrating the expanding network
architecture into the organization and procedures of the corps or division had been a
complete failure. This section examines these two aspects of the network level. Once the
corps was able to support the DCP concept through SPADS communication gateway
stations, it was in a position to begin integrating the V Corps C2 process from individual
staff duty stations throughout the entire network.
a. SPADS Connectivity
Individuals continued to achieve resourceful solutions to communications
problems throughout OC2. During R£FORGER 82, soldiers from the 8ID decided to
connect the 8ID TAC CP gateway to another gateway some 180 feet away using WD-1
field wire. This experiment worked so well that they used that connection for the
remainder of the exercise. [Ref. 14:p. 8]
The V Corps Commander requested that the V Corps main CP SPADS
gateway connect to a VII Corps pre-production model AN/UYQ-30, Tactical Computer
Terminal (TCT). One staff duty station was hardwired to the TCT using a military version
of an RS-232 interface. Not only were the two systems physically linkable, but they could
transfer files between them. DNA observed this pairing as a possible candidate for future
interoperability funding. A successful project along these lines would have given the V
Corps automated C2 system a means to communicate with the VII Corps militarized,
automated C2 system. [Ref. 14:p. 9]
By exercise Caravan Guard IV, V Corps had learned how to effectively use
the corps multichannel system to support the SPADS network. The Corps C-E section had
begun to understand how to accommodate SPADS requirements, and the After Action




At the start of OC2 there were no SOPs—at any echelon—for the
employment of SPADS. By Able Archer 82, V Corps had begun to make limited progress
towards identifying the information necessary to develop a SPADS SOP. There was no
8ID document related to the preparation or deployment of SPADS [Ref. 15:pp. 7, 10]. A
new set of SPADS manuals were delivered to V Corps in January 1983. The Operator and
System Manager Manuals were distributed immediately, and SPADS operators took these
manuals to the field during the last two exercises. The Staff Officers' Manual, however,
was not even read by those officers with primary C^ADS responsibilities. Even though
guidelines for an extensive SPADS SOP were contained in the manual, no SOPs were
developed by any staff section after this information was distributed. By Caravan Guard
IV only a Current Situation SOP had been developed by any staff section within V Corps.
[Ref. 17:p. HI-12]
Two of the primary lessons V Corps learned after the series of exercises that
culminated in Wintex 83 were that: (1) evolutionary development must be based upon user
identification of needs, and (2) system capabilities must be designed and/or enhanced in
accordance with deliberate plans to integrate SPADS into the V Corps C2 processes.
Unfortunately, throughout OC1 and 2 there had been no systematic approach to defining
and testing user applications or in integrating them into command post routines [Ref.
16:pp. 11-26, 11-27]. The TCATA evaluation of SPADS during Wintex 83 should have
forced the commander and the staff to recognize their situation. The outbrief was honest
and to the point: V Corps either had to embrace SPADS and internalize it within the corps
C2 system, or it had to abandon it entirely. [Ref. 16:pp. 11-27, 11-28]
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c. Inhibiting Factors
The two principal factors inhibiting the progress of SPADS throughout the
first two OCs were: (1) insufficient primary staff emphasis, and (2) insufficient integration
of SPADS into the V Corps C2 processes [Ref. 16:pp. II-8 - 11-10].
V Corps had not placed sufficient emphasis on educating primary staff
officers on the value a distributed data base had in meeting their needs. The DCP concept
represented a dramatic change in traditional C2 procedures. These applications were seen
as foreign to tactical operations by many senior officers [Ref. 12:pp. 21-22]. Many senior
officers conceded that these methods might have value; some even gave them verbal
support. But almost uniformly throughout the V Corps CP, their subordinates were
isolated from the staff duty stations and SPADS products during exercises [Ref. 16:p. II-
8].
Conceptually, the SPADS distributed and replicated data base could have
provided the V Corps commander with the critical common perception of the battle and
with specific information required for timely decision making. Unfortunately, most of the
primary staff had not devoted any time to learning SPADS, nor had they directed their
overburdened subordinates to use or learn SPADS. As a result, most staff sections could
not idendfy information flows that would satisfy their own C2 functions by the end of
OC2. [Ref. 16:pp. II-8 - II-9]
d. Contributing Factors
Exercise Caravan Guard IV demonstrated to V Corps and 8ID commanders
that SPADS could have been a reliable tactical C2 system during the DCP experiment if
they had devoted resources to proper planning and operational procedures. They
considered the overwhelming success of these exercises as the first step in a new phase of
SPADS development. At the post exercise In-Progress Review, V Corps adopted a draft
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SPADS charter (displayed in Table 15) and adopted a tentative plan for a new
organizational element for controlling SPADS within V Corps. [Ref. 17:pp. 11-14 - 11-16]
TABLE 15
V CORPS SPADS CHARTER
Develop a DCP program plan with specific exercise objectives
Identify and prioritize information needs to support procedures and decision making
Define how SPADS works in each module
Develop a SPADS program plan with specific exercise objectives, training
requirements and organizational responsibilities
Develop SOPs for DCP and SPADS
Conduct mini-CPXs in garrison prior to each exercise
D. DATA GENERATION
The data generated for this OC are shown in Table 16.3 The data generation
worksheet and formulas discussed in Chapter II were used to produce values for this OC.
The means for each evaluation category are displayed in Figure 4.4. The next paragraph
briefly discusses the data generation procedures presented in Chapter II.
4 The following sources provided raw data on OC2 exercises: Ref. 13 (REFORGER
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To begin the data generation for this operational capability, after action and lessons
learned reports were collected for each exercise from V Corps, DNA, and the developer.
Using the worksheet, definitions, and procedures specified in Chapter II, values were
determined for every measure from each exercise. The measures were individually
considered as binary conditions for each DCP module that participated in the exercise being
evaluated. The summed measures (e.g., FAIR, XMOTi, and XCSTi) received their
cumulative, unweighted scores based upon their constituent measures of performance or
effectiveness. The final measure, C2/FE, was calculated using the procedure specified in
Chapter II. The results for each exercise are displayed in Table 16, and the means for each
evaluation category are shown in Figure 4.4.
E. AGGREGATION AND INTERPRETATION OF MEASURES
The extensive information available in these After Action and Lessons Learned Reports
(Ref. 14 - 18) contained a great deal of data and were extremely helpful in understanding
the characteristics of the experiments during the exercises.
1 . C2 Mission Orientation
The value of C2 Mission Orientation, XMOTi, seems to start at approximately
the same level as OC1, drops sharply and then rises dramatically at the end of OC2. There
is a measurable gain in effectiveness by the end of the experiment period; however, there
was a tremendous loss of functionality during the period of REFORGER 82 through the
8ID CPX in December 1982. The following three sections interpret the three components
of C2 Mission Orientation.
a. C2 Process
There was a dramatic loss in functionality from the end of OC1, in June
1982, through the 8ID CPX that December 1982. While the functions of the V Corps
commander and staff may have remained constant, the DCP environment and SPADS, in
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particular, caused a severe decrease in the commander's and staffs abilities to exercise
command and control of the corps. Only the sharp rise in FAIR values during the last two
exercises represents the increasing functionality of the SPADS system within the DCP
environment.
b. Physical Entities
Physical entities continued to change during OC2. Some new software was
introduced, established software functions were constantly refined, and new hardware was
integrated into the DCP environment. The value of capacity does not remain constant for
each module that was already in the V Corps DCP. As the modules were rearranged from
exercise to exercise, the system's capacity diminishes until the exercises in spring 1983.
Then, the total aggregated value increases as the modules were networked by the
communications gateway stations to one another through TASS.
c. Structural Components
The value of the structural measure rises slightly, decreases again, and
finally steadies at the end of OC2. For the first time, SPADS was able to accomplish the
transmission of critical information required by the commander. Despite peak transmission
periods and temporary communications outages during each exercise, SPADS was finally
able to provide the V Corps commander with dependable, critical, decision making
information.
2 . Command Survivability
SPADS continued to make significant gains towards achieving command
survivability during OC2. Except for the initial three command post exercises, dispersion
between modules gradually increased and more modules were added to the corps system.
Continuing the trend from OC1, no progress was made toward redundancy; this continued
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to be specifically related to command influence and staff interest. Finally, the values of
reliability and transportability remain constant for each module during OC2.
3 . C2 Force Effectiveness
SPADS did evolve during the operational capability based upon the operational
lessons learned. It was still not clear how much progress SPADS had made during this
19-month period. The evolution involved hardware, software, protocols and
communications interfaces. SPADS only began to affect the organization, procedures or
concept of operations for the V Corps command posts at the end of OC2, during the
Caravan Guard IV In-Progress Review [Ref. 17:pp. 11-14 - 11-16]. The values of C2/FE
rise distinctly at the end of the experiment period when the V Corps and 8ID scaled
objectives down to realistic levels and sought to gain maximum advantage from their
automated C2 system. The values of all significant measures, i.e. XMOTi, XCSTi and
C2/FE, nearly double in value by the end of OC2.
Figure 4.5 provides the cumulative (unweighted) value of each evaluation
category for each exercise of OC2. Figure 4.6 displays the changing value of each
measure—XMOTi, XCSTi, C2/FE—throughout each exercise of the second operational
capability.
F. SUMMARY
The second operational capability was a turbulent period for V Corps, 8ID and DNA.
All of these organizations had specific objectives for this period, and all of their objectives
failed to some degree. This section frankly discusses procedures, training,
communications, hardware and software as they relate to the performance of the V Corps





































in o ir> o
cm o r*» in
eg CM t- T-
m
CM
OO in oin inCM

















































3spj9xg qDBg joj sanjBA. aAijEjnuirQ
91
The lessons learned from the SPADS evolutionary development cycle must focus on
procedures and training because these two structural components are critical to the success,
or lack thereof, of a prototype C2 system. To a large extent they determine the
effectiveness of the fielding and implementation. System designers should have been more
careful planners, thoughtful schedulers and more cognizant of requirements, committed to
successful implementation, and engaged in a systematic training program if they wanted to
insure SPADS user effectiveness. This does not imply that system and personnel
problems, diagnoses, fixes and modifications that resulted as a response to system
problems would not ha,7e occurred. These situations are a necessary part of any rapidly
fielded system. The lessons learned by users in the field environment are the basis for
system improvement and enhancement in an evolutionary development cycle. The scope
and speed of the system's advancement, measured objectively, was significantly influenced
by staff priorities for the system, SOP construction and revision, and the staffs attitude
toward effective training and retraining. [Ref. 8:p. 65]
1. Procedures
Throughout the evolutionary development cycle, there was evidence that a highly
reliable tactical command and control could only be implemented if adequate planning and
operational procedures were employed. A critical factor in the success of this evolutionary
development program was the careful definition of minimum essential information and the
data distribution architectures by the headquarters staffs. This essential step was almost
totally lacking throughout the first two operational capability cycles. [Ref. 8:p. 65]
Emphasis should have been placed upon soliciting and coordinating staff
requirements of the corps and division headquarters. These staffs significantly failed to
produce a working SOP that reflected the flow, storage and retrieval of messages, data ,or
briefings from SPADS. Without this document, staff requirements could not be translated
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into data to support the distributed C2 system. Also lacking was a listing of the operator
and staff officer responsibilities for information processing procedures. The SOP should
have indicated who, what, when, where and how each test of the DCP program related to
the functions that were being supported by the staffs. Little time was available for this
critical document, and there is no evidence that any was expended to accomplish this task.
Its completion during OC2 would have greatly enhanced the quality of implementation and
the rapid fielding of the distributed C2 system. [Ref. 8:p. 69]
2 . Training
The headquarters' staffs should have carefully scrutinized the personnel selected
for training. They did not ensure that potential operators and system managers had
sufficient time to gain experience with SPADS. Experienced SPADS users could have
clearly identified those procedures that could have been better automated, pinpointed
obsolete functions or equipment, and identified the manner in which new operational
procedures could have been implemented. The corps would have obtained an ongoing
program that produced quality operators and system managers who could have significantly
contributed to fine tuning SPADS to meet the Army's needs. [Ref. 8:p. 67]
Two other integral training program components were lacking. On-the-job
training and pre-exercise rehearsals were equally necessary for users to understand the
enemy threat, the constraints of the exercise scenarios, and the functions of SPADS in the
DCP environment.
Training documentation should have reflected the level of sophistication of the
commercial technology and should have been incorporated into SPADS itself. Self-paced
documentation could have been available for the user who recently joined the organization
or who missed the formal training cycle. On-line tutorials using SPADS videodisc
technology could have been substituted for the lengthy manuals to assist the operator in
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learning how to set up and operate the staff duty stations. A critical oversight was the lack
of a small, weatherproof, pocket-sized reference manual that could be carried by the
operator or permanently affixed to the SDS; this would have been superior to the bulky
system documentation that was nearly always damaged or left behind by staff officers and
users. [Ref. 8:p. 67]
Finally, data file development for future exercises should have been initiated as
soon as possible within the guidelines of the requirements document and completed before
the anticipated move to field locations. Selected operator refresher training could have been
conducted concurrently with this development. Following the move to the field,
immediately after system equipment and communications were installed and operational,
testing and demonstration of the system should have begun. These tests and
demonstrations should have included mini-exercise, requirements-driven scenarios to
insure a comprehensive shakedown of SPADS prior to commencement of the exercise.
[Ref. 8:p. 69]
3 . Communications
Both the V Corps Signal Brigade's and Communications-electronics (C-E) staff
section's lack of involvement with SPADS during the first two OCs severely affected its
development. Their early involvement was absolutely necessary for an initial good start as
well as to planned progress during the following evolutionary development cycle. As
military technical consultants to the system, they possessed the ability to determine whether
the system could actually meet the operational needs of the V Corps DCP concept. These
communications experts would have been an excellent source of advice in the planning of
exercises, and could have insured that operational staff sections conformed to the new
automated procedures. [Ref. 8:pp. 74-75]
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Instead, serious interoperability problems caused major time delays and
adversely affected the goals and purposes of numerous exercises and tests. The C-E staffs
involvement would have insured that essential time was devoted to testing the system,
observing the man-machine interface, obtaining user feedback, evaluating system usability
and meeting the requirements of the OC. Moreover, these communications experts could
have predicted avoidable problems that seriously frustrated new operators and system
managers who were often uncomfortable in their roles, and could have contributed to the
success of many DCP exercises. [Ref. 8:p. 74]
Another area where expert help was needed was in the communications method
used to connect local modules to one another and to other modules at longer distances.
Operational users failed to learn a basic lesson: before deploying to the field, users need to
devote considerable time to planning and pre-exercise engineering in order to ensure a
sufficiently good system interface and a better chance of success for communicating
between microcomputer based systems. The C-E staff was already planning and
engineering tactical multichannel systems, and they should have assimilated SPADS into
their area of responsibility. [Ref. 8:p. 74]
Regardless of the technological advances or the sophistication of the system
enhancements, SPADS could not meet its stated objectives unless the communications
problems—especially with the interface—were remedied. Experienced communications
planners were needed to make provisions for the distribution of information among
echelons vertically as well as horizontally across staff support functions. The V Corps
Signal community's lack of involvement prevented reliable and reasonable communications
capabilities from being planned for and employed during the first two operational capability
cycles. The most significant problem in communications was not with the communicators
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(who ignored SPADS), but with the lack of command influence which should have insured
that professional communicators were involved in SPADS from the outset. [Ref. 8:p. 75]
4. Hardware
The hardware lessons learned during OC2 interact with the lessons learned in
preceding summaries. The relatively minor hardware problems which developed during
the first two OCs indicated that the evolutionary development cycle is a good means to fine
tune hardware components that have to be fielded quickly. The successes of the SPADS
system hardware in meeting and exceeding user requirements resulted from an early
fielding strategy and hands-on use that supported the effectiveness of the evolutionary
development concept. [Ref. 8:p. 83]
It may seem obvious that hardware had to be integrated with software into a
usable system that automated the V Corps operational procedures to benefit the DCP.
However, the field users, DNA, and the developer had to develop a three-way dialogue
before they could produce and field a C2 system that permitted the staff to operate more
efficiently and allowed the commander to control his forces effectively. The hardware had
to possess the capabilities required to support the system software. Moreover, the software
had to be tailored to meet limitations of the hardware that were first identified during field
tests and exercises. Only in this manner could the users distinguish between hardware and
software problems in the SPADS system. [Ref. 8:p. 82]
Hardware that was difficult for the average military user to operate and maintain
would be abandoned as inoperable during high stress periods—when it was most needed to
contribute to a survivable system. The proponent of the system and the developer should
have actively obtained feedback about the system hardware. Staff officers, who depended
upon SPADS information processing and decision support capabilities, could have been
among the best reviewers of hardware failures and inadequacies. Moreover, senior staff
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officers were in a unique position to judge how the staff adjusted operational procedures to
the constraints imposed by the system hardware. Likewise, the advice of SPADS
operators would have been valuable because they were closest to the hardware problems
and were the most likely to make worthwhile judgments regarding its usability. [Ref. 8:pp.
82-83]
5 . Software
The interaction effects among the other system components (procedures,
training, communications, hardware and user inexperience) adversely affected the
capability of SPADS software to adequately perform its intended functions. Software
development should have taken these constraints of the users' environment into
consideration. A positive example of such an adaptation was how the developer, after
gaining an understanding of military communications traffic loads on TASS, developed
software that only transmitted the data that were absolutely essential. It was not necessary
to transmit entire files. Other successful examples include message formats being stored on
every module's hard disk and all maps being stored on videodisc. Once again, only the
new data required to fill in reports or to show unit locations on map overlays had to be
transmitted and received. [Ref. 8:pp. 87-88]
During the first OC, there were many instances where usability, storage, update
or retrieval interfered with SPADS effectiveness. Throughout the second OC the developer
made a concerted effort to minimize those software deficiencies that adversely affected
operations. However, the initial fielding and testing of software was absolutely essential in
order to identify those shortcomings that could be diagnosed and corrected before the
following exercises and test. [Ref. 8:p. 86]
The majority of the software problems that occurred during the second
operational capability related to the following tasks [Ref. 8:p. 85]:
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1.
Tailoring software to meet operational user requirements or automation needs
2. Increasing software speed and efficiency
3 Fine tuning system software to make it more usable and responsive to staff officers'
needs
4. Eliminating system software bugs that impede the execution of system utilities
5. Advancing the software's technological capabilities to perform more sophisticated
staff operations
6. Integrating existing and new software with hardware enhancements that develop as
the system matures or the staff functions change
Although much of the responsibility for software remained with the developer,
staff off wvi ! should have ascertained which operational functions and procedures required
automation early in OC1. These officers should have developed SOP documentation that
clearly addressed those considerations so that hardware meeting those software
requirements could have been carefully selected and developed. And they should have
identified appropriate data structures to support the software development. The developer
could not foresee future changes of the system, so staff officers should have concisely
specified the procedures and functions that would benefit most from software development.
[Ref. 8:p. 87]
6. Outlook
This chapter's summary catalogued the myriad sources of problems that afflicted
the SPADS experiment throughout OC2. In spite of these observations, it was clear that
DNA saw SPADS as continuing to make significant progress towards the fully dispersed
command post concept for both the corps and the division. Capabilities demonstrated in
the exercises during 1982 and 1983 verified the viability of the DCP concept in employing
a prototypical dispersed C2 system linked through standard tactical communications. By
the end of OC2, many necessary improvements to fully implement the DCP concept and
fully support SPADS had been identified. Therefore, DNA decided to continue the
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experiment through the end of Fiscal Year 1985 to fully demonstrate the concept and to
identify and improve the methodology by which it could be fully implemented.
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V. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 3
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Funding for the third operational capability started in July 1983 and field-testing began
in September during REFORGER 83. OC3 was planned and designed to start with the
first two operational capabilities as a baseline condition and progress from there. Once
again, designs and capabilities were tested and refined during the OC's five exercises:
REFORGER 83, Able Archer 83, Crested Eagle 84, Caravan Guard V, and RFFORGER
84. The Army conducted an external evaluation of SPADS during Wintex 85; this one
exercise is also considered part of the evaluation.
This section addresses four issues central to problem formulation:
1
.
What were the stated requirements of OC3?
2. What tasks from the statement of work (SOW) supported OC3?
3 What other design principles, mandated by DNA, guided the development?
4 . What were the goals of each exercise?
Figure 5.1 shows the eight requirements of OC3 along a month by month timeline.
The dates of the five exercises during OC3 are marked by "•," below the central rectangle.
The objectives of OC3, based upon requirements and technological characteristics, are
shown to the right.
1 . Requirements for OC3
The eight OC3 objectives to be completed during the final 20-month period of the DCP
experiment were to: (1) develop a mini-staff duty station for G3 ACTOs and divisional use,
(2) modify equipment for use in vehicles, (3) develop interface requirements for other C2
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management system, (6) field a 16-bit communications gateway station, (7) prepare V
Corps for self-sufficiency, and (8) complete the V Corps DCP concept.
a. Develop a Mini-Staff Duty Station for G3 ACTOs
and Divisional Use
Four ACTO SDSs were demonstrated for acceptance testing during OC2.
Based on overwhelming staff action officer acceptance, DNA decided that all non-VBDS
staff duty stations for the 8ID should be converted to the mini-SDS. In addition, once the
new 16-bit gateways were fielded, the older Apple gateways would be converted into mini-
SDSs for distribution to other units. [Rv_ f. 17:p. II-5]
b. Modify Equipment for Use in Vehicles
The 8ID experienced recurring hardware, grounding, and power problems
throughout OC2. During Exercise REFORGER 82, 8ID tested UPSs with field generators
and German commercial power to determine whether these devices could protect SPADS
equipment. [Ref. 14:pp. 1-6] During the 8ID CPX in December 1982, there were a large
number of failures on the local area network, within the SDSs and at the gateways.
Numerous interface cards and integrated circuit chips were destroyed by power surges,
grounding problems, and unbalanced electrical loads. [Ref. 18:pp. 8-14]
DNA specified that hardware solutions would be implemented to protect the
8ID SPADS equipment when it was operating in the M-4 vans.
c . Develop Interface Requirements for Other C2 Systems
The successes during past exercises produced the requirement for
interconnectivity with other Army C2 systems [Ref. 14:p. 9] The requirements for OC3
were to develop rigorous interface specifications or protocols for: (1) MICROFIX, (2) the
Tactical Computer Terminal (TCT), (3) TACFIRE and (4) the Target Analysis and
Planning (TAP) program. [Ref. 8:pp. 33-35]
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d. Develop Interactive Graphics
During past operational capability cycles there had been limited success with
the timely production of manually generated decision graphics. This shortfall would be the
impetus for a software effort that integrated information from SPADS DBMS and Briefing
to produce an automatically updating decision graphic for Current Situation.
e. Refine or Enhance the Database Management System
V Corps G3 Operations and several other staff sections had expressed a
need for data bases with additional functions. The G3 had also requested that instructions
be given to key V Corps staff personnel on the construction of data bases using SPADS
DBMS. [Ref. 16:p. III-6]
During Caravan Guard IV staff users suggested that more rapid data base
updates could be accomplished in future exercises if the data bases were updated directly,
rather than through information passed by electronic mail [Ref. 17:p. 1-4].
These two user requirements would be implemented during OC3.
f. Deploy a 16-bit Communications Gateway Station
The original 8-bit gateway could not meet the needs of the V Corps DCP by
the end of OC2. Task 1 1 of the SOW required the developer to convert the 8-bit gateway
code to the 16-bit microcomputer selected for the new gateway. New CGSs were needed
to increase the speed of message traffic transmission and reception, to reduce LAN and
hard disk contention, and to produce more efficient management of the module's computer
resources. [Ref. 8:p. 33]
g. Prepare V Corps for a Successful Transition to
Self-sufficiency
DNA selected V Corps to be the testbed for the DCP experiment in 1981.
The agency had provided all guidance and logistics, as well as most of the funding,
through the end of OC2. One of the conclusions of the Caravan Guard In-progress Review
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(IPR) was that V Corps should develop a plan to manage SPADS as an Army C2 program.
The V Corps Charter, presented in Chapter IV, would be the starting point for the transition
to self-sufficiency. [Ref. 17:pp. 11-14 - 11-16]
h. Complete the V Corps DCP Concept
The completed V Corps DCP concept would consist of: (1) horizontal
command and information flow throughout the dispersed corps modules, and (2) vertical
command and information flow from the corps commander to his immediate subordinate
combat commanders in the 3AD, 8ID, 1 1ACR, and 12CAG.
2 . Tasks from the Statement of Work
a. Task 15: Provide Extended Exercise Support
Test objectives and key data elements needed for the evaluation of V Corps
DCP exercises were to be identified for each CPX, FTX, etc. so that systems evaluators
from supporting Army agencies could monitor the progress of SPADS during OC3.
b. Task 16: Provide Continued Hardware and Software
Development for the DCP Program
The developer was to accomplish two tasks: (1) refine or correct software
problems identified in past exercises, and (2) continue 16-bit microprocessor CGS
development.
c. Task 17: Provide Exercise Support
In July 1983 TRADOC provided $1.4 million to provide support to the V
Corps and 8ID DCP programs through the second quarter of fiscal year 84 (FY 84). The
Army Command and Control Initiative Program (TACIP) was to monitor the
accomplishment of this task. 1
interview between R. Laird, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Defense Nuclear Agency,
Alexandria, Virginia and author, 17-18 December 1987.
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d. Task 18: Software Support
The developer was tasked to: (1) continue development of the 16-bit
communications gateway, (2) continue user identification requirements, and (3) customize
software for division usage.
e. Task 19: On-site Support for the DCP Program
This task required the developer to establish an on-site support facility at V
Corps Headquarters in Frankfurt, West Germany. The facility would be completely
furnished with tools, documentation, and spare parts and be supported by an integrated
logistics support plan. Two full-time employees, a software developer and a systems
inte grater, were to provide on-site support 40 hours per week in garrison and as required
during exercises. [Ref. 8:p. 20]
f. Task 20: Continued Support
The first part of this task would provide software support and corrections
during exercises. It would also improve the SPADS database management system and
integrate the DBMS with automatic graphics output. It would investigate the display of
improved decision graphics information and require that the SPADS communication
software be modified to implement both TCT and MICROFTX protocols.
g. Task 21: Field a 16-bit Communication Gateway Station
The developer was required to accomplish the following at V Corps: (1)
field a 16-bit microcomputer-based CGS, (2) install the 16-bit CGS, and (3) conduct
training for the new gateway.
h. Task 22: Transition Training and Support
This final task of OC3 was supposed to assist V Corps and 8ID SPADS
users in preparing to be self-sufficient after FY 84. The developer was required to: (1)
conduct pre-exercise support and evaluation and assist commander and staffs in identifying
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SPADS objectives and performance standards based upon such objectives; (2) conduct
technical support for Caravan Guard V and REFORGER 84; (3) publish post-exercise
reports; (4) conduct an expanded training program at V Corps; and (5) update all
documentation, revise the User's Manual, and produce a free-standing reference flip card
set.
TRADOC provided $350,000 for this task in February 1984; the first
$190,000 was to be used by 30 September 1984 and the final $160,000 used by 30
September 1985.2
3. SID REFORGER 84 Statement of Work
The 8ID developed a separate statement of work to support the plans that they
had developed for REFORGER 84 [Ref. 20:pp. 1-2]. (These plans are discussed in detail
later in this chapter.)
a. Task 1: Develop a Hardwire Interface Between a SPADS
Workstation and a TACFIRE System
This task required that a MTLSTD 188 interface to TACFIRE be developed. This
interface had to be capable of transferring data files between the TACFIRE and SPADS
systems as well as passing free text from SPADS to TACFIRE.
b. Task 2: Develop a System for Automatically Updating SPADS
Position Location Data Bases Based Upon Electronic
Information Provided by TACFIRE
The developer was required to develop a system to receive and interpret the
data base information coming from TACFIRE through the hardwire interface. The SPADS
system was required to insert this data into a PDBase relation within the DBMS.
2Ibid.
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c. Task 3: Provide On-site Exercise Support to SID During
REFORGER 84
Support was to be provided at the pre-REFORGER CPX as well as
throughout REFORGER 84. The 8ID personnel were to be trained on the following
SPADS II3 capabilities: briefing, graphics systems, and the DAViD videodisc system.
4 . DNA Design Principles
The third operational capability continued to follow the seven DNA design
principles specified in OC1 and OC2 [Ref. 8:p. 16].
5. Exercise Objectives during OC3
V Corps would use SPADS during Exercise REFORGER 83 to maintain
exercise control over the "orange" (8ID) and "blue" (3AD) forces from the corps field site
at Fliegerhorst Kaseme in Hanau. V Corps would establish one CBC for each force. 8ID
was expected to use SPADS to control the "orange" forces throughout the exercise. 3AD,
using equipment borrowed from V Corps, would employ SPADS for the first time. The
3AD SPADS objectives were to provide friendly situation data to V Corps and to 3AD
RAOC using the BIRS data base, and to pass message traffic among the 3AD main CP,
3AD RAOC, and V Corps using EMS. [Ref. 20:p. 1-2]
The primary SPADS objective for Exercise Able Archer 83 was the acceptance
test of the new 16-bit Corvus Concept-based CGS. This new gateway had been
demonstrated during REFORGER 83. A secondary objective for V Corps was to check
out internal operating procedures using SPADS. [Ref. 20:p. II- 1]
3The USAREUR Distributed Decision Aids System (UDDAS) introduced in March
1984 became known as SPADS II.
4 Corvus and Corvus Concept are registered trademarks of Corvus Computers.
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The primary SPADS objective for Exercise Crested Eagle 84 was to field and test
the full deployment of the 16-bit communication gateway station and associated software.
A secondary objective of the exercise was to evaluate a new V Corps videodisc and the new
VBDS software required to integrate the video platter into the SPADS system. [Ref. 20:p.
m-i]
The SPADS objectives for Exercise Caravan Guard V were to check out the
software corrections or modifications that V Corps had mandated at the Exercise Crested
Eagle IPR in March, and to evaluate the development of automatic graph creation that V
Corps had requested during Exercise Able Archer 83. [Ref. 20:p. V-l]
The 8ID objectives for Exercise REFORGER 84 were to implement a SPADS-
TACFIRE interface, use the USAREUR Distributed Decision Aids System (UDDAS)
software to display the exercise information at the Umpire Control Center (UCC), and use
SPADS to support the three Area Control Centers (ACQ.
The primary SPADS objective for Exercise Wintex 85 was to support the V
Corps CPX which consisted of the V Corps Headquarters, two division headquarters, and
the 1 1ACR [Ref. 22:p. 7] A secondary objective was to provide the TCATA test team the
opportunity to evaluate the V Corps DCP shortly after the conclusion of OC3
[Ref. 22:p. 1].
The two TCATA test issues for the evaluation during Wintex 85 were: (1) to
assess the assistance provided to the commander and staff by the C2 system, and (2) to
assess the assistance provided to the C2 function by SPADS and document key
characteristics of that system [Ref. 22:p. 5]
Table 17 presents an overview of the exercises and objectives for OC3.
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B. BOUNDING THE C2 SYSTEM
This section uses the same approach as Chapters 3 and 4. First, the workstation
bounds of the hardware and software are described. Then the module level describes the
SPADS entities and structure within the confines of one modular command post. Finally,
the network level defines the SPADS system within the procedural, geographical, and
hierarchical bounds that interconnect the modules.
1. Workstation Level Bounding
a. Hardware
Although no new hardware was introduced at the workstation level during
OC3, some previously tested components were removed from the staff duty station.
Neither the graphics tablet nor the joystick were rugged enough for field use and were
removed without replacements.
After the successful demonstration of the ACTO mini-SDS during OC2, the
decision was made that only mini-SDSs would be fielded for the remainder of the
experiment. The mini-SDS had all the capabilities of the original SDS except that it could
not support the VBDS functions.
b. Software
Software development during OC3 was split between upgrading older
software to take advantage of the new gateway capabilities and fielding the interactive
graphics software. The Data Automated Graphics and Retrieval (DAGMaR) system,
introduced in 1984, provided the staff user with greater control over graphics and overlay
capability. DAGMaR enabled the staff officer to link spreadsheets, data bases, and
decision graphics capabilities to produce automatically updating briefing slides that could be
incorporated in Current Situation.
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TABLE 17
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 3
Principle Objective(s) Date
Exercise REFORGER 83 Sept. 1983
• 3rd Armored Division added to system
• Automated data links V Corps - 8ID - 3AD
• Mini Staff Duty Stations fielded
• Upgraded LAN for field use
Exercise Able Archer 83 Nov. 1983
• 16-bit communications gateway demonstration
Exercise Crested Eagle 84 March 1984
• 16-bit communications gateways fielded
• New video disk software demonstrated
• V Corps CTOC linked through SPADS to the USAREUR
Distributed Decision Aid System (UDDAS)
into the CENTAG Main CP
• TCT-SPADS demonstration at CENTAG
Exercise Caravan Guard V May 1984
• Modifications to electronic mail system, text editor, data
base management system, video battlefield display system,
and communications gateway software
• Implementation ofTCT protocol on the 16-bit CGS
• 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment added to system
Exercise REFORGER 84 Sept. 1984
• Integrated Data Automated Graphics and Retrieval
(DAGMar) system software delivered
• Implementation ofTACFIRE protocol on the 16-bit CGS
• 8ED Engineer/Obstacle data base implemented
Exercise Wintex 85 March 1985
• External evaluation of all OC3 capabilities by TCATA
During Exercise REFORGER 83, V Corps staff users had requested the
feasibility of having Briefing and Current Situation graphs automatically updated by the
DBMS. With the original software, the SPADS operator had to painstakingly edit each
graphic slide with every new update. DAGMar, introduced in 1984, significantly
simplified the creation and updating of spreadsheet-based graphs. Once the user created
110
his/her fundamental graph, the program automatically generated a current version of the
graph every time the data base was updated. These automatically created decision graphics
were transmitted to all other modules in the network for viewing in Current Situation.
[Ref. 20:p. VI-3]
The text editor and EMS were integrated during the period between
REFORGER 83 and Crested Eagle 84. This integration removed unnecessary options,
made the EMS functions flow more smoothly, and allowed the operator to perform all
message-handling functions without leaving EMS. [Ref. 20:p. Ill- 15]
The following corrections and enhancements were made to the EMS
software immediately prior to Exercise Caravan Guard V [Ref. 20:p. HI- 15]:
1
.
Messages could be sent to more than 25 users simultaneously
2 . Users could no longer create illegal volumes
3 . Duplicate messages were no longer sent to addressees
4 . The mail delete option was speeded up
5 . Mail sent without an addressee no longer caused the gateway to stop
6. Action and information addressee were listed in "plain English" and selected
addressees were printed on each message
7 . An escape option was built in for use in the Read Mail option
8
.
More than ten modules could be addressed
9 . Forwarded mail was no longer returned to the sender
A major objective of Exercise REFORGER 83 had been to use the BIRS
and OB data bases for the first time to exchange friendly and enemy information among V
Corps units at different echelons. During Exercise Crested Eagle 84, the two data bases
were used even more, resulting in G3 Operations and G3 Plans identifying areas that
required timely correction before the next exercise. The following refinements were
implemented immediately before Caravan Guard V [Ref. 20:p. IE- 16]:
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1.
A global update capability was created
2 . V Corps engineer data bases were developed
3 Time required to print out BIRS and OB reports was reduced
4. An "as of DTG" reporting format for BIRS and OB was added
Following Exercise REFORGER 84, V Corps SPADS users developed an
updated, friendly status data base called BIRS II. This was based upon the identified
requirements of G3 Operations, G3 Plans, G4 Operations, and FSE. Table 5.2 displays
the BIRS II input fields [Ref. 22:p. 56]
Up until Exercise Crested Eagle 84, the text editor SPADS used was a
commercially produced Pascal text editing package. SPADS users had noted recurring
problems in this text editor. Additionally, the editor no longer met V Corps requirements.
A new text editor was integrated with EMS. Following Exercise Crested Eagle 84, SPADS
users requested the following fixes and refinements [Ref. 20:p. HI- 16]:
1
.
Eliminate the appearance of control characters within text
2. Insert a spooling capability so that all output does not go to the local printer
3 Develop a List Directory capability so that users can scan their own workspaces for
file names
A secondary objective of Exercise Crested Eagle had been to evaluate a new
videodisc and the associated software. The G3 staff users recommended that the following
capabilities be included within VBDS as soon as possible [Ref. 20:p. HI- 17]:
1 Put six-digit coordinates in both VBDS and the DBMS
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The software capabilities of SPADS were virtually completed by Caravan
Guard V. DAGMaR was introduced in three stages over the next three months. The
integration of DBMS, the chart editor, and the spreadsheet was accomplished by October
1984.
SPADS developed four information exchange capabilities: word processing,
electronic mail, graphics, and a common data base. Word processing provided the
capability to prepare, edit, update, and print text information e.g., plans and orders.
Electronic mail provided the means to transmit and receive the following information within
and between modules: Commander's estimate, FRAGO, FLOTREP, SITREP, OPORD,
INTSUM, SPOTREP and Weather. The graphics data were stored locally; the overlay
data, which were superimposed on graphic data or videodisc-generated maps, were
transmitted within and between modules. The common data base at each module was
partitioned according to staff/echelon functions; users input data into their partitioned area
of the common data base; and the input data was automatically replicated in common data
bases at other module locations.
These information exchange capabilities were supported by the following
software capabilities of SPADS. BIRS gave the SPADS users information on friendly
units and was available through the DBMS at all staff duty stations. Similarly, OB
provided information on enemy units for all users. EMS provided intra- and inter-module
text transfer for all SPADS users. VBDS was available at one SDS in each module to
provide display of friendly and enemy force data and situation. Spreadsheet provided
processing for worksheet calculations and transmission for all users. Current Situation
was available at every SDS. DAGMaR provided decision support by integrating the
DBMS, spreadsheet, and decision graphics at all staff duty stations. [Ref. 19:p. 50]
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In addition, SPADS developed five decision support capabilities during the
three operational capabilities. A relational database management system provided the
means to extract information from large data files by querying of a single file or across
multiple files. The correlation of geographically indexed reports and data bases with map
backgrounds provided the capability to automatically display data such as unit locations on
a single overlay of specially prepared maps shown on the color monitor. Map-to-photo
correlation allowed quick retrieval of photographs stored on the videodisc by pinpointing
the location of the desired photograph on the map display being viewed through a series of
crosshair overlays. Spreadsheet models provided the means to perform mathematical
calculations related to status monitoring and projection. The execution of functional area
algorithms supported individual staff functions such as maneuver, combat service support,
target planning, and force comparison.
2. Module Level Bounding
a. Hardware
The significant advancement at the module level was the introduction of the
16-bit communications gateway station. The 16-bit gateway was demonstrated during
Exercise REFORGER 83 and successfully underwent acceptance testing during Exercise
Able Archer 83. Prior to Exercise Crested Eagle 84 all SPADS Apple n+ 8-bit gateways
were replaced by the new 16-bit Corvus Concept-based gateways. The new gateway
implementation followed the seven layer ISO-OSI model. Table 19 presents an overview
of the SPADS implementation of this model [Ref. 20:p. 11-5].
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RS232 Asynchronous
The new gateway controlled the local network within a module and
provided users with the capability to send both messages and files to other users within the
module or to users in other modules via the tactical communications system. The
components of the new gateway were [Ref. 20:pp. III-3, ni-6]:
1
.
Two Corvus Concept 16-bit microcomputers
2 . A modem for each communication link (one microcomputer could handle up to four
links)
3 An 8-inch floppy disk drive
4
.
A full function keyboard
5 A monitor with a video switch that permitted viewing of either microcomputer's
contribution to the CGS
6. Two cases that permitted operating the equipment without removing it from the cases
and that provided protection for the equipment when it was transported
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One of the microcomputers controlled the module network and was called
the network control processor (NCP). The other microcomputer provided the
communications interface and was called the communications link processor (CLiP); the
CLiP supported four external data links.
The new gateway hardware alleviated the following problems and
weaknesses in the old Apple 11+ CGS [Ref. 20:p. HI-6]:
1
.
Excessive size and weight
2 . Excessive hard disk accesses for program chaining and polling for files
3 Inadequate queuing for files
4 . Nearly full processing and memory capacities
The 16-bit gateway was one third the size and one fourth the weight of the
old gateway. Hard disk accesses were reduced by 70 to 80 percent. Improved file queuing
resulted in reduced system manager intervention and the prevention of message loss.
Approximately 50 percent of the processing capacity and 30 percent of the memory capacity
were in use on the new CGS, as opposed to both capacities being nearly 100 percent full
on the older gateway. [Ref. 20:p. III-6]
The Apple equipment that was recovered from the older gateways was
retrofitted to create 26 mini-staff duty stations, four shared output stations and two mass
storage stations. The resulting configurations were placed in the 3AD and the 1 1ACR to
provide complete interconnectivity for the V Corps DCP. [Ref. 20:pp. III-6, ffl-14]

















(One each for NCP and CLiP)
Motorola MC-68000
• 32 bit data
• 24 bit memory
• 16 bit data bus
256K
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RS-232C 19,2000 baud
RS-422 1 Mil baud
15 inch CRT,
•35 MHz
• Bit mapped display
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The three major functions of Jie new gateway were an upgraded EMS, new
common area management, and substantially more powerful network management. The
new EMS selected routing, prepared headers, sent messages and packages to authorized
users, received and analyzed messages, and delivered messages and packages to authorized
users. The common area management (CAM) automatically updated common area within
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the local network, routed updates to remote modules, and allowed users read-only access to
common area volumes of all authorized users. The network management administered user
access to the network, administered the network topology, provided statistical monitoring
or network usage, and performed user service requests. [Ref. 20:p. HI- 14]
Figure 5.2 displays an overview of the three functional areas of the
communications gateway station [Ref. 20:p. III-8].
During Exercise Crested Eagle 84, SPADS system managers identified the
following problems with the NCP code [Ref. 20:p. Ill- 17]:
1
.
The NCP sometimes stopped and/or fatally ciashed when processing BIRS and OB
updates
2. The NCP needed a distinct audio or visual alarm to signal fatal errors
3. A capability was required to automatically reinstate users when the NCP was
restarted after stopping
By the end of Exercise Caravan Guard V all but six of the software
modifications mandated by V Corps had been installed. The most significant remaining
modifications related to the number of staff duty stations that could be logged onto a local
network and the number of total modules permitted in the network. Up to this time, V
Corps could only connect ten SDSs to a local network and ten CGSs to the global network.
The final modifications increased the number of users in the global network to 10,000, the
only restriction being that a maximum of 255 staff duty stations could be logged on the
LAN. This increase, together with the elimination of restrictions pertaining to the number
of modules, provided V Corps with immense flexibility for employing SPADS in future
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Following Exercise REFORGER 84 two final upgrades were made to the
gateway software [Ref. 20:p. VI- 14]:
1
.
An Initializer was introduced that replaced the Gateway Manager and ran on the same
microcomputer as the NCP
2. Modifications were made to the NCP and the CLiP that resulted in full, TCT free text
message interface with SPADS, allowed up to four CLiPs per module (permitting 16
external communications links), and moved the overflow and queuing functions
from the CLiP to the NCP.
3 . Network Level Bounding
Based upon the new gateways and the dispersal of equipment to 3AD and
11ACR, the V Corps DCP had spread throughout its entire geographic area and had
established interconnectivity from the USAREUR/CENTAG level down to its principal
combat units. Figure 5.3 displays the V Corps SPADS network that was possible during
OC3.
4. Economic Bounding
The total funding for SPADS through FY 84 had been $7.2 million. Table 21
presents an overview of both the equipment costs and contractor support costs during
OC3 5 .
C. C2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
1. Workstation Level Integration
During OC3 only one new software implementation produced new opportunities for staff
interaction. However, since DAGMaR capabilities were gradually phased into SPADS, the
spreadsheet and DAGMaR can be considered two separate functions. The next two figures
present the integration of the two new software functions with the C2



















16-Bit Communications Gateway Station $12,230.00
Staff Duty Stations
• SDS with Video Package $ 1 1 ,800.00
• SDS without Video Package $ 5,860.00
• Mini SDS with Medium Speed Printer $ 5,640.00
Mass Storage Stations
• Large Package 20 MByte Hard disk $ 8,050.00
• Small Package 20 Mbyte Hard disk $ 5,750.00
CONTRACTOR SUPPORT COSTS
Exercise support per week $ 2,547.00
per contractor (Europe)
Maintenance of System 10% of Component Costs
Maintenance support per week $ 1,007.00
per technician (Europe)
Module Transportation Costs $ 900.00
(Approx. $10/pound to Europe)
TOTAL FUNDING THROUGH FY 84 $7.2 million
system and the C2 process. First, figure 5.4 displays the integration of system, process,
and function with the spreadsheet. Then figure 5.5 shows the integration of entities,



















































2 . Module Level Integration
The gateway had a strong integrating influence on the C2 process and functions
at the module level. The concept of the Network Monitor Station (NMS) was introduced
late in OC3 to further cement the unifying concept of the gateway and the mass storage
station as one logical entity. Up to 16 staff duty stations would be supported by one NMS
under this plan. [Ref. 6:p. F-l]
The V Corps G3 Operations clarified the role of SPADS equipment within a
DCP module [Ref. 6:p. F-l]:
The most important function of SPADS is the automatic distribution of threat order of
battle and friendly operational databases [sicl....any staff officer/NCO can get instant
data and video graphics on any unit and its situation (friendly and enemy) that has been
reported via SPADS without contacting the unit with an individual request.
Figure 5.6 represents the integrating influence of the SPADS Protocol
Architecture. This figure displays the ISO functional model vis-a-vis the SPADS
hardware, software, and staff user applications. [Ref. 20:p. II-6]
Despite their broad outlook, the DNA and Army agencies supporting the DCP
never foresaw the new implementations that the V Corps and 8ID SPADS users would
create to overcome operational difficulties in Germany. The last exercise of OC3,
REFORGER 84, gives an example of this environment. 8ID was supposed to apply
Umpire and Exercise control over the VII Corps field exercise. The following paragraphs



























































Figure 5.6. Integration via the SPADS Protocol Architecture
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In their role as umpires, 8ID had wanted to use TACFIRE to keep track of
umpire-reported unit and obstacle locations and to use this data in conjunction with other
exercise data to develop briefings. They had also wanted to use USAREUR's DAViD with
a large screen and video projector to display the exercise situation. DAViD had been
developed for HDDAS; UDDAS was also known as SPADS II because of its similarities to
SPADS. DAViD performed the same functions as the V Corps VBDS but provided
significant enhancements in that symbols, data base relations, and display features were all
user definable. The 8ID needed the SPADS II workstations to run DAViD; these
workstations consisted of Corvus Concept 16-bit microcomputers and advanced high-
resolution graphics devices. [Ref. 20:pp. VI- 1, VI-2]
The 8ID objectives for REFORGER 84 were to use their newly developed
TACFIRE interface, DAViD, SPADS II, and SPADS to support umpires throughout the
exercise area. This concept of operations included four capabilities not previously used by




(2) The DAViD-generated large screen display
(3) The SPADS II workstations
(4) An engineer obstacle data base
The most unorthodox part of their solution was the selection of two systems that
had not previously been interconnected. After 8ID initiated its statement of work for the
TACFIRE interface, significant coordination occurred between the TACFIRE Project
Manager in CECOM, the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, and the developer to develop
the software for the interface and to select an appropriate modem for the hardwire interface.
A synchronous circuit card had to be designed for the gateway microcomputer.
128
Appropriate software had to be developed that handled the Hamming code scheme used in
TACFIRE for error detection and correction during data transmission. [Ref. 20:pp. VI-9 -
VI- 10]
3 . Network Level Architecture
Unlike the second operational capability, OC3 focused on accomplishment at the
network level. The fielding of the new gateway during Exercise Crested Eagle 84
dramatically accelerated V Corps DCP integration. The ingenuity of operational planners
and users produced a greater interconnectivity than that conceived by the DNA or other
financial supporters of the DCP experiment.
The two perspectives to examining OC3 are connectivity and structure. OC3
marked the successful network interconnections from CENTAG and USAREUR down to
the corps maneuver elements. During this same period V Corps finally attempted to
integrate SPADS into the C2 structure.
a. SPADS Connectivity
With the advent of the new gateway, V Corps had the opportunity to
experiment with connectivity between different generations of gateways. V Corps did not
deploy to the field during Exercise Able Archer 83, but set up five modules at the
headquarters in Frankfurt. The new CGS was used in the CBC module. The Intel, FSE,
Plans, and Rear modules all used the older gateway. All modules were interconnected
through TASS, set up outside of the headquarters, to successfully communicate among the
modules. [Ref. 20:p. II- 1]
During Exercise Crested Eagle 84 the CENTAG main CP used the newly
developed UDDAS. In addition to its intra-CP connections, it also established
communication links to V Corps through SPADS via their respective communication
gateways. Electronic mail traffic was passed between the systems. [Ref. 20:p. III-3]
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Following Exercise Crested Eagle 84, the earlier Apple gateways had been
converted to new equipment for V Corps maneuver units. One SPADS module, with one
gateway and one staff duty station, was installed for the 1 1ACR during Caravan Guard V.
The 11ACR started with one small module to allow staff to learn the system during the
exercise. They were to have an active role in a highly dynamic field exercise. Two
SPADS modules, each with one gateway and two staff duty stations, were installed for
3AD. 3AD had used SPADS, borrowing equipment from V Corps, in two previous
exercises, REFORGER 83 and Crested Eagle 84. [Ref. 21:pp. V-l - V-2]
The concept of operations for Exercise REFORGER 84 was ur 8ID
umpires at field locations to enter unit and obstacle locations into SPADS data bases.
Umpires used the TACFIRE Digital Message Device (DMD) and single channel FM radios
to enter data into the TACFIRE computer at the UCC. This computer passed the data to
SPADS via the hardwire interface from TACFIRE to SPADS. The UCC SPADS module
then updated the ACC data bases via the gateways at each ACC module. The data were
used to generate various reports and briefings using SPADS and SPADS II capabilities. In
particular, the data were used to automatically generate large screen displays of the blue and
orange forces with DAViD, using SPADS II workstations. [Ref. 20:pp. VI-2 - VI-8]
The objectives for this exercise were met and exceeded. When 8ID was
tasked to provide exercise support for REFORGER 84, they had no automated capability to
process the data that umpires entered into the TACFIRE computer via the DMDs or to
display that data for situation briefings. They did have the SPADS system and had used
SPADS with varying degrees of success during several exercises. The TACFIRE
interface, the obstacle data base, and the use of DAViD in conjunction with a large screen
display, all integrated to work with the 8ID SPADS system, providing them with the
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required capabilities. This integration demonstrated the adaptability and ingenuity of the
operational planners and users of SPADS. [Ref. 20:p. VI- 14]
Fewer SPADS problems occurred during Exercise REFORGER 84 than in
previous exercises despite the integration of new concepts and capabilities. Three primary




Detailed planning began three months prior to deployment
2. Adequate time was set aside for training without conflicts from other activities
3. A thorough equipment check-out was conducted prior to leaving for the field
locations.
V Corps and its subordinate units had assigned each of these three factors
varying degrees of importance throughout the three operational capability cycles—this
inconsistency resulted in widely divergent degrees of success. The highly successful
results of Exercise REFORGER 84 proved the value of giving each of these factors a high
degree of emphasis. V Corps SPADS users and planners should have seen these successes
as a further demonstration of the best direction toward self-sufficiency. [Ref. 20:p VI - 15]
b. Structure
DNA was particularly interested in the successful transition of V Corps to
self-sufficiency before the completion of the contract at the end of FY 84. Following the
Caravan Guard V IPR, V Corps gradually started the necessary action to establish a
dedicated section to plan, train, and support the deployment and operation of SPADS at V
Corps. [Ref. ll:p. V-3]
A decision briefing was presented to the V Corps commander on 21 November
1983 regarding the missions, goals, functions, and organization of the proposed Command
and Control Initiatives Office (C2IO) [Ref. 23:pp. 1-10]. All recommendations were
approved. Requirements for officers to staff this new organization were delivered to the
131
ACofS, Gl, on 13 December 1983. These officers had already been interviewed by the
newly appointed C2 Initiatives Officer in late October and early November (prior to the
decision briefing). Political infighting stalled the original assignments and certain
substitutions had to be accepted by the end of December.
The C2IO was to have two sections—each consisting of four officers and one
NCO—supervised by the C2 Initiatives Officer. The functions of each section are
presented in Table 22. The C2IO was activated 1 January 1984 for a period of one year.
By 1 January 1985, the C2IO was supposed to have established a long-term program for
the arte ation of the V Corps C functions, including logistical support and sustainment
training for evolutionary C2 systems. [Ref. 24:Incl 3]
The broad missions of the C2IO were to: coordinate all tactical C2 initiative
functions in V Corps, including developmental systems; SPADS applications to peacetime
management information requirements; and C2 developmental system sustainment and
evolutionary growth. The goals of the C2IO were to: finalize the V Corps DCP concept
and the current technical baseline for SPADS; install and maintain a non-secure SPADS
system in the peacetime headquarters that could be readily transitioned to the wartime
configuration; provide sustainment functions, including user training, staff assistance for
application development, and system troubleshooting and maintenance; develop a V Corps
C2 master plan; and identify the V Corps Management System (VCMS) automation




FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMAND AND
CONTROL INITIATIVES OFFICE
PLANS AND OPERATIONS SYSTEMS
• Requirements identification • Program planning
• Concept formulation • System architecture planning
• Exercise plans and operations • Configuration control
• Field evaluation planning • Training plans and coordination
• Test planning • User's documentation




• Data Base and Applications Development
• Coordination with Other Commands:
- USAREUR DCSOPS C3I
- Defense Nuclear Agency
- Combat Development Activity (CACDA)
- Material Development Activity (CECOM)
- V Corps Major Subordinate Commands
(3AD, 8ID, 1 1ACR, 3rd SUPCOM)
The ACofS, G3, was the proponent for the organization and operation of the V
Corps command posts and for the fielding of the Maneuver Control System (MCS) within
V Corps. The C2IO was the proponent for the microcomputer-based C2 systems at the
different echelons of the corps CPs, and was responsible for integrating the MCS into the
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overall corps C2 network. The automation management officer (AMO) was the proponent
for "Battlefield Automation Management"; the C2IO was responsible for keeping the AMO
advised of tactical C2 system planning and system actions. Finally, the C2IO was to
establish a program for automation of the VCMS in coordination with the ACofS, Resource
Management. [Ref. 24:Incl. 3]
There had been an absence of specific SPADS objectives for each exercise
during the first thirteen tasks of the SOW. One result of the creation of the C2IO was the
development of specific, measurable SPADS objectives for each exercise that occurred
during the last ten tasks. [Ref. 20:p. 3]
The software accomplishments that occurred during the last ten tasks were the
result of a concerted effort by the C2IO to implement only those refinements and
enhancements that met mission-essential C2 functions. The significant software
modifications during this period were in response to requirements—identified by the C2IO
during Exercise Crested Eagle 84—for the communications gateway software and the
decision graphics package. [Ref. 20:pp. 7-8]
The SPADS objectives for Exercise Crested Eagle were to install the new
gateway in all DCP modules as well as evaluate the new videodisc and VBDS software.
C2IO members aggressively tested and validated the software and made a concerted effort
to identify shortfalls, refinements, and enhancements for SPADS. C2IO officers mandated
21 modifications to the SPADS software for OC3. These modifications involved the EMS,
text editor, DBMS, VBDS, CAM and NCP software. [Ref. 20:p. 8]
Lack of a comprehensive training management program in the past had caused
operational problems during nearly every exercise. In addition, because corps staff users
and decision makers never recognized the power and potential of SPADS, the system had
not been integrated into the corps C2 processes. Staff officers and NCOs who were
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performing C2 functions were not aware of SPADS capabilities, while previously trained
operators and system managers were not involved in C2 functions. And neither the data
bases nor their uses had been refined from OC1 through the close of OC3. These factors
had all adversely affected V Corps staff user attitudes and the integration of SPADS C2
functions. [Ref. 20:p. 10]
This counterproductive situation improved sharply when the C2IO began a
systematic training program which was managed, planned, and conducted by V Corps
personnel. This program supported only the V Corps exercise objectives identified by the
C2IO. Training v. . s scheduled well in advance of exercises. The number of trainees from
each staff section was based on the needs of the command posts. Periodic refresher
training was mandated for all personnel. Finally, follow-up training was scheduled after
exercises.
Parallel to the improvement in training was a concerted C2IO effort to improve
the SPADS documentation. The documentation included several versions of the Operator's
Manual, a System Manager's Manual, and a Staff Officer's Manual. These manuals varied
greatly in quality, ranging from the slickly produced Staff Officer's Manual to the wholly
inadequate System Manager's Manual. The Operator's Manual, for example, contained
out-of-date instructions for each of the SPADS capabilities as well as obsolete descriptions
of the hardware, software and system.
The System Manager's Manual was outdated as soon as the Corvus-based
gateway superceded the Apple n+ CGS. The C2IO produced a timely and concise version
of the System Manager's Manual before Exercise Crested Eagle. Changes updating the
Operator's Manual were ready in advance of Exercise Caravan Guard V in May 1984.
Almost up-to-date versions of both manuals were finally delivered by the developer at the
endofOC3. [Ref. 20:pp. 11-12]
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The developer delivered six of the last 21 software modifications shortly before
Exercise Caravan Guard V. The C2IO received a short, but intense, familiarization session
on these changes, prepared updated training materials, and conducted training for V Corps
personnel. The Caravan Guard V IPR noted that "Fewer SPADS problems occurred
during this exercise than in any previous exercise." [Ref. 20:p. 12]
The next major step V Corps took was to distribute the V Corps Dispersed
Command Post LOI in 1985. This document provided instructions for the DCP
configuration, listed module and staff section responsibilities, established authorized
equipment levels, and dictated thai SPADS was to be used as the V Corps C2 system for all
exercises. The LOI presented an honest appraisal of the employment constraints of and the
threats to the V Corps DCP. It specifically waived the requirement for a ten-kilometer
dispersal between main CP modules [Ref. 5:p. 2]:
With the current V Corps communications equipment and assets the modules of the
main CP can not [sic] be dispersed further than 1200 feet from the Signal Center.
It further stated that this critical survivability requirement would not be met until
some unspecified future time [Ref. 5:p. 2]:
...the concept of a modularized, dispersed command post which cannot be dispersed
until the introduction of Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) communications
network. This system will give each module its own signal center and allow true
dispersed operations.
Figure 5.7 displays the V Corps DCP constrained by communications equipment
in the mid-1980s. It also presents the SPADS staff duty station and gateway assignments
for the six modules that made up the V Corps DCP. Figure 5.8 shows the planned V
Corps DCP employment after the corps received the new Mobile Subscriber Equipment.
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Figure 5.8. V Corps DCP Employment (Mobile Suscriber Equipment)
138
D. DATA GENERATION
The data generated for the five exercises of OC3 are shown in Table 23 6 . The data
generation worksheet and formulas discussed in Chapter II were used to produce values for
this OC. The means for each evaluation category are displayed in Figure 5.9.
As an aid to better understanding of SPADS and the V Corps DCP employment, three
additional evaluations were conducted after OC3. The first was an evaluation of Wintex
85; during this exercise TCATA conducted the last formal evaluation of SPADS. The next
two evaluations were scenarios based upon the V Corps DCP LOI. The second evaluation
was conducted with the dispersal constrained by the communications. The final evaluation
was conducted with full MSE support of the V Corps DCP. The data generated for these
three evaluations are shown in Table 247 . The means for each evaluation category are
displayed in Figure 5.10.
A brief review of the data generation procedures from Chapter II are presented in this
paragraph. After action and lessons learned reports were collected from V Corps, DNA,
and the developer for each exercise during this final operational capability cycle. The V
Corps DCP LOI was the source of data for the two scenarios. Values were determined for
every measure from each exercise using the worksheet, definitions, and procedures
specified in Chapter n. The measures were individually considered as binary conditions
for each DCP module that participated in the exercise or scenario under consideration. The
summed measures (e.g., FAIR, XMOTi, and XCSTi) received their cumulative,
unweighted scores based upon their constituent measures of performance or effectiverness.
The final measure, C2/FE, was calculated in accordance with the procedure specified in
Chapter II. The results for each exercise are displayed in Table 23, and the
6 The following sources provided raw data for the final three evaluations: Ref. 22
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means for each evaluation during 0C3 are shown in Figure 5.9. The results for the final
three evaluations are presented in Table 24, and the means for these evaluations are shown
in Figure 5.10.
E. AGGREGATION AND INTERPRETATION OF MEASURES
Once again, After Action and Lessons Learned Reports contained a great deal of data
and were extremely helpful in understanding the characteristics of the experiments during
the exercises.
1 . C2 Mission Orientation
The value of C2 Mission Orientation, XMOTi, begins at approximaiely the
same level as OC2, rises slightly and then gradually recedes until the end of OC3. There
was a measurable loss in effectiveness by the end of the experiment period. The following
three sections interpret the three components of C2 Mission Orientation.
a . C2 Process
There was a sharp loss in functionality during OC3 from the Caravan Guard
V to the end of the experiment. While the functions of the V Corps commander and staff
may have remained constant, the DCP environment and SPADS, in particular, caused a
gradual decrease in the commander's and staffs abilities to exercise command and control
of the corps. The flat response during the three additional observations may represent the
C2 process steady state in a resource-constrained environment.
b. Physical Entities
Physical entities continued to change during OC3. Some new software was
introduced, and refinements were continually made to established software functions. The
new communications gateway package was integrated into the DCP environment. The
value of capacity reached a three-year high during Exercise Caravan Guard V. With the
fielding of the upgraded CGS throughout the V Corps DCP, the system's capacity reached
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a new level. The last two evaluations sustained the same level of capacity as Exercise
Caravan Guard V.
c. Structural Components
The value of the structural measure modulates gradually throughout OC3.
SPADS was able to consistently accomplish the transmission of critical information
required by the commander . Although more traffic was generated during each exercise,
SPADS was able to consistently provide the V Corps commander with dependable, critical,
decision making information. Theoretically, the values of timeliness reached a higher state
during the last two evaluations than during the previous three operational capability cycles.
2 . Command Survivability
SPADS made more progress towards consistently achieving command
survivability during OC3. Except for the first two command post exercises, dispersion
between modules gradually increased and more modules were added to the corps system.
The low value for the next-to-last evaluation reflects an honest appraisal of the
communications-constrained environment. Conversely, the final measure represents the
highest possible value possible using MSE. Defying the trends from OC1 and OC2,
significant progress was made toward redundancy; this can be specifically related to new
command influence and staff orientation. The values in the final two evaluations represent
an ideal redundant environment. Finally, the values of reliability and transportability rise
slowly to the high points of Crested Eagle 84 and Caravan Guard V. Like redundancy, the
last two values represent an ideal state for continuity of operations.
3 . C2 Force Effectiveness
SPADS did evolve during OC3 based upon the operational lessons learned. The
evolution involved hardware, software, protocols, and communications interfaces.
SPADS reaches new high values for C2/FE and only gradually declined when it entered a
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highly constrained, resource-depleted environment after all sponsors s :opped funding at the
end of OC3. SPADS was becoming institutionalized within the V Corps C2 structure;
unfortunately, the creation of the C2IO and the distribution of the DCP LOI occurred in a
period when no sustaining resources were available. The potential values of C2/FE rise
distinctly when V Corps was forced to take maximum advantage from their automated C2
system. The value of C2/FE could nearly double in value, compared to the start of OC3, if
the V Corps DCP is employed in an MSE-supported environment. .
Figure 5.11 provides the cumulative (unweighted) value of each evaluation
category for each exercise of OC3. Figure 5.12 provides the cumulative (unweighted)
value of each evaluation category for each evaluation conducted after the operational
capability. Figure 5.13 displays the values of each measure—XMOTi, XCSTi, C2/FE
—
throughout each exercise of the final operational capability. Figure 5. 14 displays the values
of each measure—XMOTi, XCSTi, C2/FE—for each evaluation conducted after OC3.
F. SUMMARY
This final section frankly discusses the procedures, training, communications,
hardware, and software as they relate to the V Corps DCP experiment throughout OC3. In
addition, the conclusions of the TCATA evaluation, from Wintex 85, will be included
where appropriate.
1. Procedures
Command emphasis of the V Corps C2 system was a reliable predictor of the
satisfactory performance of, or delay in effective performance by, staff users during tests
and exercises [Ref. ll:pp. 21-22]. Generally, if the commander emphasizes the
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It was absolutely essential that thoughtful planning and procedures were
documented. V Corps needed to document its objectives and operational procedures by
constructing well-defined standing operating procedures (SOP). These SOPs should have
reflected the evolutionary development of the V Corps DCP as it changed with new
operating procedures, new goals and objectives, and system enhancements that followed
hardware and software upgrades. The SOPs should have provided the following




2. Schematics and loading plans
3 Hardware operation and maintenance
4 . Training procedures
5 . Documentation requirements
Additions to the SOP needed to be systematically and faithfully updated if they
were to serve their useful purposes as C2 mechanisms. Once again, this activity requires
command emphasis and staff interest. [Ref. 8:pp. 65-66]
Lack of identification of information needed for the development of well-constructed SOPs
was a crucial failure during the DCP program development. Such a commitment was
necessary to ensure that personnel knew their duties; that the C2 system was maintained,
set up, and operated properly; and that the organizations were in a position to identify new
needs and applications for system evolution. There should have been a principal SPADS
staff officer who had the backing of the commander and staff from the beginning of the
DCP experiment. This individual should have been involved in the initial SOP
development to provide the direction that guided systems integration throughout the staff
elements and group functions. This principal staff officer should have assessed the manner
in which system capabilities would assist in the performance of the staffs C2 functions.
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Following exercises and tests, the usefulness of the system, its operability, and the
identification of new capabilities should have been evaluated and incorporated into the
SOP. Likewise, the failure to involve appropriate personnel in identifying communication,
hardware, and software as well as training requirements created problems until the creation
of the C2IO. [Ref. 8:pp. 66, 69]
2 . Training
Sufficient operators and system managers were seldom available for all modules,
particularly during field exercises when 24-hour operations exacerbated the requirement for
continuous operations. Operators required hands-on practice on equipment between
exercises; unfortunately, only the C2IO had the resources to maintain an entire, functional
module during garrison operations. Well-trained SPADS operators and staff officers
would have provided the maximum value to the V Corps C2 process if their duties had
been integrated with SPADS capabilities.
The importance of training throughout the DCP experiment was profound.
Those few personnel who were previously trained and/or had prior field experience gained
the confidence and the skill necessary to experiment with applications which substantially
improved the battlefield view available to the commander and staff. A systematic training
program was necessary to provide sufficient numbers of properly-trained operators and
system managers for 24-hour operations in all modules of the V Corps DCP. [Ref. 8:pp.
69-70]
3 . Communications
The communication of accurate and timely battlefield information should have
been the core of an effective, distributed C2 system whose twofold objectives consisted of
sustained decision support and rapid information exchange capabilities throughout all DCP
operations [Ref. 8:p. 71]. The fact that the C2IO was composed primarily of
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communicators was met with some derision in January 1984. However, until operationally
oriented communicators experienced SPADS from the inside, the C-E staff and Signal
Brigade did not provide the consistent multichannel support required to make SPADS work
at different locations and echelons. The C2IO's experienced communications planners
were needed to make provisions for the staff to distribute information horizontally
throughout the dispersed corps CPs and vertically from CENTAG down to the maneuver
commanders. [Ref. 8:p. 75]
4 . Hardware
As previously indicated, definition of requirements and identification of
operational specifications were important considerations lacking in the SPADS system
design. The lack of operational user involvement in the design of power systems,
grounding protection, and the local area network caused critical failures during the 8ID
SPADS program. Equally important, if not more critical, was hardware selection,
modification, integration, and planned future innovations based upon testing and field
exercise findings. There was a need for a concerted effort between the designer/engineer
team and military users to ensure that hardware met military specifications in the field
environment. Throughout the DCP experiment, the critical hardware components were
packaged in rugged containers that nearly always protected them no matter what level of
abuse they experienced; however, those "nice-to-have" items, e.g., graphics tablets and
joysticks, were not made for, were not protected against, and could not withstand the
users' operational environments. [Ref. 8:pp. 81-82]
This thesis has presented hardware issues that should be addressed when
implementing and fielding an automated C2 system—based upon NDI acquisitions—in a
DCP environment. The problems concerning power, grounding, interoperability, and
usability could have been solved sooner if the operational users had been involved in the
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design process from the beginning. Certain hardware problems may appear simple enough
to avoid, suggesting that they need not have been mentioned. The experience gained from
evaluating the SPADS system, however, indicates otherwise. The most fundamental
mistakes occurred due to the human errors that resulted from basic design oversights.
These numerous mistakes impeded the successful fielding and attainment of exercise
objectives. SOPs and specifications, revision of documentation as technology and
requirements changed, involvement of the operational user in the system design phase, and
adequate time for preparation and planning are necessary for effective hardware integration.
[Ref. 8:p. 76]
5. Software
Of all the C2 system components, the SPADS system software provides the best
example of an element that must be tested by the operational user in evolutionary
development cycles. Testing was essential if the software was to meet operational
requirements, adequately automate staff procedures and functions, integrate successfully
with existing hardware and with future upgrades, and respond to user requirements
through hands-on, garrison-to-field operations. More than any other system component,
the software evolved best after it was refined through exercise and field test. Conversely,
software requirements, SOP documentation, and the identification of data structures were
more difficult for the operational user to construct alone. Here the developer performed a
poor service for the military user; instead of engaging in an intensive user-developer
dialogue to get needed information, the developer simply selected and implemented his own
doctrinal concepts. The rationale for having a software developer on-site—to furnish
additional software support prior, during, and following exercises—was a sham; the local
developer's representative was not allowed to make the required modifications on-site.
Such changes were only authorized at the parent organization. [Ref. 8:p. 84]
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6. TCATA Evaluation
The final section of this chapter regards the TCATA evaluation of SPADS during
Wintex 85 [Ref. 22]. This evaluation was particularly appropriate to this thesis because it
offered an outsider's perspective of what was happening in the V Corps DCP. The focus
of that evaluation was germane to this research because it provided reinforcing and
complementary data collected immediately after the third operational capability concluded.
The TCATA evaluation measured two general areas to determine whether the V
Corps C2 system assisted the commander and staff: (1) did the overall V Corps C2 system
assist the commander and staff; and (2) what assistance was provided by SPADS to the V
Corps C2 functions, and what were the key characteristics [Ref. 22:pp. 11-49]? Each of
these questions were addressed by sub-issues discussed below.
The two sub-issues to the first question were: (1) does the C2 system permit the
commander and staff to monitor and be knowledgeable of the current tactical situation, and
(2) are the V Corps communications adequate to support the C system? [Ref. 22:pp 11-
37].
TCATA found that the V Corps staff "...consistently demonstrated the inability
to monitor the overall tactical situation..." at all six modules. It also found that "...the
staff, in general, was able to monitor the location data better when using SPADS." [Ref.
22:pp. 11-13] Further, it stated that equipment and personnel shortages in the V Corps
Signal Brigade degraded its ability to perform its wartime mission [Ref. 22:pp. 13-21].
The TCATA evaluation presented the following recommendations that are
directly related to the subject of this thesis [Ref. 22:p. 37]:
Develop a standing operating procedure (SOP) that clearly establishes procedures for
information flow (including SPADS) both within and between modules and echelons.
Conduct section oriented staff training on staff procedures within the CP....
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Expedite fielding of mobile subscriber equipment; current C2 communications requires
bulky equipment and is cable intensive....
The second area was divided into seven sub-issues, each of which are presented
and discussed sequentially in the succeeding paragraphs [Ref 22:pp. 38-49]:
(1) What was the effect of SPADS on staff functions, organization, workload
and procedures? TCATA's assessment was [Ref. 22:pp. 38-39]:
...There was a shortage of SPADS trained personnel.
The corps staff needed additional training on staff procedures.
SPADS was an asset since it improved C2 by providing the capability for word
processing and hard-copy message traffic. But the system is difficult to learn and
needs more efficient software.
(2) What were commander and staff perceptions of the system's products to
support C2 functions? TCATA stated that the individual products were not rated separately
from the system. This seems a glaring error on the part of the evaluation team. The sub-
issue suggests that this should have been done; the evaluators spent 10 hours per day
collecting data about such inconsequential matters as the number of times an operator
logged onto the system. A rating scheme for the diverse information exchange and
decision support capabilities would have permitted V Corps to invest its meager resources
in the most valuable areas without expending resources of the entire system.
(3) What were the interoperability and interface capabilities of systems in
support of the C2 system? There were no systems other than SPADS supporting the C2
system.
(4) What was the system's effect on operator workload and productivity? The
TCATA assessment stated [Ref. 22:pp. 39-45]:
Generally, the operators appeared to support SPADS and consider it an aid to getting
their job done. However, it is felt that the system needs improvement, particularly in
speed, reliability and simplicity of operation.
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(5) How effective were the training and orientation programs in providing for
the integration and the use of the system in the organization? TCATA correctly observed
[Ref. 22:pp. 39-45]:
The corps does have a multiechelon training program for SPADS. However, there
appeared to be too little command emphasis on training which resulted in problems
such as poor attendance and people starting a class without finishing it. There was a
high personnel turnover which also reduced the level of proficiency of the average
operator. In addition, the user manual is too complex for most operators.
(6) What is the in-garrison application of SPADS and how is training
proficiency maintained? TCATA reported [Ref. 22:pp. 45-46]:
The in-garrison applications of SPADS are minimal and consist mostly of infrequent
use as a stand-alone device. Review training for system managers and operators is
scheduled quarterly; however, the selection process for attendees is vague.
(7) What is the test availability of the C2 system? TCATA reported that the
equipment was very dependable. They found that SPADS was available between 95 and
98 percent. [Ref. 22:pp. 46-48]
TCATA's overall assessment of the issue of whether or not SPADS provided
assistance to the V Corps C2 system was that [Ref. 22:pp. 48-49]:
The assistance provided by SPADS marginally improved the general capabilities of the
commander and his staff to perform C2 functions during the CPX.
In the "Executive Summary" to the evaluation, TCATA summarized the
following observations about SPADS and the V Corps DCP [Ref. 22: unnumbered 4th
page]:
• SPADS was used to improve command and control by providing the capability for
word processing and exchange of hard copy message traffic.
• SPADS was rated an asset by the staff.
• SPADS equipment was operational 95 percent of the time.
• There was very limited in-garrison use of the system.
• Of 27 operators, 19 stated they had received no formal training.
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• There was a shortage of people in the plans and intelligence modules, and the plans
and rear modules lacked the correct rank structure and skill levels.
• The system is difficult to learn and needs more efficient software.
• Erroneous data base entries occur because there are no mandatory or legal entries
required for unit identification.
• The Battlefield Information Reporting System output cannot be used as received to
readily determine the task organization and status of a unit.
• Due to data base contamination existing at the start of the exercise, SPADS did not
provide a common perception of the battlefield.
7. QutlQQk
SPADS was an evolutionary development with each phase based upon the
results of lessons learned during field exercises. In spite of the problems that naturally and
inevitably occurred during a rapid fielding, SPADS' development clearly showed that the
evolutionary development process was a viable method to rapidly field an effective C2
system. The benefits associated with this process were significantly quicker fielding and
implementation, elimination of obsolescence, lower costs, end-user operation, and
increased survivability.
The summaries of chapters HI, IV and V presented a critical analysis of the state
of procedures, training, communications, hardware, and software throughout the V Corps
DCP experiment. Chapter VI will discuss recommendations and conclusions for SPADS,
evolutionary development, and the Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on operational experience with SPADS at V Corps from 1984 through
1986, the author stated three problems, in Chapter I, that he would answer to evaluate the
effectiveness of SPADS. The MCES provided the methodological framework to define,
bound, and analyze SPADS and its evolving relationship with the V Corps DCP concept.
Appropriate measures of performance, effectiveness, and force effectiveness were
specified, through MCES, to answer these problems. The following sections are the
author's own findings and opinions, except where otherwise noted.
A. SPADS PROGRAM CONCLUSIONS
SPADS evolved because of the following seven design mandates [Ref. 7:pp. 16-17]:
1
.
Provide an information exchange capability which would enable widely dispersed
command post elements to maintain a common perception of the battlefield situation
and thus effectively direct the employment of friendly forces
2. Provide automation of map displays for C2 support; minimize the time required to
collect, process, analyze, store, retrieve, and display map information
3 Minimize data transmission requirements so the system can use available U.S. Army
communications systems
4. Provide for survivability through a dispersed system that supports continuity of
operations and rapid relocations
5 . Provide computational support to each command post element
6 Develop a user-friendly system (one that is easily learned and understood, and easy
to operate)
7. Provide a sufficiently rugged, low-cost system which will operate in a field
environment and support field tests
These seven mandates were applied throughout each operational capability. Their
influences were examined in Chapters III, IV, and V. These design principles can be
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mapped to the SPADS statement of work tasks. They can be further mapp id through OC
requirements to specific implementations at the staff duty station, module and network
levels. The following sections examine the application of each mandate, and discuss
specific pros and cons of its implementation.
1 . Maintain a Common Battlefield Perception.
Every module of the dispersed command post had to share a common perception
of the battlefield situation if operations were to be effectively planned, executed, and
controlled. This meant that every module had to share the same information. A key design
concept of SPADS was the replication of the ess mtial parts of the Current Situation
information available at every module. In theory, designated staff sections in each module
were responsible for maintaining a portion of the Current Situation data base and for
transmitting updates to all other modules. This common perception design concept:
1
.
Allowed the commander and staff immediate access to critical data on the total
situation at any module
2. Provided a common perception of all aspects of unit status to all headquarters
modules
3 Provided the redundancy necessary for continuity of operations
4. Depended less on communications than remote query to a central data base
5 Relieved the staff from requesting information from distant modules, or from being
queried by distant staff sections
6. Depended upon the following SPADS capabilities: DBMS (BIRS and OB), VBDS,
Briefing, and—ultimately—Current Situation
a. Pros:
The Current Situation software worked. It was graphics-oriented and could
clearly exhibit "exception data" at all modules. This was one of the first successfully
completed software sub-modules of SPADS.
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The Data Base Management System (DBMS) evolved into a powerful
reports generator that delivered force structure information to all staff users. DBMS was
consistent, accurate and timely. Its interface with the Video Battlefield Display System
(VBDS) had the same characteristics. Both the DBMS and VBDS were able to provide the
commander and the staff with a timely and accurate, common perception of the battlefield at
any module.
b. Cons:
The entire Current Situation process was manual. Procedures were lengthy,
complicated, and tiresome. The system was unpredictable to novice users and did not
tolerate mistakes. Only an educated staff officer who had used the Current Situation data
base software before could successfully enter the correct data in a timely manner. In fact,
the entire process was so complicated that a contractor representative was usually required
to enter the staff section's work. By 1985, Current Situation had devolved into an
"undocumented" feature of SPADS.
The DBMS evolved under duress. As a file management system originally
developed by the contractor merely to satisfy the SOW, the program did not begin to meet
the needs of the commander and staff. By 1984, the Battlefield Information Reporting
System (BIRS) portion of the DBMS had progressed to the point where it could meet most
needs of the G3 Operations and Plans sections. However, BIRS still did not meet the
needs of most other staff sections. Furthermore, the Order of Battle (OB) data base was
static after initial development, and frequently was not used by any staff other than the G2.
2 . Automate Map Graphics.
A key SPADS objective was to minimize the "culture shock" associated with the
introduction of new equipment and procedures. The videodisc technology employed in
SPADS stored over 50,000 color photographs of standard military maps from the Western
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European theater. Map images v/ere overlayed with standard military symbols and
displayed on an analog color monitor. This method avoided computer-generated maps that
didn't have a one-to-one correspondence with the standard tactical maps in the command
posts.
a. Pros:
Everyone used the same maps, but could view them at the scale most
appropriate to his/her tasks. Various combinations of friendly and enemy units could be
displayed. All current force information in the data bases could be displayed
simultan u-Jy or be selected by echelons. Simple keyboard commands, help menus and
easy operation made the VBDS one of the few software functions that could be mastered by
any soldier.
b. Cons:
Although unit location information could be reliably displayed in a timely
manner, no other standard military markings could be displayed easily. Various
experiments with paddles, joysticks, and graphic tablets failed to provide a simple
capability to draw appropriate force information on the screen and/or share that information
with distant modules. VBDS software capability to "draw" this information using
keyboard commands existed, but was quite difficult to learn and mastered by only a few
"visually oriented" soldiers.
3 . Minimize Data Transmission.
Limited communications capabilities in the corps area required a conservative
data update philosophy to reduce the heavy burden imposed by graphic display data.
SPADS' strategy was to transmit only overlay data by electrical means; backgrounds such
as maps or chart matrices were to be pre-positioned at all locations or delivered by courier
on floppy disk. Only the Briefing and Current Situation overlays that changed data were
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sent through the communications network. This feature could reduce—by 1,000 percent
—
the communications load over what would have been required if complete graphics had to
be transmitted throughout the network.
a. Pros:
The transmission of "exception data" certainly reduced the communications
load imposed by employing a graphics-oriented decision support system. DAGMaR, a
successful solution that incorporated links between the decision graphics, data base, and
spreadsheet. In fact, DAGMaR was able to transmit only the changed values from the
spreadsheet to produce updated graphics for all recipients.
b. Cons:
The original graphics programs—commercial products incorporated into
SPADS—were too cumbersome to use, so few, if any, backgrounds were completed
before they were needed. Bi-daily courier runs were not timely enough to carry critical
graphics needed for Current Situation software. The staff users were thus forced to
transmit entire graphics throughout the system and thereby reduced the capacity of the
network by a factor of ten. This seriously strained the capacity of the early gateways, and
imposed a severe load on the tactical communications system.
4 . Maintain Continuity of Operations.
This critical requirement influenced both SPADS equipment configuration and
recommended employment concept. The basic philosophy was to design for graceful
degradation. If part of a staff duty station, or part of an entire module should fail, the




Distributed intelligent staff duty stations were selected rather than traditional, less
capable work stations serviced by a multi-user central computer. If a staff duty
station failed, the highest priority tasks could be completed on remaining stations.
Each staff user had dedicated equipment so that he/she did not compete for
processing resources during crisis periods.
2. A medium-speed printer provided hard copy messages and ensured essential record
traffic was maintained in the event of a major system failure.
3 A direct access communications (DAC) interface to and from selected high priority
staff duty stations provided timely communications. DAC accomplished this despite
substantial traffic backlogs and provided manual interfaces to other microcomputer-
based systems, such as TAP.
4. The data bases, Current Situation briefings, and map videodiscs were duplicated at
each module. Enough data existed at each module to replicate the functions of any
other module should one be destroyed or otherwise lost from the network.
a. Pros:
Since all staff duty stations were intelligent microcomputers, staff sections
could use commercial software to compensate for capabilities not provided by SPADS
software. Each module's shared output station (SOS)—the medium-speed printer—was
critical for printing and distributing OPLANS and OPORDS or lengthy data base reports.
In addition, all FLASH message traffic for each user was automatically printed at the SOS.
The DAC provided the ability to "network" non-connected equipment suites such as
SPADS and TAP. Replication of hardware and software at each module was reinforced by
corps SOPs and staff organization that placed complimentary personnel at each module to
maintain continuity of operations.
b. Cons:
Although the staff duty stations were state-of-the-art in 1981, they were not
upgraded throughout the lifetime of SPADS. Compared to later, more capable
microcomputers, the system's components were merely able to hold established ground as
demands on the system increased. The DAC was actually a work-around for the real
solution, which would have been to net SPADS and TAP; unfortunately this was not a
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funding priority, so information had to be extracted from either system and then typed in
again by the operator.
5 . Provide Computational Support.
Each staff section in a module might have its own set of requirements for
analysis, such as generating spreadsheets or personnel and equipment status reports, or for
creating local data bases. SPADS was designed to provide the capability to execute non-
SPADS programs and to create local programs to meet the needs of each staff section. This
capability ensured maximum utilization of existing programs and enabled staff sections to
develop software tailored to their unique needs.
a. Pros:
Initially SPADS had no number-crunching capabilities, so various staff
sections took advantage of the commercial program Visicalc 1 to meet their needs. Certain
functional algorithm software had been developed by the Command and Control
Microcomputer Users Group (C2MUG), headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, KS, that
could be executed on the staff duty stations. Programs for weather, NBC, force
projection, and logistics were frequently used.
b. Cons:
Users were continually frustrated in their efforts to share the results of their
local applications with distant users since SPADS did not support any transmission
standards but its own. When SPADS finally got a spreadsheet, users welcomed it until
they found it was vastly inferior to the software they had given up. Furthermore, "home-
grown" programs written to run on the SPADS operating system quite often crashed the
iVisacalc is a registered trademark of Software Arts, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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entire local area network if they had any failures, and sometimes could even create havoc
inside of the operating system itself.
6 . Develop a User-Friendly System
Using familiar formats and simple equipment would ensure effective operation in
the stress of field use. Ideally, the SPADS design principles would consistently involve
the following concepts:
1. The SPADS program provided prompts to the operator on steps necessary to
perform each function
2. The automated map display used images of standard Army maps stored on videodisc
to present a display identical io the working maps used in the tactical command posts
3
.
The graphics backgrounds and message formats were designed to look similar to the
paper message formats currently in use; users adapted SPADS to conventional
formats whenever desired
a. Pros:
Several programs were powerful, flexible and concise; they had good visual
prompts and useful help menus. The VBDS images were identical to the standard tactical
maps on the walls of the command posts.
b. Cons:
Most programs running under the SPADS main command line were "user-
hostile"; they provided incomplete on-screen clues that were meaningful only to the
programmers, many had no help screens at all, and a few allowed no mistakes in, or
escapes from, tedious sequences of input and keypresses. Quite often undocumented
features from previous versions of programs were left on the system for the unwary user to
stumble onto with unpredictable results.
The ideal of common backgrounds was almost never achieved due to the
severe difficulty in manipulating the graphics programs to look like standard formats. Most
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staff officers either put up with what was already on the screen or merely employed blank
backgrounds rather than fighting with the system.
7 . Provide a Rugged, Low-cost System
SPADS used commercial microcomputer equipment modified for field use, the
time to develop and field SPADS was about one-fifth of a normal development cycle
because of the use of off-the-shelf commercial products. This also maintained low costs.
Obviously, it was necessary to take some steps, without attempting full militarization, to
ensure that the system would perform well in the field. First, the microcomputers were
modified by the addition of a backplane that provided simple connections between the
computer and other devices in the system. This circumvented the need to open the
microcomputer case and expose sensitive parts in order to make connections. Second,
special transport cases were designed to protect the equipment during transportation and
provide the physical support for each work station.
a. Pros:
The use of nondevelopmental item (NDI) equipment certainly accelerated the arrival
of SPADS to the operational user. Existing operating systems and programming languages
for these microcomputers further accelerated program development. Use of backplanes
made it easier for the SPADS operator to learn to install, operate and maintain the
equipment. The special transport cases were extremely rugged and sufficiently protected all
of the equipment from severe abuse during transportation and field employment.
b. Cons:
The microcomputers selected were the most powerful available during the
system start. Unfortunately as newer, more powerful, and less expensive microcomputers
rapidly became available, SPADS was stuck with its original staff duty stations, and no
amount of modifications later on could increase either capacity or processing power. The
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backplanes were a quick idea that wasn't thought through; the connections, while simple,
were much too fragile for field tests, and equipment was frequently out of commission
because it couldn't be connected to the LAN. The transport cases were extremely effective,
but their handles and closures seemed to have been added as design afterthoughts.
B . SPADS PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS
Reviewing the history of SPADS' evolutionary development program, certain lessons
can be derived for planning, training, communications support, and procedures. These
lessons are applicable to any new C2 system, but are especially important to a program that
evolves over time based upon the lessons learned by its operational users.
First, SPADS needed the V Corps commander's emphasis—from the time the original
request for assistance was sent to DNA through the end of OC3. In 1982, McGrew and
Jutte observed the fledgling SPADS experiment during Caravan Guard HI; at that time they
noted the critical necessity of getting the commander and staff behind the project to ensure
its success [Ref. 12:pp. 21-22], As new commanders took control of the corps, their
interests in SPADS changed with what they perceived it could do for them at any given
time. Unfortunately SPADS could not be an effective command and control tool unless the
commander insisted on its use for his critical decision making information. This was not
consistendy the case until the spring of 1984, after C2IO had been created to manage the V
Corps C2 system.
After the commander's expressed interest, the next major problem was training
personnel to use SPADS in accordance with established command post procedures. Once
again, there was not real progress in this area until the C2IO had been established. Prior to
that time, the major lessons learned relating to training were:
1
.
Every module needed dedicated SPADS operators
2 Operators required formal training
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3. NCOs and staff officers needed training which emphasized the interpretation of
outputs as well as SPADS operating procedures
4. Operator proficiency could only be maintained in garrison by using the system
capabilities to perform peacetime functions
5
.
A regular training plan that included periodic refresher training was required
6. Trainees had to be able to attend SPADS training without interruptions
7 . A "field-proof quick reference guide was needed to supplement the User's Manual
A corollary of the training problem was a total lack of established, SPADS-based
command post procedures. The DCP program started at V Corps in 1981; until the V
Corps DCP LOI was distributed in the spring of 1985, the only SOP written for SPADS
involved Current Situation. Three recommendations that would have greatly increased the
effective use of SPADS throughout the OCs are:
1 Develop written procedures for the use of SPADS and for internal processing of
SPADS information
2. Require and enforce scheduled updates of all reports required through SPADS
3. Ensure that the system is ready before field use; clean out the data bases and fill
Current Situation with briefings
In the realm of technology and communications, V Corps had a critical need for on-site
expertise to guide the system from initial fielding through full operation. The expertise was
available—in the Communications-Electronics staff and the Signal Brigade—but those
experts were not tasked by the commander to participate in this project. They could have
assisted operational users in defining the critical information needs of the commander and
staff. They certainly could have ensured the selection of the four-wire autodial modems
needed from the beginning of the DCP experiments that were never fielded. Finally, they
could have planned the field use and development of SPADS so that communication
requirements complemented the scarce signal resources of the corps, rather than
exacerbated them.
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C. EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the 1980s, Army C3 systems were being proposed to satisfy operational
users' needs from division through theater levels. The principal system in the Army
Command and Control Master Plan during the past decade has been the Maneuver Control
System (MCS). MCS is a product of the traditional concept-based requirements definition
process. MCS is envisioned as a fully militarized, general purpose, data processing,
display and communications system designed to be the backbone of Army tactical C2 [Ref.
25:pp. 56-57]. Although originally scheduled for fielding in the mid-1980s, mounting
costs and program slippages have (almost) annually put the system in jeopardy before
Congress.
The evolutionary development approach used throughout the SPADS program met the
immediate command and control requirements of military users while maintaining flexibility
to respond to changing requirements and advancing technology. The use of carefully
selected and configured off-the-shelf commercial products put the components of the first
operational capability in the field in months instead of years. Starting in September 1981,
V Corps operational users were immediately able to test system capabilities as well as C2
procedures during each field test and exercise.
System enhancements and corrections were made within each operational capability
cycle by adding or replacing hardware components and by integrating new software
tailored to meet specific military requirements. Subsequent OC cycles consolidated
incremental enhancements or involved system upgrades which took advantage of major
advances in microcomputer technology. [Ref. 26:pp. 60-63]
Three of SPADS' key achievements within V Corps were: (1) helping define
commander and staff C2 requirements, (2) providing a basis for conceptual and doctrinal
development, and (3) putting a C2 capability into the field in the near term. In August
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1984, the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments wrote [Ref. 25:pp.
55-56]:
One of the programs the Army is evaluating is called the Staff Planning and Decision
Support System (SPADS)....The experience the Army is gaining in SPADS
and.. .related programs is directly guiding the evolution of our Maneuver Control
System (MCS).
D. MCES APPLICATION CONCLUSIONS
Other NPS degree students who employed MCES were able to draw from either an
established body of work or a team of experts when evaluating their chosen C2 systems.
Since SPADS was a unique exploratory program, this researcher had no such traditional
sources for guidance or assistance. In addition, SPADS had already completed its
evolutionary life cycle from concept through three operational capability stages to fully
deployed system. During that term there had been two highly unfavorable evaluations by
the U.S. Army TCATA; in fact, one deputy director, Mr. Reedie A. Stone, Jr., stated:
"With respect to SPADS, it didn't work and I recommend that the corps contact the GSA
for disposal instructions 1 -" In direct contrast to this, the DNA Program Manager for
SPADS, LTC Robert E. Laird, stated: "DNA considered SPADS as success as a proof of
concept." 1 It was obvious at the outset that an objective evaluation of SPADS using the
MCES would present some challenges.
The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure proved itself to be a
robust and powerful framework for evaluating the Staff Planning and Decision Support
system. It was flexible enough to evaluate the three problem areas presented in Chapter I
better addressed to author by Mr. R. Stone, Deputy Director, BATD, TEXCOM,
Subject: Request for Information on the Staff Planning and Decision Support System,
dated 14 December 1987.
2 Phone conversation with LTC Laird, 23 November 1987.
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under four different evolutionary conditions. The evaluations proceeded iteratively from
the V Corps baseline through the three operational capabilities.
Throughout Chapters III, IV, and V this thesis specifically assessed SPADS'
effectiveness for the following three problems:
1
.
Did SPADS provide the V Corps commander and his staff with the ability to exercise
command and control of combat assets to meet overall mission objectives?
2. Did SPADS demonstrate that the dispersed command post concept enhanced
command survivability?
3 Did SPADS evolve as a command and control force effectiveness system for the V
Corps DCP based upon operational lessons learned?
The resolution of the first problem required a measure of effectiveness that was
derived from the three part definition of a C3 system. This problem addressed C2 mission
orientation in terms of the C2 process, structural components, and physical entities for the
evolving interaction between SPADS and the V Corps Dispersed Command Post concept.
The Summaries of Chapters III, IV, and V individually addressed the changing aspects of
this problem. Figure 6.1 provides graphic evidence that SPADS provided the commander
and his staff increasing value for C2 mission orientation, XMOTi, throughout the three
year experiment.
The second problem addressed command survivability, in terms of the facilities,
equipment, procedures, personnel and information flow patterns that made up the V Corps
Dispersed Command Post. Until the V Corps commander and staff provided effective
leadership and management of SPADS during OC3, command survivability increased only
slightly in value. After the C2IO was established, the staff sections and elements of each
command post received the expertise required to consistently increase command
survivability. The center section of Figure 6.1, XCSTi, clearly shows that SPADS,
together with the DCP, enhanced survivability during the last operational capability cycle.
The third problem measured—across levels of operational capacity—the evolution of C2
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force effectiveness together with survivability. This final measure of command and control
evolution was derived as a function of the MOFE from Problem 1 and the MOE from
Problem 2, with respect to time. The C2/FE layer in Figure 6. 1 graphically reinforces the
conclusions reached in Chapters IE, IV, and V. As SPADS evolved from August 1981 to
March 1985, it provided distinct advantages to V Corps in terms of C2 force effectiveness,
C2 mission orientation, and command survivability.
E. MCES RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Further Testing and Refinement
MCES is a powerful evaluation framework; like any such system or
methodology, it has a steep learning curve. The only way to learn to use MCES is by
applying the seven iterative modules. Any analyst interested in employing MCES would be
well-advised to both examine the written results of previous evaluations and to begin
applying the methodology as soon as possible—ideally with guidance from an analyst that
has applied MCES in a similar problem area.
The present literature on MCES presents a diverse approach to this evolving
methodology. One refinement to MCES that would allow analysts and decision makers to
communicate more effectively throughout the MCES evaluation process would be a
glossary or "thesaurus" of MCES terminology and concepts. Another valuable effort
would be the pooling of previous MCES evaluations into a knowledge base that could be
used to develop a microcomputer-based toolset for the MCES analysts.
2 . Education and Dissemination
The MCES is a systems approach to the evaluation of C2 systems. It is a
valuable framework for any planner, engineer, or analyst who is charged with evaluating
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The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure is a flexible
framework that would add great value to an appropriate course in the C3 curriculum at the
Naval Postgraduate School. The experience gained from applying MCES in a controlled
academic setting would assist C3 graduates in future assignments. MCES can assist the
military officer in: identifying C3 system requirements; applying operational experience and
technical knowledge to evaluate the effectiveness of C2 systems; evaluating R&D projects
as well as technical and engineering studies; integrating the results for near- and long-term
C3 system improvements; planning C3 aspects of operations, exercises, and tests; and
developing joint C3 systems plans, operating concepts, and policy.
Future C3 graduates who have used MCES in their academic work at NPS will
be better able to fulfill their responsibilities in the field of command, control, and
communications. That experience will assist them in their efforts to analyze the technical
and operational aspects of C3 environments as they effectively interface with engineers,
planners, and operational personnel in the development of new C3 systems and the
improvement of old systems.
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Assistant Chief of Staff
Armored cavalry regiment




Air Forces Southern Europe





All Source Intelligence Center (Intelligence module)





Automatic Secure Voice Communications
Automatic Voice Network
Available
Black and green (monochrome)
Battle Control Center (Air Force)









































Command and Control Microcomputer Users Group
Command, control and communications
Command, control and communications countermeasures
Command, control, communications and intelligence
Combined Arms Combat Development Activity
Combined Arms Training Development Activity
Common area maintenance (SPADS function)
Close air support
Corps Airspace Management Element
Current battle cell
Current battle module
Command and Control Automation Office (V Corps)




Central Army Group (NATO)
Communications electronics operating instructions
Combat fighting vehicle
Communications gateway station (SPADS hardware)
Communications link processor (SPADS hardware)












































Communications Security Maintenance Agency/
carrier sense multiple access
Combat service support
Corps tactical operations center
CTOC support element (Intelligence module)
Direct access communications (SPADS software)
Data and graphics manufacture and retrieval (SPADS
software)
West German data network of the Deutsches Bundespost
Data automated video display (SPADS II software)
Database Management System
Deutsches Bundespost (West German telecommunications
agency)
Dispersed command post









Division tactical command post
Dated
Date time group
Dual tone multiple frequency




External communication processor (SPADS hardware)
Exploratory Development Program
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EMP Electronic mail processor (SPADS hardware)/
electromagnetic pulse
EMS Electronic Mail System (SPADS software)
ENGR Engineer
EPW Enemy prisoners of war






FAC Forward air controller (Air Force)
FAIR MOE for evaluating C2 Process (flexibility,
availability, interoperability ,and responsiveness)
FC Field Circular
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops
FLOTREP FLOT report
FM Field manual/frequency modulation
FORSCOM Forces Command (Army)
FRAGO Fragmentary order
FSCOORD Fire support coordination officer
FSE Fire support element
FSM Fire support module
FTX Field training exercise
FY Fiscal year
Gl ACofS Gl, Personnel and Administration
G2 ACofS G2, Intelligence
G3 ACofS G3, Operations
G4 ACofS G4, Logistics
G5 ACofS G5, Civil-Military Operations
GATEWAY Communications gateway station (SPADS hardware)
GFE Government furnished equipment
GMGR Gateway Manager (SPADS software)
GSA General Services Agency
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HEL Helicopter
hpits DAC software (SPADS)
HQ Headquarters
HZ Hertz (cycles per second)
ID Identify/identification
IFFN Identification, Friend, Foe or Neutral Joint Testbed
IFP Interfile Processor (SPADS software)






IOC Initial operational capability
IR Intelligence requirement
JAAT Joint air attack team




LAN Local area network
LANCE Nuclear-capable field artillery system
LNO Liaison officer/office
LOG Logistics
LOI Letter of Instruction
LTC Lieutenant Colonel (Army)
LTCOL Lieutenant Colonel (Air Force)
MAIN Main command post
MBYTE Megabyte
MBPS Megabyte per second
MCES Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure
MCS Maneuver Control System (Army C2 system)
METT-T Mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available
MICRO Microcomputer/microprocessor
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MICROFIX Army intelligence workstation program
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MM Millimeter
MOE Measure of effectiveness
MOFE Measure of force effectiveness
MOP Measure of performance
MORS Military Operations Research Society
MP Military Police
MSE Mobile Subscriber Equipment
MSR Major supply route
MSS Mass storage station (SPADS hardware)
MUX Multichannel communications
NBC Nuclear, biological and chemical
NCO Noncommissioned officer
NCP Network control processor (SPADS hardware)
NCS Network control station
NDI Nondevelopmental item
NETT New equipment training team
NLT Not later than
NPS Naval Postgraduate School
O/H Quantity on-hand











PDR Power distribution and regulation





































Production management branch (Intelligence module)







Rear Area Operations Center
Reference
Return of Forces to Germany (Annual exercise)
Required
Store and Forward Concentrator (Gateway software)
Strategic Defense Initiative
Staff duty station (SPADS hardware)




Shared output station (SPADS hardware)
Statement of work
Staff Planning and Decision Support System





Staff weather officer/office (Air Force)
Graphics overlay device (SPADS hardware)
Tactical command post
Tactical air support
Army field artillery command and control system































Tactical air control party (Air Force)
Target Acquisition and Planning system
Task organization report
Tactical Army Switching System
TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity
Tactical Computer Terminal (MCS hardware)
Target/targeting





Training and Doctrine Command (US Army)
Teletypewriter
Umpire Control Center
USAREUR Distributed Decision Aids System




U.S. Air Forces Europe
U.S. Army Europe




Biannual winter exercise in Germany (Army)





SPADS STATEMENT OF WORK*
Task 1: V CORPS SUPPORT. Provide software support to V Corps during
REFORGER 81, Able Archer 81, Crested Eagle 82:
(1) Plan, train, assist, and report
(2) Applications/data base development






Task 3: CARAVAN GUARD SUPPORT. Contractor shall support
V Corps test of DCP:
(1) Plan, train, assist, report
(2) Develop SOP for dispersed operations using microcomputer equipment
(3) Communications gateway software development
(4) Deliverables
Task 4: PTT MANAGEMENT INTERFACES/PROCEDURES. Document and
demonstrate how the DCP can utilize the Deutsche Bundespost (DBP):
( 1 Document management procedures/interfaces
(2) DATEX test
Task 5 : V CORPS/8 ID COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE
EVALUATION:
(1) Develop a capability to evaluate, through evolutionary testing,
the effectiveness of and requirements for emerging Army doctrine
on dispersed field C2
(2) Trie principal effort will be to develop a testbed for providing an
information distribution and processing system between the corps,
division, and corps/division command elements
(3) The final test plan will provide a basis for documenting and
evaluating the results of the theoretical efforts related to the
internal corps and division C2 operations
SOURCE: LTC Robert Laird, Defense Nuclear Agency, UNCLASSIFIED Letter to
the author, Subject: SPADS, 23 November 1987.
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Task 6: NUCLEAR AIR BATTLE MANAGEMENT (Conducted for USAFE)
Task 7: SUPPORT FOR REFORGER AND ABLE ARCHER:
(1) Provide "on-site" contractor liaison support for V Corps
(2) REFORGER 1982 support
(3) Operational test of full-up DCP concept
(4) Assist V Corps in developing SOPs required to operate effectively
in each functional area.
(5) Conduct a series of tests of the various modules separately
to refine SOPs
(6) Applications software enhancements [From Task 3]
(7) Deliverable
Task 8: 8TH INFANTRY DIVISION AIRLAND BATTLE COMMAND POST
PROGRAM:
Sub-task 8a: Procure, develop, test, and deliver the division SPADS system
Sub-task 8b: Conduct user training
Sub-task 8c: Support user test of system in garrison
Sub-task 8d: Support user tests of system in tield environment
Sub-task 8e: Support tests of SPADS during REFORGER 82




Increase the overall effectiveness of the system
(2) Increase the user friendliness
(3) Improve clarity
Task 10: ON-SITE SUPPORT THROUGH WINTEX 83
Task 1 1 : 16-BIT MICROPROCESSOR COMMUNICATIONS GATEWAY:
Sub-task 11a: Gateway software conversion
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Task 12: SPADS SYSTEM TRAINING DOCUMENTATION:
Sub-task 12a: Written instructional materials:
(1) Users' guide to the software
(2) Technical user notes
(3) Concept of operations
Sub-task 12b: Audiovisual training
Task 1 3 : DCP VIDEO DISC SUPPORT
Task 14: PROVIDE SUPPORT TO EXERCISE CARAVAN GUARD IV:
(1) Pre-exercise training
(2) Equipment upgrades
(a) ACTO SDS for CBC and Intel modules
(b) Upgrade CGS
(3) Exercise support
Task 15: PROVIDE EXTENDED EXERCISE SUPPORT. Test objectives and
key data elements needed for evaluation of the exercises will be identified
for each CPX, FTX, etc., so that Army systems evalua.or^ can monitor
program progress
Task 16: PROVIDE CONTINUED SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE SUPPORT FOR
THE DCP PROGRAM:
(1) Refine/correct software problems identified in previous tasks
(2) Continue 16-bit microprocessor CGS software development
(3) Provide technical and hardware support to AFSOUTH and SHAPE
Technical Center in their DCP activities




Continue development of 16-bit communications gateway
(2) Continue user identification requirements
(3) Customize software for division usage
Task 19: ON-SITE SUPPORT FOR DCP PROGRAM:
(1) On-site support personnel (2)
(2) Establish an on-site coordination office at V Corps HQ
(3) On-site support
Task 20: CONTINUED SUPPORT:
(1) Provide exercise software support
(2) Improve the SPADS database management system
Integrate DBMS with automatic output
(3) Investigate the display of improved decision graphics information
(4) Implementation of a TCT/MICROFDC to SPADS protocol-
for both 8-bit and 16-bit gateways
Task 21 : FIELDING OF 16-BIT COMMUNICATIONS GATEWAY STATION:
(1) Field a 16-bit microcomputer-based communication gateway station
(2) Install a 16-bit microcomputer-based CGS
(3) 16-bit CGS training
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Task 22: TRANSITION TRAINING AND SUPPORT:
(1) Pre-exercise support and evaluation. Assist commander and staffs





(5) Documentation-revise User's Manual, produce a free-standing
flip card reference set
Task 23: SUPPORT TO I CORPS IN TEAM SPIRIT 84
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APPENDIX C
CORPS STAFF MISSION TASK LISTS*
A. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, Gl MISSION TASK LIST
1
.
Coordinate personnel service support
2. Perform strength accounting management
3 Manage replacement operations
4 . Track task force composition and management of cross attachments
5 Supervise strength accounting and management operations
6 . Perform by-name casualty reporting and monitor personnel status changes
7 . Monitor awards and decorations program
8 Manage essential personnel actions
9 . Supervise the Personnel Accounting Section
10. Provide administrative service support
1 1 Operate classified/unclassified official mail and message distribution center
12. Provide limited essential reproduction services
1 3
.
Supervise the Administrative Services Office
14. Provide financial advice to the commander
15. Provide liaison services between the Area Finance Support Centers




Coordinate essential financial operations
SOURCE: Ref.7:pp. F-l - F-48.
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B . ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2 MISSION TASK LIST
1
.
Request maps required for force operations
2 Provide input to the intelligence estimate
3. Establish liaison with US agencies and friendly host country
4. Prepare the Intelligence Annex to the OPLAN/OPORD
5 Task organize resources to satisfy mission requirements
6 Request tactical transportation for Military Intelligence assets
7 . Execute deployment
8 Employ long-range surveillance detachment
9 . Plan for aerial intelligence support for the rear, close-in, and deep battles
10. Develop a security plan
1 1 Monitor the intelligence effort
1 2. Collect and dispose of captured enemy materiel and equipment.
1 3 Process combat information from maneuver elements and
intelligence products from main CP
14. Analyze incoming information from maneuver elements in
conjunction with intelligence received from the main CP
1 5
.
Disseminate combat information and combat intelligence
1 6. Maintain the collection plan
1 7 Process incoming collection results
1 8 Establish and maintain counterintelligence technical data bases




Issue an EW estimate
22 Develop an EW annex to the OPLAN/OPORD
23. Establish EW section operations
24. Process incoming intelligence information
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25. Modify ECM and ESM using data base and commander's PIR/IR
26. Establish and control EW activities
27. Evaluate effectiveness of friendly EW against the enemy
28. Prepare the Intelligence Estimate
29. Prepare the Intelligence Annex to the OPLAN/OPORD
30. Maintain the intelligence data base
3 1 . Process all source information/intelligence
32. Disseminate combat information and combat intelligence to
appropriate agencies
33. Develop a data base to support the rear battle
34. Analyze incoming information (from elements operating in the rear area)
with information/intelligence received from the main CP
3 5
.
Disseminate combat information/intelligence to the rear area
36. Maintain the rear battle asset collection plan
37. Develop and maintain the OPSEC data base
3 8 Conduct a vulnerability assessment
39. Implement OPSEC measures
40. Update OPSEC plan based on maneuver unit input
C. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G3 MISSION TASK LIST
1
.
Plan and coordinate combat operations:
Conduct mission analysis
Prepare the Operation Estimate
Develop the OPORD
Recommend the task organization and assign missions to
subordinate units
Recommend augmentation force requirements
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Supervise fire support planning
Plan for employment of nuclear and chemical weapons
Plan for employment ofEW
Supervise ADA fire support planning
Plan and coordinate tactical air (TACAER) support
Plan utilization of airspace
Integrate engineer support into tactical operations
Integrate PSYOP and combat operations
Control and coordinate combat operations:
Maintain a current operations estimate
Maintain the current friendly situation and unit status
Coordinate immediate close air support (CAS) request
Plan for Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) operations
Supervise the preparation of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs)
Supervise the coordination of airspace utilization
ustain combat operations:
Program and supervise OPSEC activities/programs
Incorporate rear battle planning and operations
React to enemy chemical or nuclear attack
Plan and supervise deception operations
D. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G4 MISSION TASK LIST
1 . Provide input to the planning and decision making process:
• Develop plans
• Make recommendations
• Prepare plans and orders
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2. Coordinate and monitor supply and operations:
Maintain information about the status of supplies
Supervise collection and distribution of excess, salvage and
captured material
Coordinate reception of augmentations
3 . Coordinate and monitor field services:
Monitor status of field service support units
Coordinate reception of combat service support (CSS) augmentation
4
.
Coordinate and monitor maintenance operations:
Maintain records of the status of maintenance
Coordinate reception of maintenance augmentations
5 Coordinate and monitor transportation services:
Monitor status of surface and air transportation
Supervise movements
Coordinate reception of transportation augmentation
Perform command post functions:
Establish section within the main CP
Provide augmentation to tactical CP
Provide augmentation to rear CP
7 . Perform staff coordination in other functional areas:
Monitor personnel activities
Monitor intelligence activities
Monitor type of tactical operations
E. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G5 MISSION TASK LIST
1
. Assist in the acquisition of local resources, facilities, and support
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2. Minimize local population interference with U.S. military operations
3
.
Prepare an area assessment:
• Establish liaison with national officials
• Determine area resources available for mission
4. Advise the commander on civil military operations (CMO):
• Formulate CMO plans applicable throughout the area of operations
• Provide for liaison to subordinate units
• Recommend policies and procedures for civil affairs (CA) activities
for command support in area of operations
5 Advise commander on CA governmental functions in operation under
the control of other agencies in the area of operation
6 Provide the necessary CMO input into all operational and
administrative/logistic plans and orders
7 . Advise the commander on the impact of PSYOP on the
civilian population
F. AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY SECTION MISSION TASK LIST
1
.
Advise the commander and staff on the air defense operations:
• Coordinate matters concerning ADA operations
2. Coordinate, integrate, regulate, and identify use/users of Army airspace:
• Perform Army airspace command and control (A2C2)
element functions
G. AIR LIAISON SECTION MISSION TASK LIST
1
.
Supervise forward air controllers (FACs)
2. Supervise the TACP
3 Advise commander and staff regarding USAF support
4. Coordinate close air support (CAS) with the fire support element
5 Function as a member of the Army airspace command and control (A2C2)
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6.
Operate air request and tactical air (TACAIR) net
7 . Transmit air support requests
H. AVIATION SECTION MISSION TASK LIST
1 Plan aviation combat employment:
• Advise on and plan aviation cross-FLOT operations
• Advise on attachments and detachments to subordinate units
• Plan for aviation augmentation
• Monitor combat operations
2 Plan aviation combat support operations:
• Recommend employment of aviation for air logistics
• Allocate units for air logistics operations
• Monitor combat support operations
3 Function as a member of the Army airspace command and control
(A2C2) element:
• Coordinate aviation operations with ADA
• Employ liaison officer to coordinate aviation operations
4. Supervise aviation training and safety:
• Monitor aviation safety program
• Monitor crash rescue program
• Monitor the crew endurance program
• Monitor the search and rescue program
5
.
Supervise technical aviation aspects:
• Monitor the flying-hour program
• Plan aviation flow and aircraft requirements for strategic
deployment of the combat aviation battalion
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I. CHEMICAL SECTION MISSION TASK LIST
1 . Prepare for chemical section operations:
Evaluate the NBC threat
Initiate attack record
Recommend nuclear observation units
Establish situation map and overlays
Review NBC defense training program
Activate internal NBC SOP
Establish chemical section operations:
Coordinate with the G2 for NBC data input
Conduct vulnerability assessment
Prepare NBC estimates
Prepare the NBC portion of OPLAN/OPORD.
Prepare and disseminate wind message
3 . Provide immediate warning of expected contamination:
Process reports of attack
Prepare prediction of contamination
Disseminate warning
Prepare immediate damage estimate
Evaluate NBC contamination data:
Evaluate NBC 4 reports
Examine contamination data
Select reporting unit for series reports
Evaluate series reports
Prepare and disseminate NBC 5 reports
Maintain unit radiation status:
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• Process tactical dosimetry reports
6. Assist in planning the use of nuclear and chemical weapons:
• Recommend integrating nuclear and chemical fires into the
scheme of maneuver
Advise on allocation and use of chemical means
• Plan and supervise chemical target analysis
• Assist in nuclear target analysis
7 . Exercise staff supervision over NBC activities throughout the force
8
.
Advise commander and staff on NBC matters
J. PROVOST MARSHALL MISSION TASK LIST
1 Supervise and coordinate MP force requirements
2. Plan MP portions of estimates, plans, orders, and reports:
Prepare a straggler control plan
Prepare a traffic control plan
Prepare the MP support annex to the OPORD
Conduct area security operations:
Plan, coordinate, and supervise area reconnaissance
Plan, coordinate, and supervise MP rear battle operations
Coordinate and supervise security of designated personnel,
units, convoys, facilities, and MSR critical points
Coordinate and supervise intelligence collecting and reporting
Coordinate and monitor NBC detecting and reporting
Conduct battlefield circulation control (BCC) operations:
Coordinate and supervise route reconnaissance and surveillance
Monitor MSR regulation
Plan, coordinate, and supervise straggler/dislocated civilian control
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• Monitor information dissemination activities
5
.
Conduct enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations:
• Coordinate and plan for the execution of EPW and CI
collection operations
• Coordinate and monitor EPW processing and evaluation
• Supervise, monitor, and coordinate central collecting point facilities
6. Conduct MP support to operations requiring special considerations:
• Plan, coordinate, and supervise MP support to
river crossing operations
• Plan, coordinate, and supervise MP support to military operation
in urbanized terrain
• Plan, coordinate, and supervise MP support to the deep attack
7 . Conduct law and order operations when directed by the commander





• Plan C-E support with the staff
• Prepare the C-E staff estimate
• Monitor signal equipment status
2 . Coordinate C-E support:
• Coordinate with the staff
• Coordinate with the signal battalions
• Coordinate the use and allocation of radio frequencies
• Coordinate COMSEC and SIGSEC





• Supervise the ECCM program
• Supervise the CEOI
L. ENGINEER SECTION MISSION TASK LIST
1 . Plan, coordinate, and supervise mobility, countermobility and
survivability operations:
• Plan and advise supported units on mobility missions
• Perform estimates using factors of mission, enemy, terrain,
troops, and time available (METT-T)
e Provide recommendations to the maneuver commander on
mobility operations
• Prepare a survivability estimate based on METT-T
M. FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT MISSION TASK LIST
1
.
Establish and maintain fire support facilities:
• Establish continuous fire support planning and coordination facilities
• Advise the commander and/or G3 on fire support operations
and capabilities
• Communicate
• Manage fire support coordination reports and information
2
.
Prepare and coordinate the fire support plan:
• Prepare the "Fires" portion of the concept of operation
paragraph and the fire support paragraph to the OPORD
Direct and coordinate the preparation of the fire support plan
3 Plan/coordinate employment of fire support assets:
• Recommend organization for combat
• Coordinate and plan the integration of all fire support assets to
support the maneuver plan
• Coordinate with the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) element
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5.
Process and coordinate target attack:
Recommend target attack guidance
Process planned fire support requests
Expedite immediate fire support requests (tactical FSE)
Request target damage assessments
Perform target analysis:
Perform non-nuclear target analysis
Perform nuclear target analysis
Schedule nuclear weapons
Perform toxic chemical target analysis
Employ nuclear weapons:
Plan nuclear weapon employment
Perform post-strike analysis (main FSE)
N. STAFF WEATHER SECTION MISSION TASK LIST
1
.
Provide weather support data and recommendations
2. Prepare climatological studies and analysis
3 Evaluate and disseminate weather data
O. HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT MISSION TASK LIST
1
.
Provide operational control and planning for the HQ:
• Supervise the movement of the HQ main CP
• Supervise the internal arrangement of the HQ main CP
2. Provide essential services:
• Provide food service, medical support, morale, and
supply service to the HQ main CP
• Plan local security for the HQ main CP
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The MCES is a framework for systems planners and analysts to evaluate C2
architectures. It is intended to guide problem specification and analysis, to provide concise
conclusions, and enhance decision making. It is composed graphically of seven sequential
modules and a "Decision Maker" block [Figure D.l, Ref. 2:p. 7]. The following
description is taken in part from Dr. Ricki Sweet, et. al, MCES: Applications of and
Expansion to C3 Architectural Evaluation [Ref. 2:pp. 10-23] and Sweet's subsequent
publications.
B . MCES MODULES
1 . Module 1: Problem Formulation
Module 1 describes the decision maker's objectives and needs for a specific C2
problem. The decisions being formulated, problem assumptions and the level of analysis
required are taken into consideration. As a result, both the appropriate scenarios and
problem scope are made explicit. Thereafter, the precise statement of the problem is used
in the second module to bound the C2 system of interest [Figure D.2, Ref. 2:p. 15]
The objectives of the decision maker posing the problem are addressed from the
standpoint of: (1) the life cycle of the military (C2) system, and (2) the level of analysts
prescribed [Ref 2:p. 11], The decision maker's objectives generally mirror the various
phases of the life cycle of a military system, namely: (1) concept definition and/or





























































Figu MCES Problem Formulation
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analysis is derived from: (1) the mission the system is addressing, (2) the system itself, or
(3) the components of the system or subsystems.
In summary, three steps take place in Module 1: (1) the decision maker's needs,
previously known as applications objectives, are characterized; (2) the problem boundaries
are selected; and (3) the remaining modules are previewed for their potential impact on the




What are the assumptions of the application?
2 . Are the decisions related to planning or implementation?
3 Does the evaluation apply to an individual C2 system or require a comparative
evaluation of several alternatives?
4. What type of analysis of methodology is appropriate?
5 What part of the life cycle of a military system is involved?
6. What mission/service area is involved?
7. What level (system, subsystem, platform, etc.) is the analysis focused upon?
8. What type of measure, i.e., how quantitative, will answer the decision maker's
questions?
9 . Who is the decision maker, and how will he/she use the data?
10. Who is the analyst, and what background must he/she have to properly address the
evaluation?
2. Module 2: C2 System Bounding
Module 2 identifies the relevant system elements that will bound the system of
interest. The primary goal is to delineate the difference between the system being analyzed
and its environment. To bound the C2 system, the analyst should employ the three
component definition, based upon JCS Publication 1, preliminary to the implementation of
this module, of the C2 system. A C2 system consists of: (1) physical entities—equipment,
software, people and their associated facilities; (2) structure—organization, procedures,
concepts of operation and information flow patterns; and (3) (C2) process—the
functionality or "what the system is doing." [Ref. 28 :p. 22]
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Once the system elements of the problem have been identified and categorized as
a result of the deliberations taking place in Module 1 and input into Module 2, the C2
system of interest may be further bounded by relating the "physical entities" and the
"structure" components to the graphic representation of the levels of analysis, using the
"onion skin" graphic model [Figure D.3, Ref. 2:pp 12-13]. In this module, the C2 system,
represented by the hardware and software design specifications, is identified and related to
the environmental C2 stimulus. This relationship is developed in terms of establishing
boundaries to calibrate the system. [Ref. 2:pp.l2-13]
The C2 system statics must be distinguished from the C2 system dynamics, the
"C2 Process." The statics may be taken as the physical entities together with the structure
of what is needed to perform C2. The physical entities include equipment, software,
people, and the facilities that house them. The structure is represented by the arrangement
and interrelationships of physical entities in the form of procedures, protocols, concepts of
operations and information flow patterns.
3. Module 3: C2 Process Definition
After the system is bounded and the system elements identified, the generic C2
process component of the system is identified. Module 3 forces the analyst's attention on:
(1) the environmental "initiator" of the C2 process, which results from a change in the
desired state; (2) the internal C2 process functions (sense, assess, generate, select, plan,
direct); and (3) the input to and output from the internal C2 process and the environment
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Figure D.4. MCES C2 Process Definition
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The C2 Process Definition Module represents the C2 system in several ways:
1
.
The total (end-to-end) process
2. The boundary of the C2 components vis-a-vis the non-C2 force components
3 The structure, especially time and organization (hierarchical) relationships
4 . Internal dynamics
5 Interactions between the C2 system and the environment
6. Information transfer
This definition may help to focus an analysis if several conditions are met,
namely, that it is: (1) understood and agreed upon by the decision maker; (2) considered as
the basic building block for individual entities of the C2 system of interest; (3) measurable
within the bounds of the specified problem; and (4) able to incorporate the functions of all
physical entities included within the system being analyzed.
For distributed C2 systems, three factors affect the overall performance: (1) an
intelligence process aids decision makers throughout the C2 system in forming perceptions
of enemy capabilities and intentions, (2) a separate Crosstell (XTEL) process provides a
way to share information for the purpose of improving the overall picture of the
environment and improving the accuracy of information, and (3) the C2 process is
supported by the two previous processes. In a geographically distributed C2 system, the
separate C2 processes associated with separate command posts will be netted together
through the XTEL process; the intelligence process will be interfaced with some, but not
all, C2 processes. How these processors are interfaced together will be defined by
communications links, protocols and operational procedures. These interfaces may be
taken as fundamental to the architecture of the C2 system, when the term "architecture" is
used to specify the communications support to command and control. [Ref. 2:pp. 70-73]
Another approach in this module may translate the design specifications into a
network model of the C2 system to demonstrate the functionality of the C2 system. When
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applicable to the analysis being conducted, the functional subsets of the C2 process model
should be related to relevant measure is Module 5.
4 . Module 4: Integration of System Elements and Functions
Analysis during Module 4 occurs as: (1) the relationships between the physical
entities and the structure (defined in Module 2) and the staff functions or processes
(described in Module 3) are called out; and then (2) a technique, such as directed graphs,
may be used to model the observables, e.g., information flow, that is used to track these
relationships. Information flows may be conceptually employed to link the separate pro-
cesses into an architecture of the complete C2 system. The term 'architecture" is used in
Module 4 to emphasize the integration of the individual C2 systems—whose physical
entities, structures and functions are coherently related—into a set. The form of the C2
architecture is designed to support an evaluation of the mission effectiveness. The final
form of the architecture will include the process description and the system elements
performing the processes arranged in a structural framework [Figure D.5, Ref. 2:pp. 16-
17]
5. Module 5: Specification of Measures
In Module 5, the analyst specifies the measures necessary to address the problem
of interest in terms of problem, bounding, process and integration. The components of the
C2 system definition may be employed to derive an exhaustive set of relevant measures,
which are then subjected to further scrutiny: (1) comparison with a set of criteria, which
reduces the number to a more manageable set; (2) these are classified as to their level of
measurement—as an alternative, a minimum essential set may be sought rather than an
exhaustive grouping; and (3) the resulting measures are used to determine the value added






























Figure D.5. Integration of Statics and Dynamics
210
The functional subsets of the C2 process model may be related to relevant
measures of performance (MOPs), measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and measures of
force effectiveness (MOFEs). The determination of the boundary helps to identify what
kinds of measures are necessary; for the boundary between the force and the environment,
MOFEs are appropriate. Within the force boundary, MOEs are used. For the subsystem
—
within the boundary of the system—MOPs should be employed. Within the subsystem,
dimensional parameters (DPs) are the relevant descriptive terms. Thereafter, the data
generation module objective may be taken as the analysis of the hardware and software
system specifications against its design parameters [Figure D.6, Ref. l:p. 2-4].
The application directly influences the selection of the measures to be used (and
ultimately the means of specifying those measures). These applications are the phases of
the military life cycle: conceptual, definition, acquisition and operational. The levels of
analyses relate to the focus of the evaluation (i.e., on subsystems, systems or missions).
Guidelines are provided in Module 5 to identify, develop and select measures
that gauge the C2 system's response in directing forces. These measures will provide a
standard for comparison as the underlying architecture of the C2 system is re-configured;
they are directly tied to operational issues relating to the architecture. Table D-l shows the
criteria for evaluation measures that may be compared to a set of desired measures to insure
that the measures are useable [Ref. 2:p. 19].
6 . Module 6: Data Generation
After identifying the measures for functions, the analyst addresses the issue of
how data will be generated. Exercises, simulations, experiments and subjective judgments
are all examples of data generators [Figure D.7]. Although a data generator may be
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Figure D.7. Data Generation
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specified in Module 5. The analyst must consider the following: reproducibility of results,
precision and accuracy, timing of collection, environmental controls, and experimental de-

















Relates to force/system mission
Identifies real differences between alternatives
Can be computed or estimated
Can be assigned numbers or ranked
Relates realistically to the C2 system and
associated uncertainties
Can be defined or derived, independent of
subjective opinion
Relates to acceptable standards and analysis
objectives
Reflects changes in system variables
Reflects those standards required by the analysis
objectives
Is mutually exclusive with respect to other
measures
Is easily understood by the user
7. Module 7: Aggregation of Measures
From Module 6, Data Generation, the analyst obtains values for the specified
measures which will be analyzed in this module [Figure D.8]. Because varying scenarios

























Figure D.8. Aggregation and Interpretation of Measures
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factors in each. Techniques are provided within MCES to aggregate measures in a way that
relates measurement of the C2 response to combat outcome. Next, the issues of measure
causality, sufficiency and independence must be considered. Finally, the analyst must
decide if the decision maker's original queries can be addressed by the MCES analysis.
[Ref. 2:pp. 21-22]
C. DECISION MAKER
The products derived from the MCES analysis are presented to a decision maker.
Generally, there are three courses of action available. First, the results of :he analysis may
be implemented. Second, the decision maker may require a re-iteration of the MCES based
upon the need for further study. Finally, the process may be terminated. The MCES does
not contain a specific decision process. The decision maker's analysis of the MCES
products may be entirely subjective; objective, based upon the numerical values; or any
combination of these. MCES only specifies the framework of the logical evaluation
process. It remains with the decision maker to reach a final conclusion. [Ref. 39:pp. 18]
D. USES
MCES can provide a comprehensive framework for the areas of C2 analysis and
management. MCES clarifies the specification of problems by systematically focusing on
and indentifying the essential characteristics of C2 systems and architectures. MCES
assists analysts to effectively conduct C2 evaluations for the decision maker and operational
user. [Ref. 29:p. 26]]
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DEFINING THE FORWARD DEPLOYED CORPS
A. GENERAL
The corps is the U.S. Army's largest maneuver unit; it is the focal point for fighting
the AirLand Battle. The corps is organized to perform major operational and tactical tasks;
it takes an active part in directing campaigns and fighting battles [Ref. 3:p. 1-1].
Generally, a corps consists of two to five divisions, a combat aviation group, corps
artillery, and a corps support command as well as a large number of separate combat,
combat support, and combat service support units. Based on mission and location, a corps
is normally classified as either contingency or forward deployed [Ref. 31:p. 1-6].
The forward deployed corps exists only in Europe [Ref.31:p. 2-1]. It controls
combined arms forces and maintains those forces in a high state of combat readiness. The
corps has established command relationships, defined missions, assigned areas of
responsibility, and established logistics facilities. It receives some support from the host
nation and is affiliated with units in the United States that are designated for quick
deployment as reinforcements in wartime [Ref. 31:p. 1-6].
B. HIERARCHICAL RELATIONSHIPS
1. Superior
The forward deployed corps is subordinate to the theater army. In West
Germany, the Central Army Group is composed of two U.S. and two German corps.
Each corps has two to five assigned divisions.
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2. Corps Lateral Structure
The peacetime headquarters of the forward deployed corps is structured to
perform normal staff operating functions in the peacetime headquarters building. In
wartime, the demands for coordination of staff effort require that the headquarters be
functionally organized into command posts; these command posts are further subdivided
into functional modules or cells. This reorganization facilitates communication among
those staff elements that must interact frequently. [Ref. 6:pp. 2-10, 2-11]
3. Subordinate
The corps is made up of combat, combat support, and combat service support
units. The commanders of the corps' principal maneuver units (divisions, regiments, and
separate brigades) direct the combat activities of their immediate subordinate maneuver
units. To the greatest extent possible, all routine operations that support the corps are
controlled through staff channels, leaving the maneuver commanders free to direct their
forces. [Ref. 3:p. 3-5]
The combat units of the forward deployed corps are the armored and mechanized
divisions, the armored cavalry regiment, the combat aviation group, the two artillery
brigades, and the engineer brigade. Due to the mobility, firepower, and survivability of the
armored and mechanized divisions, they are best employed where combat will take place
over wide areas. The armored cavalry regiment has both air and armor units which operate
as a combined arms team over a wide area of the battlefield. The combat aviation group
provides an air attack capability in support of the corps mission. The artillery brigades are
designed to suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemy targets. The engineer brigade performs
three battlefield missions: mobility, countermobility, and survivability. [Ref. 31:pp. 1-14 -
1-19]
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The combat support units of the forward deployed corps are the signal brigade,
the military police brigade, the military intelligence group, the chemical brigade, and the
rear area operations center. The signal brigade provides communications-electronics
support for the corps and its major subordinate commands. The military police brigade has
three battlefield missions: battlefield circulation control, area security, and control of enemy
prisoners of war. The military intelligence group: provides all source intelligence products
to the elements of the corps and its subordinate commands; conducts signal intelligence
(SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection
operations; conducts electronic warfare missions; and provides operations security support
to the corps and its subordinate commands. The chemical brigade provides nuclear,
biological, and chemical defense support to the corps and its subordinate commands. The
rear area operations center executes and manages the corps rear battle. [Ref. 31:pp. 1-22 -
1-25]
The corps support command (COSCOM) serves combat service support needs
by providing for personnel, administrative, logistical, and medical needs of the corps [Ref.
45:p. 1-25]. COSCOM's functions are supply, maintenance, manning, transportation,
field services, administration, reconstitution, and rear area protection [Ref. 3:p 7-1].
C . OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
1. Overview
Corps operations generally consist of phases which can be characterized as
offensive or defensive. Our national strategy dictates that the initial phase of operations for
a forward deployed corps will be defensive. The AirLand Battle doctrine provides the
opportunities for commanders to seize the initiative in local defensive actions. Follow-on
operations will be based upon exploitation of these opportunities to support achievement of
the corps campaign plan. [Ref. 31:p 1-3]
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The forward deployed corps fights the major battles of a campaign. The corps
commander directs the tactical operations of subordinate divisions, separate brigades, and
regiments to achieve the operational objectives. The corps integrates the air support from
other services to support these tactical operations. [Ref. 31pp. 1-4 -1-5]
The corps operational concept, whether attacking or defending, is to defeat the
enemy by securing, retaining, and aggressively exercising the initiative. [Ref. 31:p. 3-15]
2. The Three Battles
The corps simultaneously fights three battles. The specific objectives of the rear,
close-in. and deep battles support the objectives of that phase. The objective of the rear is
to retain the corps' freedom of action. The objective of the close-in battle in the offensive
phase is the complete destruction of enemy divisions at the Foward Line of Own Troops
(FLOT); the objective in the defense is to retain terrain and defeat enemy forces. The
objectives of the deep battle in the offense are to deny the enemy freedom of action and to
destroy second echelon divisions; the objectives in the defensive phase are to disrupt the
enemy forward flow at critical times, to alter the enemy commitment plan, and to find
enemy operational echelons. [Ref. 31:p. 1-3]
3. Offense
The primary purpose of offensive operations is to defeat the enemy by disrupting
and destroying both his forces and their support. The corps executes offensive operations
when the commander seizes an opportunity to take the initiative or when the theater army
orders the offensive. These operations are characterized by aggressive initiative on the part
of subordinate combat commanders, by timely shifts in the main effort to seize opportuni-
ties, by momentum, and by the deepest and most rapid destruction of enemy forces
possible. [Ref. 3:pp. 5-1 - 5-3]
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4 . Defense
The forward deployed corps and its allies will be defending at the onset of war
because of our national strategy and the defensive character of our alliances. The
underlying purpose of all defensive operations is to seize the opportunity to change to the
initiative. By simultaneously righting the close-in battle and the follow-on forces, the
forward deployed corps creates opportunities to seize the initiative. The corps commander
must follow Napoleon's concise requirements of the defense:
The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defense,
followed by rapid and audacious attack. [Ref. 3:p 6-1]
The objective of the defense is to create the conditions that allow the corps to
withstand the initial shock of the enemy attack, to halt the enemy forces, to seize the
initiative, and to go on the offensive. [Ref. 3:pp. 6-1 -6-2]
5. Command. Control and Communications Countermeasures
Command, control and communications countermeasures (C3CM) must be fully
integrated into the corps' operations to preserve the capability of effective command and
control. C3CM is the integrated use of operations security, military deception, jamming,
and physical destruction—supported by intelligence—to influence, degrade, or destroy
adversary C3 capabilities and to protect friendly C3 from similar enemy actions. The full
participation of all corps units is required for the C3CM effort. The commander has the
opportunity to seize the initiative and retain it if C3CM efforts are used to disrupt enemy C3
and slow his decision cycle. [Ref. 31:p. 4-28]
D . THE THREAT
1 . Warsaw Pact
The most serious threat to the forward deployed corps is the Soviet heavy
maneuver force. The Soviet principle of heavy maneuver warfare is based on violent,
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sustained, and deep offensive action. Soviet doctrine dictates that mechanized and armored
formations, supported by aviation, artillery, and air defense, must seize the initiative at the
outset of war, penetrate NATO defenses, and then drive decisively and deeply into the rear
areas. [Ref. 3:pp. 2-2 - 2-4]
At the operational level of war, the Soviets aim to defeat the forward deployed
corps throughout the theater of operations. Their operational concept is to attack in force to
such a depth in the entire corps area of operations that defense becomes impossible. To
provide operational leverage in defeating the corps, the Soviet army commander will
introduce second echelon forces and/or operational maneuver groups and deliver nuclear,
biological, or chemical fires. [Ref. 31:pp. 2-1 - 2-2]
The Soviet forces are echeloned in depth to maintain a rapid advance. The army
first echelon is made up of motorized rifle and tank divisions. This echelon will attempt to
attack, penetrate the corps' forward defenses, and neutralize or destroy friendly forces up
to the assigned mission objective. The second echelon contains tank divisions and/or
motorized rifle divisions. It attempts to exploit through the penetration area to its
subsequent objective, the corps reserves. [Ref. 3:p. 2-5]
The Soviet operational maneuver group (OMG) is made up of combined arms
and tank armies; it may be as large as a reinforced maneuver division. When this force is
deployed, it attempts to attack at high speed along a separate axis to seize or destroy deep
objectives. Likely targets for OMG are the corps nuclear weapons, reserve forces,
airfields, key terrain, and/or political and economic centers. The OMG is normally
introduced before the first echelon battle is completed and before the second echelon is
committed. [Ref. 31:p. 2-2]
A major focus of Soviet doctrine is the disruption of the corps rear area activities.
These operations will range from acts of sabotage and assassination to large-scale
223
insertions of airborne or airmobile units as well as an operational maneuver group. Likely
targets of these forces are C2 centers, communications facilities, logistics facilities,
airfields, and reserve forces. These disruptions may be carried out throughout the corps
rear area. [Ref. 3:pp. 2-8 - 2-9]
2 . Nuclear and Chemical Environment
The corps must operate with the knowledge that nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons may be used by the Soviets at any time. In the nuclear environment, the corps
must balance the tactical requirement to mass its forces with the survival requirement to
disperse them. Special efforts must be conducted to conceal or deceive the actual locations
of critical units and facilities. [Ref. 31:pp. 3-40 - 3-43]
Command and control facilities and procedures must be robust enough to
withstand periods of intense communications degradation without major disruption of the
corps' operational momentum. Command posts will have to maintain dispersion and move
frequently to ensure survival. Command and control will have to be maintained even when
some headquarters are destroyed. Redundant C2 facilities are required to maintain
continuity of command. [Ref. 3:pp. 2-19 - 2-20]
3. Electronic Warfare Environment
Soviet radio electronic combat (REC) will pose significant problems for the
corps and its subordinate forces. Soviet REC units collect combat information by
monitoring; once they have located and identified critical radio stations, they will attempt to
deceive or exploit them, disrupt their communications, or destroy them with artillery fire.
[Ref. 3 l:pp. 2-12-2-13]
Defensive electronic warfare efforts will be critical to friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. The communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI)
must be used by all friendly forces to maintain continuity of operations. Frequent
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displacement of corps and divisional CPs will provide certain protection for command
facilities and key personnel. [Ref. 3:pp. 2-21 - 2-23]
E. CORPS COMMANDER AND STAFF
1 . Commander
To effectively fight the corps' battles, the commander must position himself to
command and control his forces. Depending upon the particular circumstances of the
battle, he may choose to command from one of his own CPs, from a division CP, or from
a forward vantage point on the battlefield. The commander must have immediate access to
information throughout the width and depth of the corps area of operations to synchronize
the corps war fighting capability. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-9 - 3-10]
The corps commander must "think" brigades and "fight" divisions. He
anticipates the battle 24 to 96 hours in the future. He influences the battle by dividing the
battlefield, allocating assets, establishing priorities, and synchronizing the AirLand Battle.
The corps commander has the assets to move forces on the battlefield in order to position
them to gain distinct operational or tactical advantage over the enemy. [Ref. 3:p. 2-2]
The commander provides the direction for the corps. He establishes the corps
plan to drive operational and tactical planning throughout the corps. With the support of
his staff, the commander defines the corps mission, sets its objectives, designs the concept
of operation, communicates his intent, assigns missions, and allocates the resources for
those missions. [Ref. 31:pp. 4-5 - 4-7]
Clearly one of the primary purposes of the corps command and control system is
to support the commander in the exercise of command. While each commander uses his
own command style, all commanders must perform the critical functions shown in Table 27
[Ref. 6:pp. F-2 - F-3].
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2. staff
Common functions of the corps staff are to obtain and provide information, to
estimate and anticipate the situation, to recommend courses of action, to prepare plans and
orders, to supervise execution, and to coordinate operations. (Specific staff functions are
detailed in Mission Task Lists found in Appendix C). The corps staff must be capable of:
continuous operations; operating from multiple sites and during displacements; continuous
communications with higher and lower forces; timely reception, analysis, and presentation
of information that is critical to the commander; simultaneous conduct of current tactical
operations, planning for future operations, and long-term force support tasks; and effective
liaison with other services, allied forces, and adjacent corps. [Ref. 3:p. 3-8]
TABLE 27
MISSION TASK LIST: CORPS COMMANDER
4.
Know the situation: 5.
• See the battlefield
• Define mission
Make decisions:
• Provide commander's intent
• Request necessary augmentation
Assign missions:
• Design concept of operations 6
.
• Apply imperatives of combat
Allocate means:
• Employ augmentation force
• Weight main effort 7
• Delegate authority
• Fight the deep battle
Direct the force:
• Synchronize force efforts
• Fight the deep battle
• Concentrate/shift combat powers
• Maintain momentum
• Commit reserve
• Deceive the enemy
Maintain the force:
• Direct combat service support priorities
• Protect the force
• Establish reconstitution priorities
Motivate the force:




The commander requires assistance to assimilate the information provided
through the corps command and control system. He needs support to filter available
information, demand more when the picture of the situation is not complete, analyze
pertinent facts, and communicate decisions to the many people that must thoroughly
understand the commander's intent. The staff directs and coordinates execution of the
commander's intent by providing the necessary control of the battle. Table 28 shows those
critical functions performed by the staff [Ref. 6:p. F-8]. (Appendix C specifies those tasks
completed by each staff section in the corps CP.)
3 . Information Flow Patterns
Information to support the commander's decision making process lies at the heart
of the command and control process. Controlling the information in the corps headquarters
is a critical task. Procedures must be fully defined to ensure effective control, flow, and
processing of the overwhelming volume of information. Positive control of information
must be maintained despite the fact that the corps CPs are large, support many concurrent
functions, and are frequently spread over a sizable geographic area. [Ref. 31:pp. 4-36 - 4-
39]
All information in the corps command posts must be evaluated for accuracy and
processed according to consistent guidelines. Unncessary information should be
eliminated. Command and control personnel should have easy access to information.
Important information should be retained in its original form. All information should be
protected against the effects of combat. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-36 - 3-40]
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TABLE 28.
COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPS STAFF
1
.
Implement and monitor commander's decision and concepts




6 . Collate and analyze information
7. Make estimates
8 Prepare plans and orders
9 . Diss^^^ate information
10. Maintain current situation status
1 1 Develop plans based on missions
12. Communicate plans and orders
1 3 Ensure units are organized and equipped for combat
14. Implement and update necessary plans and orders
15. Supervise forces/operations to ensure compliance with
commander's concept and decisions
1 6. Analyze and evaluate enemy capabilities
17. Defend against NBC attack
18. Defend against enemy's EW
F. COMMAND POSTS
1. Overview
The corps command post (CP) concept is based on the commander exercising
personal control of the battle by using a small, highly trained staff. The commander plays
the central role. The purpose of the CPs throughout the corps is to support the commander
by providing a structural framework to facilitate his decision making. The staff provides
the information and coordination so that the commander can synchronize the deep, close-in,
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and rear battles. To support the commander throughout the corps area, the headquarters is
normally divided into three command posts: tactical CP, main CP, and rear CP. [Ref. 6:p.
2-1]
The physical and electronic signatures of all corps CPs must be minimized
consistent with mission responsibilities. Radios and other emission devices should be
remoted from the CPs so that signatures emanate at a distance. Physical and infrared
signatures should be reduced or eliminated by siting the CPs in built-up areas. Vehicles,
helicopters, and personnel movement must be carefully controlled in the vicinity of all
corps command posts. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-30 - 3-31]
2. Tactical Command Post
The orientation of the TAC CP is more limited in scope than that of the main CP.
With the focus on the close-in fight, the deep and rear battles are monitored only for then-
impact on FLOT operations. Planning is narrower in scope and has a shorter timeline
—
normally only about 24 hours. Because detailed planning and coordination to sustain
operations are conducted at the main CP, the TAC CP is small and mobile. Housed in
M577 CP vehicles or wheeled vehicles, the TAC CP can operate in a mobile configuration
or be dismounted to take advantage of hardened structures. Design of this CP retains 100
percent mobility. The total personnel assigned to the TAC CP should be limited to 100 to
120. This CP relies on mobility and use of terrain and man-made structures for hardening.
The physical and electronic signatures should be minimized, and displacements should be
planned every 12 to 24 hours. [Ref. 3:pp. 3-24 - 3-25]
The organization of the TAC CP is simpler and more flexible because of the
narrower scope. Despite this, a functional organization like that used in the main CP
should be used. Command, current operations, intelligence, fire support, logistics, and
signal support cells are required. Operation of the TAC CP is normally the responsibility
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of either the deputy corps commander or the G3. The functions and organizational
structure of the TAC CP are presented in Table 29 [Ref. 3:pp. 3-24 - 3-25].
TABLE 29
THE TACTICAL COMMAND POST
Functions:
1 . Fight the close-in battle.
Develop combat intelligence of








Air liaison team (USAF)
4. Fire support team









4. Coordinate engineer activities.
5 . Control and coordinate
immediately available fire support.
6 Monitor the deep and rear battles.





9 . Coordinate airspace and forward
Air Defense Artillery (ADA)
operations.
10. Communicate Combat Service
Support (CSS) requirements to the
main CP.
3 . Main Command Post
The main CP directs the C2 system and synchronizes the battle. This CP has a
broader orientation and is more forward looking than the other CPs. During this decade the
main CP has been reduced in size, partially because of a shift of resources to the TAC CP
and partially in recognition of the need to reduce the physical signature. The main CPs
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have moved farther to the rear to enhance survivability and to lessen the need to displace
frequently. The main CP is 60 to 70 percent mobile, but requires considerable time to
displace. The size reduction combined with mobility efforts makes main CPs easier to
move. While equipment is provided to operate the CPs in a mobile configuration, the main
CP is frequently dismounted to provide increased shelter and space when the situation
permits. Dismounting normally increases the time required for displacement. [Ref. 3:pp.
3-26 - 3-28]
Because of the size of the main CP, it must be functionally organized to facilitate
staff communication nd interaction. Multi-disciplined modules are created to enhance
speed and coordination as well as reduce reliance on electronic means of communication for
information exchange. Modules required include command, current operations, plans,
intelligence, fire support, administrative/logistics, signal support, and CP support
(headquarters company). The functions and organizational structure of the main CP are
presented in Table 30 [Ref. 3:pp. 3-26 - 3-28].
4. Rear Command Post
Although the rear CP's primary function is sustaining the battle, it must also
conduct and control rear area operations. This function entails planning for the rear battle,
intelligence preparation of the rear area, terrain management in the corps rear, traffic
control, and overall C2 for all administrative and logistic support that takes place in the
rear. The rear CP must be prepared to serve as the main CP until the main CP is restored
after attack or destruction. [Ref. 3:p. 3-28]
The rear CP consists of the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) and members
of the coordinating and special staffs. The commander delegates responsibility for






Fight the deep battle.
2 . Monitor the close-in battle.
3 Monitor the rear battle.
4. Coordinate and allocate resources
to sustain the three battles.
5 . Plan future deep, close-in and rear
battle actions.
6 Collate information for the
commander.
7 . Provide reports to higher
headquarters.
8 Provide a focal point for the
development of all-source
intelligence.
9 Coordinate requirements for
rear protection.







• Commander and Chief of Staff
2. Administrative and personnel sections
• Gl Operations and plans
• Provost Marshall
3 Operations section




4 . CTOC Support Element (CTOCSE)
• Collection, management and
dissemination section
• Intelligence production section
• Imagery interpretation section
5 . Logistics section
• G4 operations and plans
• Transportation section
6 Civil-military operations section
• G5 cell
7 . Fire support element
• Artillery, tactical air, naval gunfire
coordination elements
8 Air space management element
• ADA and aviation representatives
9 . Engineer element
10. Communications center
11. Support troops
• Signal, military police, aviation,




1 3 Headquarters commandant
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TABLE 31
THE REAR COMMAND POST
Functions: CTganization of Personnel:
1. Fight the rear battle. 1. Command cell
• Deputy corps commander assisted by
deputy chief of staff
2. Monitor and support the deep
and close-in battles.
2. Gl administrative cell
3. Monitor and control all rear area
protection efforts.
3. G4
• Logistics, field service and
transportation cells
4. Keep the commander and staff
informed.
4. G5
5. Provide combat service support
(CSS) functions.
5. Provost marshall
6. Monitor counterintelligence and
prisoner of war interrogation.
6. Staffjudge advocate
7. Monitor military police and 7. Chaplain
provost marshall activities.
Provide airlift support information 8 . Public affairs office
and coordination.
Sustain the three battles. 9 . Inspector general
10. Adjutant general
• Corps personnel operations center
commander, the COSCOM commander or a separate brigade commander. The functions
and organizational structure of the Rear CP are presented in Table 31. [Ref. 3:p. 3-28]
G. COMMUNICATIONS
1. Corps
The corps signal brigade is responsible for the installation, operation, and
maintenance of reliable, responsive, and redundant communications to all its major
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subordinate commands as well as to other selected combat and combat support commands
within the corps area of operations. As corps communications-electronics (C-E) officer,
the signal brigade commander advises the corps commander on all signal matters and
exercises technical supervision over all C-E activities. The signal brigade employs a variety
of communications means to support the corps. These means are: multichannel radio, FM
retransmission, radio/landline teletypewriter, cable/wire, facsimile, and air/motor
messenger service. [Ref. 6:pp. 4-16 - 4-20]
The corps area of operations is extensive. For a fully manned, forward
deployed corps, the number of nondivisional troops in this area is approximately 120,000.
The corps signal brigade has more than 5,000 personnel, 1,300 vehicles, 500 shelter-
housed signal assemblages, and over 2,600 kilometers of wire and cable. It supports about
150 battalion-sized units spread over diverse terrain. The environment of the corps signal
brigade includes enemy activity, electronic warfare, and the dynamics of the integrated
battlefield. [Ref. 3:p. C-l]
2. External Interfaces
Corps communications are unique because the corps is the interface between
theater and tactical communications systems. In the European theater, theater
communications are provided to the corps by the Army theater communications command.
This provides the corps access to Department of Defense (DOD) systems, including the
Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), the Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON), the
Automatic Secure Voice Communications System (AUTOSEVCOM), and the Worldwide
Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). [Ref. 3:p. C-3]
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